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SUMMARY 
The thesis ~eports the results of an exploratory study. designed to 
examine and clarify the concept and practice of project financing 
within, the U.K. banking industry and with particular reference to the 
petroleum and minerals industries. 
The specific objectives of the research were: 
(a) To determine exactly what is meant by the term project financing 
(b) To identify the motives of both borrowers and banks in using 
project financing 
(c) To examine and assess the practices of banks when evaluating 
and arranging project financing deals. 
After a review of the relevant literature tlventy-s8ven banks were 
visi ted. Senior bankers involved in project financing 'tlere interviewed 
using a 'focused' interview approach. An interview guide consisting 
of a series of topic headings covering all aspects of project financing 
"/as used. This allowed considerable freedom to develop and probe 
certain points where appropriate. 
. . ~ 
The thesis is arranged in three parts. Part,'·! is concerned with the 
:-'~'.: - ... , .. ,' 
project finance market and dearsw'ith' the "def:iriition and concept of 
project financing; the history and reasons for gro"/th; and the roles 
and participants in project financing. Part II is an examination of 
the practices of banks when arranging project finance. It covers the 
--------
ii 
processes of identifying. measuring and controlling project risks. 
using as a framework the concept of ri~k analysis. In addition' 
sources of finance and the pricing of loans are also covered. Part III 
presents some general findings regarding future developments in project 
financing. and areas for further research are identified. 
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PART I 
THE PROJECT FINANCE MARKET 
------------ -----
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CHAPTER 1 
- INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter sets out the general purpose of the thesis. It states 
the objectives of the work, the approach adopted and some of the 
limitations of this approach. 
-1.1 GENERAL PURPOSE 
The general purpose of this research was to investigate the concept 
and practice of project financing within the U.K. banking industry. 
Specifically, the research work had the following objectives: 
1. To determine exactly what is meant by the term project financing. 
2. To identify the motives of both borrowers and lenders in using 
project financing. 
3. To examine and assess the practices of banks when arranging 
project financing. 
Of these objectives the third was considered to be the most important. 
The initial motivation for the work derived from the increasing 
coverage which 'project financing' has received in recent years in 
various journals. While the phrase project financing has appeared 
at regular intervals it is discussed at a relatively superficial 
level. A need was therefore perceived for an exploratory study, 
-designed to examine and clarify the concept and practice of project 
financing in some depth. 
-- - ---------------
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1.2 SCOPE OF THE ENQUIRY 
The subject was approached from the position of banks located in the 
U.K •• rather than from the viewpoint of the borrower. Banks located 
in Europe or the U.S.A. were excluded as time was limited and the 
problems and expense of visiting them would have been prohibitive. 
The study was not limited to project financing in any particular 
1 industries ,the only requirement was that the financing was 
arranged by banks located in the U.K. The nature of the subject 
dictated. however. that the research concentrated only on hydrocarbon 
and mineral projects. Moreover. it was found that U.K. based banks 
were more involved with hydrocarbon than mineral projects and so the 
bias of the research tended to be towards project financing in the 
petroleum industry. 2 
It was also considered to be too restrictive to examine only. say. 
project financing in the North Sea, or in developed countries in view 
of the newness of tne subject and the fact that the general practices 
of banks are similar in all projects regardless of location or 
industry. Therefore no geographical limits were placed on the loca-
tion of proj ects.-
1 .3 REVIEH OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
A major aim of the work was to review all of the available literature 
on project financing and the related areas of financing the petroleum 
and minerals industries. 
~-~~---~-
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Project financing has only recently been the subject of any writing 
and most of the literature cited dates from 1970 onwards. A few of 
the references from the 1950's and relating to production payment 
financing of the Texan oil,fields were also examined since this was 
the real birth-place of project financing. An extensive survey of 
this literature was not. however. undertaken as the articles could 
add very little to the main objective of the research which was a 
survey of current practices in the U.K. 
A major problem in the, literature search was the diverse nature of 
the sources of reference. The subject cove>;S'several fields including 
economics. management. banking. finance and petroleum and mining 
engineering. Most of the references took the form of journal articles 
and there are very few books on the subject - the two most important 
being White (1) and Nevitt (2). However. White's book is concerned 
with financing the petroleum industry in general. and Nevitt con-
cent rated mainly on' the use of leasing and . covered 
ing in the U.S.A. 
project financ-
The only significant prior research discovered was by Wynant (3). 
This can be distinguished from the present work in that it 
was restricted to the mining industry in the U.S.A. and examined the 
subj ect from the borrower's vie.'point. The main focus of his work 
Was also on the balance sheet aspects of project financing. 
1.4 METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
It was found that the literature on project financing raised more 
questions than it answered and the second stage of the research was 
- -------------
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designed to clarify and substantiate some of the issues raised. 
1.4.1 Methodology 
Leedy (4) described four basic types of research methodology: 
i) The historical method 
ii) The analytical method 
iii) The experimental method 
iv) The descriptive survey method 
i) The historical method - This relies on data derived from 
documentary evidence, and in particular on primary data. 
Certain parts of this research did involve the use of document-
ary evidence, particularly as regards the illustrative case 
studies of project 'financing that are given as appendices. 
ii) The analytical method - The objective here is to collect, data 
that are essentially quantitative in nature and then to analyse 
the data using analytical techniques. The researcher is primarily 
concerned with the testing of a statistically based hypothesis. 
This methodology was considered inappropriate for this research 
which aimed to establish practices, for which numerical data are 
not available. 
iii) The experimental method - The essential characteristic here is 
an attempt to control the research situation except for those 
variables under study. Clearly this methodology would have been 
inappropriate. 
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iv) The descriptive survey method - The essential characteristic 
of this methodology is to observe and record what is seen, 
using techniques such as interviews, questionnaires etc. This 
was the methodology adopted for the bulk of the research. 
3 It appears to be widely accepted that academic research need not 
necessarily consist of the formulation and testing of hypotheses or 
the use of quantitative techniques. Selltiz (5), for example, stated: 
" •.•.•• we may think of research purposes as falling 
into a number of broad groupings: 
(1) to gain familiarity with a phenomenon or to achieve 
new insights into it, often in order to formulate a more 
precise research problem or to develop hypotheses: (2) to 
portray accurately the characteristics of a particular 
individual, situation, or group (with or without specific 
initial hypotheses about the nature of these characteristics): 
(3) to determine the frequency with which something occurs 
or with which it is associated with something else (usually 
but not always, with a special initial hypothesis): (4) to 
test a hypothesis of a causal relationship between variables." 
This research really falls within the second category. 
Similarly Moser (6) has argued that survey research need not use 
quantitative techniques: 
"Analysis of survey material does not necessarily have to 
be statistical. To the extent that interest centres on 
the individual case rather than on the characteristics of 
the aggregate, non-quantitative methods of analysiS and 
evaluation may be preferred: and, even in surveys concerned 
chiefly with aggregates, non quantitative methods can play 
an important part." 
In view of the fact that the work represented one of the first pieces 
of academic \·/Ork relating to the practice of international bank lending 
-6-
and certainly the first on project financing in the U.K., it was 
decided to adopt a pragmatic and qualitative approach rather than to 
attempt a quantitative or theoretical analysis. 
1.4.2 Techniques 
Within the descriptive survey method, several techniques may be used. 
This research made .use of ~hat Moser (6) p.298 termed the guided or 
focused interview. This, he said, is a situation " •••.• in which the 
interviewer, whilst allowing the respondent a good deal of freedom, 
aims to cover a given set of topics in a more or less systematic way". 
An interview guide consisting of-; series of topic headings together 
with a few open-ended questions, was drawn up from some of the issues 
raised in the literature. While all of the interviews covered the 
basic topics, the emphasis of the interview varied depending on the 
bank being interviewed, and if the intervie~lee raised a novel point 
this was explored in more depth. 
other techniques were considered but subsequently rejected. The first 
alternative was to use a formal questionnaire requiring either 'yes/ 
no' type answers. or some form of open-ended but pre-coded answers. 
-7-
Both of these approaches have the advantage over the focused interview 
that they permit quantification and statistically significant results 
to be obtained. However, the questionnaire was rejected in favour 
of the focused interview for the following reasons: 
(i) It was not possible to define the total 'population' of banks 
involved in project financing and therefore a statistically 
acceptable sample could not be obtained. 
(ii) Different banks are involved in different segments in the 
market and so the population is not homogeneous. Some banks 
act as advisors, some as lenders and some as both. 
(iii) Every project financing has unique objectives and problems and 
while it was at first hoped·· to produce, for example, some 
measure of the. frequency with which certain types of security 
were used, it was soon realised that such generalisations would 
not be particularly meaningful 4 and that the bankers would 
not be prepared to make unqualified generalisations. 
(iv) Project financing appears to be an example of what Simon (7) 
has termed a 'non programmed decision', characterised by multiple 
conflicting and non-quantifiable objectives and no clear metric 
for achieving an optimum or satisfactory solution. This suggested 
further that the subject was not capable of being analysed in 
a statistical manner. 
It was considered that the focused interview approach WeS more appro-
priate for an exploratory study particularly because: 
(i) It gave considerable flexibility to the interview, enabling 
both questions and answers to be clarified where necessary, 
as well as permitting deeper probing into certain answers. 
---------
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(ii) It enabled the interviewee to qualify his answers and discuss 
specific situations to a degree which would not have been 
possible using a formal questionnaire. This was considered 
particularly important as it was felt that the cooperation of 
the interviewees would have been lost if they had been asked to 
answer in an over simplified way. As Merton et al (B) said 
" it allows his (the interviewe~s) responses to be placed 
in their, proper context rather than forced into a frame,"ork 
which the interviewer considers appropriate". 
Naturally, exploratory research work using the focused interview has 
certain limitations. In particular, it must be emphasised that 
statements of exactness cannot be' made, and the ability to make valid 
generalisations is limited. Where possible however, statements and 
conclusions are made in terms of 'trends' or 'tendencies' in order to 
avoid being too dogmatic. The work also outlines the techniques and 
'tools of the trade' which can be applied if appropriate in particular 
situations, as well as giving some indications as to the situations 
in which bankers considered these 'tools' to be appropriate. 
In order to respect a frequently expressed desire for confidentiality, 
it proved impossible to attribute the various statements and opinions 
contained in this thesis to particular banks or individuals. This was 
not thought to detract from the usefulness of the findings; revealing 
the name of the organisation making the statement would add very little. 
Where differences in opi'nion appeared to be related to the type of bank 
(eg merchant or commercial) this fact is noted, however. 
Another approach to the research that was considered is the use of case 
studies. This was rejected for the following reasons: 
---- - - -~------
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(i) Case studies would seem to serve only as illustrations of the 
application of techniques in a specific situation and this is 
only appropriate if there is a pre-existing framework which 
describes the processes in more general terms. In the case of 
project financing the practices were not already clearly 
described, indeed that was the objective of this research. To 
have done this and included case studies would have made the 
thesis too long. 
(ii) Each project is unique and so to satisfactorily cover the practice 
of project financing several case studies would have been necessary 
- eg perhaps an oil extraction project, a refinery, a mine, and a 
pipeline. 
(iii) Considerable problems were--·';;nvisaged in obtaining permission to use 
highly confidential information. Certainly no bank was willing to 
allow confidential material to be used in the thesis and it was also 
doubted whether borrowers would have given their permission either. 
As a compromise to the use of full case studies two things were done. 
Firstly, illustrative case studies are included as appendices. These 
are not .• true' case studies produced from first hand information, but 
they are intended to give an outline of the structure of some project 
financings. All of the information was obtained from· non-confidential, 
but reliable, published sources including in particular documents lodged 
at the Companies Registration Office. Naturally, this meant that the 
choice of the cases and the nature of the information disclosed were 
determined by the availability of published information. 
Secondly, two banks allowed me to study all of their files and the 
documentation relating to eight recent project financings. This was 
done on the understanding that no specific information relating to these 
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projects would be disclosed in this thesis. The objective in 
examining this information was rather to obtain a complete picture 
of the information provided and the documentation used which could 
be used as a framework when writing the thesis. 
1.5 SURVEY SAMPLE 
A total of 27 banks were visited during the course of the research. 
Appendix I lists these banks according to the type of institution. The 
banks were identified in a rather ad hoc manner as no source is 
available which lists all of the banks engaged in 'project financing. 
The following sources were used to identify the banks: 
1. Published articles on project financing 
2. 'Tombstones' of known project financings 
3. Bank advertisements listing project financing among the services 
offered 
4. Suggestions by other banks. 
It is thought that all of the main banks active in project financing 
in the U.K. were identified by this process and that the findings. though 
not quantitative, give a representative view of the project financing 
market. Most banks interviewed had acted as advisors or lead managers 
rather than simply as participants5 , as the main objective of the 
research was to examine the practice of banks in arranging project 
finance. However, two of the banks interviewed had only acted'as lenders 
to date;, although it was known that they would be or hoped to be acting 
as lead managers in the near future. 
The appointments were arranged by telephone since this was thought 
to be a more effective way of making contact with the right person 
~------~--
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than letter writing. given that the name of the person or his job 
title was not known in advance. Interviews were generally conducted 
with_senior bankers who were actively involved in project financing. 
Usually only one person in each organisation was interviewed although 
in four cases interviews were held with two or more bankers. 
None of the banks which were approached declined to be interviewed 
and all of the bankers had a very helpful attitude. devoting a 
considerable amount of time to ansl"ering my questions. The interview 
lasted between 45 minutes and 2~ hours. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The thesis has been arranged in three parts. Part I is concerned with 
the project finance market and deals with the definition and concept 
of project finance; the history and reasons for growth; and the roles 
and participants in project financing. Part 11 is an examination of the 
practices of banks when arranging project finance. Risk analysis is 
used as a framework for the non-financial practices and there is also 
a chapter on the sources of finance. Part III presents some general 
findings regarding future developments in project financing and 
suggestions for-further research. 
---------
----- ---------
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
1. Unlike WYNANt (3) who restricted his work to the mining industries. 
2. Throughout this thesis, the words 'petroleum' and 'hydrocarbon' 
are used to cover both oil and gas projects, while the terms 
'minerals' and 'mining' refer to the various hard minerals such 
as bauxite, aluminium. copper, coal etc. 
3. See for example: SELLTIZ, C. et al, (5) p.50; MOSER, C.A. (6) p.4; 
and MURDICK. R. G. "Business Research: Concept and Practice" 
pp.61-2. ,f{1'I'If",A1;o«I}L fGf.r Book ,6",. 196/i. 
4. For example, the "completion guarantee" is one type of security 
used in project financing, but it is not a homogeneous instrument 
and the strength of terms and conditions vary from project .to 
project. Moreover in certain cases a completion guarantee is not 
taken, but other commitments are obtained which provide equivalent 
securi ty,' 
5. See section 4.2 for details of these roles. 
--- -_._--_. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROJECT FINANCING - DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
'Project financing' has been heralded as a novel approach to financing 
by many authors. The aim of this chapter is to examine what is meant 
by the term project financing and what distinguishes it from more 
conventional financing. 
2.2 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Unfortunately. a universally accepted definition of project financing 
which is simple. clear and concise. does not seem to exist. and even 
today 'project financing' can mean different things to different 
people. For example, several U.K. merchant banks have established 
'project Finance' departments but when three of these banks were 
approached it was found that they engaged in little or, in some cases, 
no project financing as we shall define it. These banks had, it 
appeared, simply re-named their old Export Credit departments, Project 
Finance departments and changed little else." Whilo export credits 
are used to finance projects, and indeed may be a constituent part 
of a 'project financing', the activities of these banks ~not con-
sidered to fall within the more generally accepted definition of 
project financing and so were excluded from this thesis. 
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2.2.1 Project 
The World Bank definition of a project is "a proposal for a capital 
investment to develop facilities to provide goods and services" (1). 
This is a very broad definition and can cover any capital investment, 
large or small. 'True' project financing, tends to pre-
dominate in the energy e~d natural resources industries since it is 
only in these industries that there is both a need for such arrange-
ments and 'bankab le' proj ect s. . 
The broad areas in which project finance is used include: 
(i) Extraction of hydrocarbon and mineral substances 
(ii) Processing plants - .e.g. LNG plants, oil refineri8s, aluminium 
smelters etc 
(iii) Certain transportation facilities - e.g. pipelines 1 
A more comprehensive list of projects where project financing is kno'Jn to 
have been used is given in Appendix II. 
The main characteristics of these projects are therefor8: 
(i) Size and technological complexity. 
(ii) Physical facilities which can be operated as an integral unit 
and can be considered separately from the other activities of 
the company or group developing them • 
. (ii1) Although they may involve a large expansion of an existing facility, 
they usually entail a start-up operation. (This thesis does not 
consider the use of project financing techniques for the acquisi-
tion of existing projects or companies.) 
(iv) They are commercially viable undertakings rather than infra-
\"'1 
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structure developments or social welfare projects (such as 
housing. roads etc). '. 
The projects may be located in either developed countries (i.e. DEeD 
countries), or less developed countries. Also for the purpose of the 
thes'is most projects located in the U.S.A. are excluded, although this 
isa very large market, since these financings would not normally be 
arranged or financed by U.K. based banks. Two major markets for 
project financings have been the North Sea and Australia, but U.K. based 
banks were found to have arranged and financed projects in Latin America, 
Europe and the Far East. 
2.2.2 Financing 
The term 'finance' can cover a variety of different types of facility 
ranging from eurocurrency loons, through export credits' to special 
arrangeme.nts such as advance payments and production payments which are 
specifically designed to avoid a borrower/lender relationship. 
2.2.3 Project Financing 
Perhaps the best definition of project financing found in the 
li terature was given by Wynant (2):' 
"A financing of a major economic opportunity which the 
sponsor(s) has segregated from the assets and general 
purpose obligations of the company. The project borrowings 
are typically secured by assets and repaid by the cash 
flow of the project itself, and may be supported by 
undertakings from the sponsoring companies and other 
third parties". 
The essential characteristics of project financing would therefore 
seem to be: 
(i) The project is treated as a separate entity from the sponsor. 
(ii) The loans are expected to be repaid from project cash flow and 
repayment schedules are matched to expected cash flow so as to 
isolate the project from the rest of the project sponsor's 
operations. 
(iii) Some or possibly all of the project risks may be transferred to 
third parties (purchasers. governments or lenders). 
An important distinction, that has been made is between 'Project 
Financing' and 'financing of projects'. It is now generally agreed 
that if the financing scheme is relatively straightforward and if it 
is exclusively or primarily based on the direct and full credit of a 
sponsor government or company, it does not qualify as project financing. 
O'Brien (3) for example. argued that: 
"Essentially the dividing line between project financing 
,and merely financing a project is that in the former 
instance the lender's security is not purely the sponsor's 
guarantee. whereas for financing a project the loan can be 
no more complicated than a straight commercial loan with 
full,'sponsor guarantee." 
Examples cf 'financing of projects' are Shell's loans for the development 
of the Ounlin. Brent and Cormorant fields in the North Sea. and the 
numerous loans to Sonatrach for its Algerian gas fields and related 
facilities. While these loans are intended for the development of a 
particular project. they are backed by the full faith and credit of the 
sponsor. Such situations were excluded from this research. 
" 
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Wynant deliberately made his definition broad so as to cover numerous 
different situations and this was found to be the case in practice. 
In particular it becdme apparent from the literature on project financing 
that the term was being used to cover two main types of activity both 
of which fell within the definition given above. This was confirmed in 
subsequent interviews. 
The first type of activity. generally emphasised by merchant banks. 
involved financial advice and was primarily concerned with structuring 
a package comprising multiple sources of finance2 • 
The second activity covered by the term 'Project Financing', and 
. ,.--"' 
involving primarily commercial banks. was lending. and in particular 
eurocurrency lending in which recourse to the sponsor was to some 
extent limited and where the lenders themselves were shouldering some 
(or all) of the project risk3 • 
Of course, the above distinction is not absolut~ since in certain 
circumstances a project with multiple sources of finance may have 
as one component a eurocurrency loan in which-lenders shoulder some 
project risks (e.g. INCO Soroako project)4. Moreover. the results 
of the interviews with commercial banks suggested that they will. in 
the future. increasingly seek advisory roles in addition to their 
eurocurrency lending activities. For these reasons the research 
-----._- ---
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sought to examine both types of activity. However, in view of the 
fact that the advisory role arises less frequently than·the lending 
rol~ the thesis tends to concentrate more on the' eurocurrency lending 
aspects of project financing. 
In addition to the above distinction, it was also found that the 
permutations in project financing were endless. The following 
situations fall within the definition of project financing: 
(il Finance arranged for the whole of the project facilities (eg B.P.'s 
Forties loan)· or for only part of the project (e.g. The Trans-
Tunisian pipeline loan which finances only the Tunisian section 
of a pipeline running from Algeria to Northern Italy) . 
. (ii) Finance provided.to a consortium of companies borrowing as a 
group (e.g. the Ekofisk pipeline consortium) or for only one 
participant in the project (e.g. the finance for ~Joodside' s 
50% shar~ of the North West Shelf projectr. 
The manner in which the project risks are shared between the project 
sponsor, lenders and third parties is also subject to wide variation 
between projects 6 . 
2.3 CONCEPT OF PROJECT FINANCING 
The concept of project financing and the distinction between project 
financing and traditional corporate financing can be examined from 
the viewpoint of either the bank or the borrower. The following 
discussion examines the subject from the bank's viewpoint only. 
Moreover, this discussion only relates to eurocurrency lending rather 
than the advisory aspects of project financing. 
-71 
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Deverell (4) argued that: "The fundamental difference between project 
finance and more traditional balance sheet lending is not (therefore) 
one of basic philosophies but more one of approach". This view was also 
supported by Bulfield (5). 
Certainly, in both cases lenders seek to ensure that there will be 
adequate cash flow with which to repay the loan in accordance with 
some pre-arranged repayment schedule. Equally, both involve lending 
rather than equity investments (such as venture capital); the latter 
being characterised by large potential gains from dividends and capital 
gains, but also high uncertainty as regards income, capital growth and 
recovery of principal. Al though a .. few project financings have involved 
the payment of royalties (which are a form of equity return), project 
financing banks do not act ·as venture capitalists. It became apparent 
however, both from the literature and from interviews. that there are 
certain differences in approach between traditional balance sheet lending 
and project financing. These may be summarised as follows: 
1) Focus of Appraisal 
In project financing the lender looks forward rather than 
at previous performance. Indeed. by definition project financ-
ing involves a start-up situation where there will be no previous 
track record. To some extent this is an extension of a trend 
in traditional lending rather than a distinction. In recent 
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years bankers have increasingly stressed the 'going concern' 
approach which is forward looking,as opposed to the 'gone 
concern' concept which relates the forced sale value of the 
company's assets to its liabilities '7. Even when using the 
going concern approach,however, bankers do. look at the past 
,performance of, companies as reflected in their balance sheets. 
In project, financing there are no pre-existing balance sheets 
for the project and,the banker has to rely entirely on future 
projections • 
.2,) Nature of Risk Analysis 
In traditional 'lending,banks are primarily concerned with 
evaluating the corporate credit risk to ascertain the overall 
ability of the company to repay. Certain established lendin'g 
criteria such as the gearing ratio, current assets ratio ete 
are used in this evaluation, and if cash flow forecasts are 
provided they will relate to the company as a whole. 
In project financing the lenders are primarily concerned with 
the viability of the project and with an evaluation of project 
risks. A cash flow forecast for the project is of fundamental 
importance. The traditional lending criteria such as gearing 
-are not considered fundamental to project financing and are 
replaced by ,an assessment of the adequacy of project cash flow 
in relation to debt service., 
3 ) Prirnary Source of Repayment 
In traditional corporate lending the company itself is liable 
as principal debtor and any security taken is accessory. In 
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the case of a project finance loan the project is effectively 
the principal debtor and any guarantee or undertaking given 
by the project sponsor is accessory. It will only be relied 
·upon if the primary source of repayment is inadequate. Thus 
while the corporate credit risk is of prime importance with 
tradi tional lending it is only a collateral risk in project 
financing. 
4) Nature and Extent of Risks taken by Lenders 
In traditional lending,banks shoulder none of the technical 
risks of a particular project: their only exposure being to 
a corporate credit risk. In project financing lenders may 
assume some, if not all, of the project risks. Whether the 
total riskiness of the loan is greater in project financing 
than in traditional lending is a matter for some debate but 
many bankers interviewed considered project financing more 
risky·8. 
5) Degree of Complexity 
Traditional lending usually involves a straightforward 
borrower/lender relationship with relatively standardised 
documentation. Project financings take far longer to arrange: 
they may have complex structures to satisfy certain objectives 
of the borrower and they typically involve several parties 
including purchasers, suppliers and host governments in order 
to create a viable financing. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. Some authors also include the financing of ships in their 
definition of project financing. In some ways this is valid 
since some ship owners are small independent companies owning 
only one or two ships. In the past it was possible to 
distinguish tanker financing from project financing since the 
former was based primarily on the second hand value of the ship. 
whereas project financings are concerned with cash flows. Since 
the collapse of the tanker market, however, banks have apparently 
looked more closely at the cash flow generated by the ship and 
whether it is secured by long-term bareboa:t charters. This makes 
-" 
tanker financing almost analogous to say, a project financing of 
an aluminium smelter secured by a long-term take or pay contract. 
It is therefore difficult to identify any major differences in 
the lending principles involved, although most bankers interviewed 
did exclude ships from their definition of project financing. 
2. This view of project financing is best illustrated in BLACK, W.A. 
"Project Finance';, Journal of the Institute of Bankers, October 1960, 
and BLACK, W,A, "Project Finance", Journal of the Institute of Bankers 
February 1961. 
3. For example, see SARMET, M. Banker, August 1960, p.89, and ZORICH, 
R.L. Petroleum Times, 21 January 1977, p.25. 
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NOTES (continued) 
4. See OEGAVRE, R. T. "Inco's Soroako Nickel Project", Mining 
Engineering, March 1979. 
5. Typically finance is provided to individual partners. Joint 
financings on behalf of all parties are much less common because 
of the frequently disparate objectives of the sponsors. For 
instance, the relatively stronger parties normally wish to see 
their own corporate strengths reflected in the loan terms. 
6. For a discussion of the possible arrangements see Chapter 8. 
7. For a discussion of the going_-. and gone- concern approaches see 
OONALOSON, T.H. Lending in International Commercial Banking 
Chapter 2. 
8. For a discussion of the riskiness of project financing see 
Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY AND REASONS FOR GROWTH 
OF PROJECT FINANCING 
3.1" INTROOUCTION 
This Chapter outlines the history of project financing and examines 
the reasons given to explain the growth of project financing. The 
problems of measuring the size of the market are also discussed. 
3.2 HISTORY 
The concept of a loan tied to a,single project or asset has been 
the essence of lending and investment for many years. but as we 
argued in Chapter 2. this is usually financing of projects rather 
than project financing. This confusion may explain why some authors 
(e.g. Gaffney (1)) have suggested that the history of project 
financing can be traced back to the Suez Canal. or to the financing 
of railway construction in the 18th and 19th centuries. These 
projects differ in two main respects from today's project financings: 
(i) The finance was raised mainly by equity subscription rather 
than by bank loans 
(ii) The finance was in the nature of venture capital with very 
uncertain prospects. 
Project financing as defined in Chapter 2. appears to have its roots 
in the need to finance the development of the Texan oil fields in 
the late 1930's 1. The small independent oil "wildcatters· 
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lacked the capital to develop their wells from their own resources. 
As a result the concept of production payment financing was developed. 
This involved the banks in. lending to finance the cost of development 
drillin~ secured by an interest in the oil to be produced in the 
future. Instead of looking to the company~s balance sheet to support 
a loan, the banks took the oil in the ground as security and, once 
extracted. used the sales proceeds to repay the loan. 
2 The Texan banks gradually recruited reservoir engineers and other 
technical experts to assess the amount of oil in place 
and its recoverability. This enabled the banks to determine the 
security for a production payment even more accurately than the 
security behind a conventional bank loan. 
By the late 1950's Horner (2) suggested that virtually every bank 
in the U.S. of any size had participated in oil and gas lending'. 
3 Of course, by comparison with present-day project finance deals 
the early. Texan deals were of modest size. Neverthe"IQss, the basic 
concepts involved remain the same. 
In the mining industries project financing does not appear to have 
4 been used until the early 1960's Again this finance was arranged 
by American based banks, and for.U.S. mining companies, although many 
of the projects were located in developing countries. 
It was not until the early 1970's that the idea of project financing 
reached Britain. The discovery of North Sea oil, and in particular, 
B.P.'s desire .to finance the first. North Sea Oil field - Forties -
-26-
on a project basis, led to the establishment of project finance or 
energy departments in the U.K. branches and sUbsidiaries of the 
major American banks. Certain British banks also formed specialised 
departments - National Westminster in 1972 and Barclays in 1973. 
Since that time most of the major banks located in the U.K. have 
established groups to engage in project financing and-have extended 
their activities both geographically and into other areas such as 
natural resources. 
3.3 GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
For a market to exist in any type of good or service there must 
obviously be both supply and demand for that good, and bank lending 
is no exception. The rationale for project financing was therefore 
examined from two angles: why borrowers wish to make use of it 
(demand), and why banks are willing to engage in it (supply). 
3.3.1 Demand for Project Finance 
A review of the literature, talks with bankers and a study of a 
number of project financings revealed numerous reasons why borrowers 
sought project finance rather than conventional loans. Although 
certain generalisations may be made, several bankers stressed that 
motives of a borrower in seeking project financing are specific to 
I->Ii-- - particular situation. 
Underlying all of the motives of borrowers there lies one fundamental 
reason for the growth of project finance: namely the cost of capital 
investments in relation to the size of the project sponsor. 
----------- -~--------
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5 All the bankers interviewed and many authors agreed that the 
rising cost- of capital investments was the main reason for the growth 
of project finance. Costs have increased both as a result of inflation 
and a rising real cost. Inflation is relatively unimportant since the 
resources of the project sponsor are like-ly to increase broadly in line 
with inflation. However, over the past few years there have been several 
factors which have increased the real cost of capital investments. 
Among the reasons given, the main factors would seem to be: 
i) Rising economies of scale 
ii) Pollution controls 
iii) Remote location of projects __ 
De la Mare (3) reported that in 1974 plants in the petroleum and 
chemical _industries were 50-100 times greater in capacity than plants 
in 1950 as a result of technological returns to scale. Similarly, in 
the mining industry Radetzki (4) found that: 
"In 1969 some 36 per cent of all non-coal mine output 
of ore in the non-socialist world came from mines with 
capacities above 3 million tons/year. In 1978 the 
proportion had grown to about 47 per cent". 
The pollution controls now required in many industrialised countries 
are reported by Radetzki and Zorn (5) to have added up to 25% to the 
capital cost of new metal mining and processing facilities. 
The effect of location on re_al costs is perhaps best exemplified by 
North Sea oil projects, where the capital cost per barrel is several times 
------~------ ~----- - - ---
higher than onshore in the Middle East or even offshore in the Gulf 
of Mexico. 
If projects are located, in remote areas it may also be necessary to 
provide infrastructure - roads, railways, ports, housing etc. and 
whereas previously this was often financed by host governments, 
Ferguson & Haclin (6) reported that project sponsors are increasingly 
being required tO,meet the cost. 
Given the enormous size of capital projects, which was found to be 
the fundamental reason for the use of project financing, it was found 
that borrowers have had, at various times, the following motives for 
using project finance: 
(i) Financial motives 
(ii) Risk sharing motives 
(iii) Other motives 
(In many cases, of course, the decision to use project finance will be 
the result of a combination of the motives listed below.) 
(i) Financial motives 
At the same time as the cost of major capital projects has 
increased, 'the ability of many companies to finance them by 
traditional means has declined. Historically, both the 
petroleum and the mining indust~ies financed their investments 
from internally generated funds and equity. From the mid 19505 
in petroleum and the 1960s in mining, however, companies 
became'increasingly reliant on long-tenn borrowing and their 
-------
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gearing ratios began to rise6 . The reasons for this may be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) Increasing investment requirements due both to the 
factors mentioned above and, in the case of the 
petroleum industry, because of moves to diversify out 
of oil. 
(b) Falling profitability due to increased taxation and 
government regulation. 
(c) Inability or unwillingness to raise new equity. 
By the late 1960s many petroleum and mining companies were 
approaching the traditionally accepted levels of gearing, and 
they therefore sought other methods to finance their investments. 
This is the argument advance'd by many writers for the development'. 
of project financing. Hall (7) for example, argued that: 
" ..••. The ratio of long-term debt in corporate 
balance sheets has been increasing steadily over the 
last few years thereby limiting the ability of many 
companies to raise their traditional gearing much 
further. In the absence of large amounts of fresh 
equity capital new sources of finance have to be 
utilised and tllis explains the current popularity 
of project finance". 
'"It ,must be,' emphasised that ,not all' companies faced these 
problems. Several bankers interviewed pointed out that 
companies such as Shell and Exxon are still able to finance 
projects by traditional means and have not therefore, 
resorted to project financing, at least for financial reasons. 
It appeared from the research that project financing may be 
used to achieve any of five financial objectives including: 
--------------
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(a) Extend ability to borrow. 
(b) Alter lender's view on prudent gearing. 
(c) Maintain financial flexibility. 
(d) "Off balance sheet" finance. 
(e) By-pass existing loan covenants. 
(a) Extend abi li ty to borrow. 
It has been suggested that in certain circumstances. project 
financing may be the only means of borrowing. It was argued 
in (8) for example that " .•.. the credit of the project may 
often be better than the general credit standing of the 
sponsor, attracting lenders who might not lend to the 
company itself". 
This view was supported by many bankers interviewed. It was 
pointed out in particular, that the only alternative to project 
financing for several small companies involved in North Sea 
projects. such as Thomson Scottish Associate~Ranger Oil. and 
Tricentrol. would have been to sell or at least 'farm out' 
their share in the licence. It was also suggested that project 
finance was the only way that Woodside Petroleum Ltd could have 
raised the $1.4 .billion needed to finance its share of the 
North West Shelf gas project in Australia (and further sums 
will be required for the second stage). 
(.b) Alter lender's view on prudent gearing. 
In many cases being able to borrow requires that lenders 
alter their view on g8a~ing but it is felt that there is 
------ -------------
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sufficient difference to merit a separate heading. A 
review of both the literature and some of the reported 
project financing revealed that a satisfactorily structured 
project can be financed on a much higher gearing level 
than is considered prudent in traditional lending. Hall (7) 
for example, argued: 
- '"~y allowing a banker to -identify and evaluote 
the risks involved, a project can be financed 
on a much higher debt/equity ratio- _than would_ 
be possible for the parent company as a whole.'" 
This view \.;as supported by \vynant((9) p. IX-19.l and 
Yassukovich (10). Moreover, all of the bankers interviewed 
agreed that the -debt/equity ratio was of no direct rele-
vance in project financing 7 
To give an example of this, Thomson Scottisll Association 
was able to raise $200 million in project finance loans 
to finance its share of the Piper and Claymore field while 
having a relatively small net worth. At the time of the 
first $100 million loan the net worth figure was only £14.7 
million. 8 It is unlikely_ that Thomsons could have borrowed 
-this amount by traditional means. 
Most of the bankers agreed that project financings required 
a much lower equity injection than would be required in 
traditional lending. Two reasons for this have been 
advanced. Wynant((9) p.V-1S) found that some bankers 
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thought it was because of a difference in perception, 
while others believed that the high gearing reflected the 
low risk characteristics of the project. This issue was 
not explored directly in this research but indirect support 
for both of these views was found when bankers 
were ',' asked " about the amount of equity they would 
require. Most said that they had no rule of thumb and that 
it was the cash flow coverage of debt service which Was 
important. This suggests a difference in perception. 
However, several bankers did say that if the project was 
risky they would require more equity and lend less so as 
to increase the amount of cash flow coverage. 
(c) Maintain financial flexibility 
' .. " 
It appears that project finance is used by some borrowers 
in order to prevent the project being a burden on corporate 
cash flow or creating liquidity problems in the event of 
delay or interruption of production. This is achieved by 
linking the drawdown on the loan to capital expenditure and 
repayment to the cash flow generated by the project. This 
is 
was apparently one reason why B.P. used project finance 
rather than a bond issue to finance the Forties field. 
A second aspect to financial flexibility is the avoidance of 
new restrictive covenants. This again was apparently g, 
a consideration in the B.P. loan. Generally in corporate 
loans lenders "set various financial covenants 
which may, for instance, .. restrict the ability of the 
----------
---, 
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company to incur more than a certain amount of additional 
debt. The aim is to ensure that .the company will -be able 
to meet its obligations ... In project financing the proj ect 
is treated as a separate entity and, to the extent that 
the sponsor's credit is involved, it is only collateral,. and 
it was considered .lesslikely that lenders would ·impose 
covenants restricting the sponsor's financial flexibility. 
Another way in which financial flexibility may be achieved 
is by the use of a completion guarantee rather than an 
unconditional guarantee. This means that the loan is only 
10 guaranteed until the project is 'completed' 
_. 
thereafter 
the loan is non-recourse. This enables the sponsor to 
minimise the period for which .its credit· has to stand 
behind .the project. 
(d) "Off" balance sheet finance 11. 
This is perhaps the most frequently mentioned reason ·for 
using project finance. The objective in this case is to 
minimise the effect on the company's gearing ratio so as 
to enhance 
the company's ability to raise debt. or to preserve its 
U.S. bond or commercial paper rating. A more detailed 
examination of the balance sheet effects of project financing 
can be found in Chapter)2 but some of the findings are 
summarised here. 
~--.----
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Wynant's study (9) on financing the U.S. mining industry 
concentrated to a large extent on the off balance sheet. 
aspects of project financing. His conclusion in 1977 was 
that project financing did provide off balance sheet 
benefits because analysts and lenders failed to take the 
obligations properly into account. and bond rating agencies 
tended to look on such obligations more favourably than 
they did to long-term debt. The results of his interviews 
with mining companies and bankers did, suggest however. that 
off balance sheet considerations were diminishing in 
importance. 
The interviews conducted' in this research revealed that 
most bankers accepted that off balance, sheet factors could 
be a reason for seeking project finance. However. they 
all stressed that it .was much less important now than in 
the past. Auditors. analysts and rating agencies have 
apparently become far more aware of the nature and implica-
tions of project financing arrangements. A good example 
of this was the $1.75 billion production payment loan arranged 
for Shell in 1979 to finance its acquisition of Belridge 
Oil. Reier (11) reported that Shell had hoped to avoid 
damaging its bond rating by using a limited recourse 
production payment ,rather than a loan. In the event 
Standard and Poor's did downgrade Shell from AAA to AA+. 
apparently because they considered that. despite the 
limited recourse nature of the obligatio~ Shell could not 
'walk away' from their investment. Perhaps significantly. 
however. Moody's left their rating unchanged. 
--~---~-- -------
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A survey of some of the project financings arranged and 
of the balance sheets of the sponsor companies sugges'ted 
that borrowers have, in the recent past perceived 
12 
some balance sheet, advantage Moreover, two banks said 
that at least one oil company still thought that project 
financing carried 'off balance sheet' advantages over ',:, 
traditional debt financing. 
It was also pointed out by one banker that certain less 
developed countries have , sought project finance for 
'off balance sheet' reasons; their objective being to 
, 
keep the borrowing out of the governments accounts and 
.-'. 
therefore out of the IMF statistics. Details of these 
projects are not known however. 
(e) By-pass' existing loan covenants. 
Closely related to the off balance sheet motive is the by-passing of 
existing restrictive covenants in debentures and loan 
agreements. Frequent ly, when loans or bond issue's are 
made, . lenders impose certain restrictions such as limits 
on future borrowings or maximum gearing ratios. If gearing 
ratios are defined as say, debt/total capital employed" 
companies can circumvent: the restriction if the ,project loan 
is not counted as ~debt". 
Four' bankers interviewed mentioned this as a possible 
reason for the use of project financing. 
---------
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The only example discovered where a loan was structured 
in such a way as to avoid borrowing restrictions was the 
$825 million lent to BNOC. This was arranged as a forward 
purchase of oil which. it was decided. did not count as a 
borrowing and therefore Was not subject to the statutory 
limit of L600 million in respect of sums borrowed or 
guaranteed. Although BNOC did not,m fact, exceed this 
limit its ability to circumvent the restrictions did cause 
considerable consternation in the Public Accounts Committee: 3 
(11) Risk sharing motives 
Here the sponsor seeks to share some or all of the project 
e'-' . 
risks with lenders or third parties. While in certain cases 
risk sharing also has balance sheet implications in that limited 
recourse loans may not be reported as long-term debt. many 
sponsomseek risk sharing for non-financial reasons. 
The results of the research interviews suggested that risk sharing 
motives are far more important than financial motives today. 
except perhaps in the case of very small companies which would 
be unable to borrow except by way of project financing. 
(a) Protection of corporate assets 
This motive stems from the desire of companies to avoid 
being entirely dependent on the success or failure of one 
project. Most companies attempt 'to diversify their range of 
activities. The problem for the smaller companies in 
particular is that. given the huge cost of projects. 
, ------------------
------ ---- - ------
-39-
financing them by traditional means' (assuming such finance 
was available) would require' the commitment of a 
disproportionate level of resources to a single undertaking. 
Given that lenders would have recourse to all the company's 
assets, failure of the project would have serious conse-
quences for tt,e whole company. In these circumstances 
therefore sponsors seek to pass on most if not all of the 
project risks. 
This was one motive, for instance, in the two Thomson 
financings. They wished to shelter their traditional areas 
of activity from recourse if anything went wrong in the 
'North Sea, particularly as they had no previous experience 
of oil activities. By limiting recourse to the project 
assets only Thomsons were able to avoid a concentration of 
risk •. 
Several inte'rviewees confirmed that this is a major reason 
for the use of project finance. 
(b) Political risk avoidance 
The results of the interviews suggest that this is perhaps 
t>1e-
one of/most common reasonS for the use of project finance 
of 
today, particularly in the case/projects located in less 
developed countries. All the banks interviewed mentioned 
this as a reason for the use of project finance. In these 
c~ses the sponsors seek to pass on the political risks, 
such as nationalisation, expropriation and increases in 
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taxes and royalties to lenders. Despite the additional 
interest spread that lenders will charge it is usually 
. cheaper than purchasing political risk insurance. 
Radetzki ((4) p.6-7). has suggested that this motive stems 
from the increasing economic emancipation of developing 
countries. These countries began to desire an increasing 
.' 
involvement in the development of natural resource projects 
and a share in their benefits. This resulted in increases 
in taxation, changes in concession agreements and in some 
cases, expropriation. This, in turn, encouraged mining and 
petroleum companies to rely more on loan finance and' 
particularly project finance. Debt enabled the return on 
equity to be geared up; and if the companies did not shoulder 
the political risk their losses in the event of expropriation 
would be limited to the amount of equity they had invested. 
There is also apparently a view that governments would be 
less inclined to expropriate assets or take other actions 
which would jeopardise the project's success if they know 
·that international banks are likely to lose money. Wynant ((9) 
p.IX-15) for example referred to a 'comparative advantage' 
in managing political risk. Gurwin (12) also argued that, 
while oil and mining companies are considered just prey for 
expropriation etc., host governments are less likely to jeopardise 
the. project if it would threaten their relationship with 
------ ---------
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leading international banks. The leverage which banks 
can exercise over borrowing countries in this respect is 
perhaps best exemplified by the case of a $300 million 
loan to Peru in 1976. Two preconditions for this loan 
were a solutinn of a back tax matter with Southern Peru 
Copper Company and.compensation for the 1975 expropriation 
of Marcona Mining Co. 14 It was however, pointed out that 
this leverage only exists in LOC's which are reliant on 
external finance, and that banks would not have the same 
influence if, say, Norway or the U.K. was to raise taxes. 
The desire to share political risks \1ith lenders appears 
to have been a major motive in several recent project 
financings for some of the largest oil companies (which 
traditionally have not used project finance). These include 
Esso in Malaysia, Shell in Sarawak (Malaysia) and Mobil Oil 
in Indonesia. 
(iii) Other motives 
Wynant (13) suggested that "the increasing frequency of 
joint ventures ••.••. provides a stimulus for project 
financing". The argument is that the use of joint ventures 
reduces the amount of control over the project and that 
companies may seek to avoid liability for problems created 
by other partners. Rather than engaging their own general 
--------.-
-'.--, 
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credit therefore, the borrowers seek to finance their 
share of the cost, on a non- or limited- recourse basis. 
No support for this idea was found in interviews and 
although several minority participants in North Sea fields 
have raised project finance, no evidence was found to suggest 
that this was the reason for their use of project finance. 
The second possible motive mentioned by Wynant((9)p.II 18-19), 
was taxation. In the U.S.A. for example, there have been 
certain tax advantages in project financing. All production 
payments received favo~rable treatment until the Tax Reform 
Act 1969, while developmental production payments still carry 
a tax advantage. Similarly, Wynant stated that until its 
abolition in 1974, the imposition of an Interest Equalisation 
Tax on foreign investments in many countries encouraged the· 
, 
use of project financing by American companies. 
Although one banker did mention that taxation considerations 
might be important, no examples were found during the course 
. of the research to support this. 
A final motive for using project financing that was mentioned 
in interviews, concerns the availability of favourable terms. 
It was suggested by one bank that in a recent North Sea 
financing the main reason for using project finance was to 
obtain certain undertakings from the U.K. government which 
would not have been available had the company borrowed on 
a corporate basis. 
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TABLE 3.1 
HOW LON~ON'S FOREIGN BANKING 
COMMUNITY HAS GROWN 
YEAR DIRECTLY REPRESENTED' 
1967 113 
1968 134 
1969 137 
1970 161 
1971 174 
1972 
-
~ 213 
1973 230 
1974 262 
1975 261 
1976 263 
1977 298 
1978 311 
1979 328 
1980 351 
'oirectly represented through a 
representative office, branch 
or subsidiary 
Source: C. Parker, Banker Nov.1980 
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Appendix VIII 
Topic List for Interviews 
The topic list which follows. shows the main issues which were covered 
during the interviews. It was designed to be used as a method of 
structuring the interview and to serve as an 'aide memoire' during the 
interview. The list gives a series of headings which the interviewer 
wished to discuss. together with some elaboration in certain cases to 
ensure that the desired points were fully covered. The actual questions 
posed to each interviewee varied. since the intention was to achieve a 
structured dialogue rather than a more impersonal and inflexible 
questionnaire approach. However. a few questions were included in the 
topic list. 
TOPIC LIST 
A. General 
1 • Establish interviewee's definition of project financing. 
2. Roles adopted. 
3. Types of projects financed - by industry and country. 
4. Approximately what proportion of your bank's energy and mineral 
term loans involve project finance? 
5. Organisational structure - numbers and background of personnel. 
B. Reasons for use of project finance 
1. Perceived' reasons for use by borrowers - size of project; off-
balance sheet; gearing; risk sharing; other. 
·' 
• ,
, 
.J 
F. 
• 1 
3. Risk - return tradeoff in loan pricing and profitability. 
4. Royalties • 
5. What has been the general experience with the projects your 
bank has financed to date? 
Sources of finance 
1. Export credits - type. limited recourse. 
2. Eurocurrency - maturity. repayment schedule. 
3. International agencies - World Bank. other. 
4. Advance payments. 
5. Leasing. 
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2, Reasons why lenders will provide it - prof~lability; avoid 
sovereign risk loans; satisfy demand; other. 
3. Attitude of analysts. 
4. Future trends - in use; in amount of recourse. 
C. Evaluation 
1. Technical and political - consultants and in-house experts. 
2. Financial - aJ discounted cash flow; sensitivity analysis; 
Monte Carlo simulation; other. 
bJ objectives of the financial evaluation. 
3. Lending criteria - debt/equity; coverage (annual. present 
value. life of reserveJ. 
D. Types of security 
1. Raw material supply contract. 
2. Throughput agreement. 
3. Sales contract. 
4. Completion guarantee - definition of completion. 
5. Mortgage. 
6. Insurance. 
E. Risk acceptance and pricing (Eurocurrency loans) 
1. Risk control - generalisation regarding the acceptability of 
the various risks to lenders. 
2. RiskiAess of project financing vis-a-vis traditional lending 
(sovereign and corporate) . 
L 
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3.3.2 Supply of Project Finance 
The following reasons were identified from the literature as having 
contributed to the willingness of banks to participate in project 
financing activities: 
(i) Competition and profitability considerations 
(ii) Dislike of general purpose sovereign risk lending 
(ii~Avoidanceof legal lending limits 
(iv) Development of a customer relationship 
(v) Existence of a demand 
(i) Competition and profitability consideration 
This has been advanced as one of the main reasons explaining the 
willingness of banks to engage in project finance. International 
banking is now a highly competitive business with over 350 foreign 
banks directly represented in London in November 1980. To this 
figure must be added the U.K. merchant banks consortium banks 
and clearing banks which are also engaged in international banking. 
3 1 Table / shows the growth in the number of foreign banks in London. 
In addition to the number of participants in the eurocurrency 
market, Davis (14) has pointed out that competition has been 
intensified by the increasingly homogeneous nature of the normal 
Eurocurrency loan since: "With few exceptions, (therefore)' the 
key variables in negotiating a Eurocurrency loan have been 
reduced to' maturi ty and pricing". 
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TABLE 3 . 2 
WEIGHTED SPREAD OF PUBLICISED. EURDCURRENCY CREDITS 
ALL COUNTRIES (%. OF TOTAL LOANS) 
WEIGHTED 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 .1 SPREAD (%) 
up to 0.500 - 0.1 11.2 22.8 29.7 
0.501 - 0.750 - 4.0 32.9 41.1 37.5 
0.751 - 1.000 2.0 30.6 22.4 20.2 24.9 
1.001 - 1.250 17.6 20.2 13.9 9.5 2.7 
1.250 - 1.500 32.8 12.3 10.1 3.6 2.1 
1.501 - 1.750 23.3 19,8 3.8 1.4 1 • 1 
1.751 - 2.000 18.7 8.9 2.9 0.5 -
2.001 - 2.250 4.5 1.8 0.9 0.1 0.1 
2.251 - over 0.7 1.6 0·.2 0.1 -
UNKNOWN 0.5 0.8 1.8 0.7 1.9 
TOTAL % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
TOTAL $M* 25.389.0 31.673.0 67.074.0 60,510.3 11,689.5 
SOURCE: World Bank Borrowing in International Capital Markets 
various issues 
• This Table only includes variable rate loans 
--- -~-----
--------- ----- ----
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The impact of competition has been manifested in two main ways. 
Firstly, U.K. merchant banks have been forced to seek specialist 
'fee earning roles since the small size of their balance sheets 
and resultant limited lending capacity has reduced their com-
petitiveness as eurocurrency" lead managers and lenders. The U.K. 
merchant banks have therefore turned to project financing (among 
other activities) as an area where they can offer advisory facilities 
without the need to lend. 
Secondly, the syndicated eurocurrency loans market has, particularly 
since 1974, been characterised by a borrower's market with very 
3.2 
low lending spreads. Table/, gives a clear indication of the 
" are 
trend since 1975 (figures before 1976/unavailable). During 1979 
84.1% of all medium and long-term eurocurrency funds lent earned 
a spread of 1% or less. Of course, this was not the total 
remuneration since banks also earn front-end fees such as manage-
ment, participation and commitment fees. Al though data is not 
published on fees, the evidence 15 suggests that fees are not 
increased to compensate for lower spreads and that the,same down-
ward trend in fees has occurred. 
At the same time, particularly since the collapse of Herstatt and 
Franklin National, banks and supervisory authorities have become 
increasingly concerned with the question of capital adequacy. 
The rate of growth In risk assets and de po si ts .has outstripped the 
rate of growth of capital and capital ratios have fallen too 
worrying levels. 
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The result is that banks have become increasingly concerned with 
the profitability of their business rather than simply seeking 
a rapid growth in lending16 One way of achieving this is to 
apply 'product differentiation' and engage in specialist lending 
activities where maturity and price are not the only considerations 
for a borrower and where there are fewer potential competitors. 
One such area of specialisation is, of course. project financing. 
Eschenlauer of Morgan Guaranty, for example. is reported by 
Cudaback (15) to have said: 
"Borrowers tend to be much more interested in 
proper loan structure than in pricing. ...1' 
can think of no major credit (in energy/project 
lending) that was won on the basis of price." 
_--,,0. 
The absolute level of earnings' may also be increased by undertaking 
more risky lending (though there is a limit to the amount of risk 
that banks will take). 
The evidence suggests that profitability has been a major 
consideration for banks in deciding to undertake project finance. 
Leeper (16) argued in 1979 that: 
"The borrower's market of the ,past two years with 
the sharp drop in the number of profitable lending' 
outlets for banks has helped break down their 
resistance to the complications of project 
financings". 
All the bankers interviewed were unanimous in agreeing that project 
financing offered higher spreads and fees than conventional euro-
--- ~-----
-------
-- ---
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currency lending .to sovereign or corporate entities. It 
appeared from their replies that both the smaller number of 
competitors and the level of risk contributed to this, though 
no attempt was made to rank these in order of importance. 
Several banks did, however, qualify their opinion in two ways. 
Firstly, they said that spreads were higher in the early years 
of project financing in the U.K. and spreads have subsequently 
declined as a result of increasing competition in project 
financing. As more banks have developed expertise in project 
financing, competition for lead management position has intensified 
and margins reduced. 
Secondly, it was pointed out that to the extent that project 
financing involves taking additional risks, a comparison of 
the absolute levels of remuneration between conventional lending 
and project financing is not necessarily valid. Rather it is 
necessary to examine where the two types of lending lie in 
relation to some risk-return.tradeoff. Since it is not 
possible to define a risk-return trade off, a definite con-
17 
clusion on this is not possible 
(ii) Dislike of general purpose lending 
Several authors 18 have suggested that a dislike of general 
purpose lending to less developed countries is a reason for the 
use of project finance. Their argument is that in general purpose 
'balance of payments' lending there is no control over the use 
of the funds and no clearly identifiable source of repayment. 
~-- - ------ --
------- ~~.-- -- -- ~----- ------ -~-
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Lenders are therefore taking both the economic risk (i.e. 
inability to repay) and the political risk (i.e. unwillingness 
to repay). 
Project financing, it has been variously argued, offers the 
following advantages: 
(a) Banks are lending to finance a specific capital investment 
project rather than to finance consumption. As Llewellyn (17) 
pointed out, this should reduce the economic risk of the 
country by increasing the overall level of absorption potential. 
(b) Project lending may enable banks to avoid the economic risk 
of a country. This was suggested by Levine (18), but as he 
pointed out, it. requires, inter alia, that project cash flows 
are sufficient to service the loan and that the project is 
located in the export sector of the economy and therefore, 
generates • hard' currency revenues. If these conditions are 
satisfied then the loan can be repaid even if the overall 
balance of payments of the country is in deficit. 
(c) Project lending may reduce the political risk in international 
lending. This argument was advanced by Wilkins (19). In the 
event of a radical political change it is suggested that a 
loan for a project which is regarded as important to the 
economic future of the country is less likely to be repudiated 
than one which was used for, say, consumpt~on by the previous 
ruler. 
(d) Risks are more easily defined in project finance than in 
country lending (Cudaback (15) p.93). 
~------
- --------~ 
-----~----~~-- --~~-~-~-
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It is certainly true that much 
international lending is now linked to specific projects, 
but this does not necessarily mean that it is 'project 
financing' as defined in this thesis, and only a small 
percentage of project linked lending is project financing. 
Indeed, to date the majority of true project financings 
have been in 'developed' countries' or other countries 
where the economic and political risks of the type discussed 
above are relatively unimportant. 
The opinion of the bankers interviewed was divided. Some 
did think that it was a factor determining their involve-
ment in project financing though the impression was that 
it was not major factor. Other ban~s argued. however. 
that it .was not a factor. 
(iiilLegal lending limits 
In several ·countries. bank supervisory authorities impose limits 
on the amounts which may be lent to any particular borrower, in order 
to limit the effect on lenders 
of failure of a single borrower. In particular the U.S. 
Comptroller of the Currency limits lending to anyone .borrower 
to not more than 10% of the bank's capital. The U.K. subsidiaries 
and branches of American banks are also subject to this rule. 
Borrowers include both companies and foreign governments. Unless 
a loan to a subsidiary of a company or a state entity of a 
government passes two tests it is included in the company or 
government's total borrowing for the purposes of the 10% rule. 
The first test is that the borrower has its own income to repay 
--------
- ------~------
-------------
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the loan (the means test); and the second is that the borrower 
can show that the money is used in the way agreed with the 
lender (the purpose test). Both of these tests can qe passed 
if a loan is structured as a project financing. 
In addition to the legal lending limits imposed on U.S. banks 
and their subsidiaries, all banks set internal exposure limits. 
Although these are flexible banks may prefer a proposition based 
on a new entity. 
No mention of these reasons was found in the literature, although 
two American bankers interviewed did suggest that avoidance of 
legal lending limits was a possible reason for the popularity of 
project financing. 
Other banks also said that if a viable project financing was 
offered in a country which had already reached the internal 
lending ceiling set by the bank they would be inclined to finance 
the project whereas they would be I,lnlikely --to make a gene-ral 
purpose loan in the same circumstances. 
(iv) Development of customer relationships 
Sarmet (20) and Kingshott (21) both suggested that project 
financing can be a way of developing strong relationships with 
borrowers. The rationale appears to be as follows. In normal 
eurocurrency lending the only real concern of the borrower is 
maturi ty and_ price and the borrower will • shop around'. Project 
financing, on the other hand, requires considerable expertise 
TABLE 3.3 
PUBLICISED EURDCURRENCY CREDITS BY PURPOSE 
-
$M (%) 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 I 
PETROLEUM & NATURAL 2,420.2 2,375.7 2,906.9 2,857.6 8,374.1 7,048.1 1,698.9 GAS (8.6) (11.5) (10.1) (8.4) (11.4) (10.2) (10.5) 
NATURAL RESOURCES 457,7 602,8 951.5 331.1 1,200.6 2,235.8 244.5 
( 1 • 7 ) (2.9) (3.3) ( 1 . 0 ) ( 1 • 6 ) (3.2 ) (1 .8) 
ALL EUROCURRENCY 28,102.3 20,553.6 28,703.3 34,185.3 73,641.4 68,646.9 13,623.8 
LOANS (100.0) " (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
SOURCE: World Bank, Borrowing in International Capital Markets, Various Issues. 
NOTES: 1. Figures represent the latest estimate for each year. There are substantial revisions of the figures 
over time. 
2. Not all eurocurrency lending is arranged in London though a large percentage is. 
3. The data exclude export credits. 
4. The data refer to gross commitments at the time of signing and. do not necessarily reflect the extent 
to which the loan has been drawn down or repaid. 
I 
1.11 
'" I 
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and close cooperation. If a bank is able to advise and/or lead 
manage a complicated financing the borrower is likely to employ 
him again both for project financing and other banking operations. 
Moreover, other potential borrowers are likely to consider 
favourably for a lead position a bank which has demonstrated its 
expertise in structuring other financings. Two bankers interviewed 
saw this as a reason for involvement in project financing. 
Cv) Existence of a demand 
It is clear that without a potential demand, banks would not have 
entered the market for project financing and that growth has been 
mainly demand-led. 
The demand manifests itself at two levels. Firstly, there is 
the potential market for project financing \-Jhich derives from 
the ever increasing investment requirements in the energy and 
natural resource industries. 
As Leeper ((16), p.??) argued: 
"Undoubtedly. the largest single factor in bringing the technique 
(project financing) across the Atlantic has been the need to 
finance the exploitation of North Sea oil reserves". 
3.3 
More generally, as Table / shows, lending to the energy and 
natural resource industries constitutes a sizeable share of 
total eurocurrency lending, and banks believe that future demand 
is likely to be just as high. Therefore, banks are concerned to 
develop energy lending activities. 
--- -----~~-.---.--.-~- --'------ ----- .~-----
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Moreover, lending to these industries frequently takes the form 
of project financing and many banks interviewed believed that an 
increasing proportion of energy lending will be by project 
finance. Therefore to become established as an energy lender, 
banks have to be able to offer project financing services. 
This view was supported by a large number of the bankers 
interviewed, and the feeling was that they had to move with the 
times or lose out. 
3.4 SIZE OF THE MARKET 
, .... 
In view of the nature of the subject it proved impossible to quantify 
the amount of project financing that is undertaken. Banks were asked 
to indicate the amount of their energy and mineral term loans that 
were made on a project finance basis, but in many cases, they were 
reluctant to give a precise an~we~ while others gave answers ranging 
from 10% to 60%. Indeed, it was pointed out that to give a precise 
answer would be misleading since if they had recently participated in 
a project financing the proportion of project lending outstanding 
would be higher than at other times. For instance, when the Woodside 
loan is syndicated the figures ~Jill be much higher as a SUbstantial sum 
is involved. Generally. the replies were that only a small proportion 
of loans involved project finance, though many added that it was likely 
to grow. This question was also not relevant for merchant banks which 
did little, if any, lending. 
-----~ ~ 
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It was not possible to determine the size of the market from published 
statistics either. Figures are available showing the amount of 
publicised eurocurrency loans to the petroleum. natural gas and 
natural resources industries (see Table 3.3) which. if we had been 
able to estimate a proportion for project finance, should give a figure 
for eurocurrency project financings. However, even this would have been 
misleading since: 
1. The World Bank figures exclude unpublicised credits, but include 
credits not yet drawn. 
2. Project financing may involve other sourceS of finance including 
export credits. Export credits are specifically excluded from 
the Wo.rld Bank figures. 
3. Some project financing may occur outside the two industry 
categories mentione~ though· this is likely to be small. 
4. The data relate to all eurocurrency lending. Not all of this is 
arranged in London, (though the great majority is and this is 
likely to be particularly true for project finance). 
The third alternative might be to identify all project financings 
arranged and add up the total amounts lent. However, it is not even 
possible to determine from published sources, such as tombstones and 
the World Bank's list of eurocurrency loans, if the particular loan 
was a project financing as defined in this thesis. 
----~-- ._- -
-- ~-~--~.-----'---
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
The results of interviews and a survey of the literature suggest that 
project financing originally grew up .as banks sought ways of meeting 
a demand that could not be satisfied by traditional lending techniques. 
The cost of projects exceeded the resources of the sponsors who therefore 
sought ways to enhance their borrowing capacity. Initially cosmetic. 
off balance-sheet motives were important but over time this has become 
less so. For smaller companies the other financial motives such as 
ability to borrow and increasing gearing remain important but for other 
borrowers. risk sharing motives. and particularly the sharing of political 
risk. tend to predominate. 
As regards the supply of project financing it can be concluded that 
the main reasons are competitive. Competition has led banks to seek 
specialist areas where the pressure on lending margins is less. Moreover. 
banks believe that. in order to participate in energy and natural resource 
financing (which is likely to rem~in an important part of eurocurrency 
lending) they have to be able to offer project financing services. 
The other reasons listed. such as avoidance of general purpose lending 
and lending limits. were found to be of secondary importance . 
. _-- - --- --- -- --.~ 
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NOTES to CHAPTER 3 
1. See WHITE, N.A. "Financing the International Petroleum Industry" 
Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this period. 
2. Such as Republic National Bank of Dallas, First National Bank 
in Dallas and First City National Bank of Houston. 
3. It is difficult to generalise on the amounts involved. The 
smallest project finance loan encountered in this research was 
for $50 million while at the other extreme the first stage of the 
Woodside project requires a project finance loan of $1.4 billion. 
4. Neither RAOETZKI and ZORN (5)'Chapter 4, nor WYNANT (9) Chapter 11, 
mentions the use of project finance during the 1950s. 
5., See for example, FOWLER. Banker December 1977, p.49, VANDER WEYER. 
"Financing of Long-Term Development" p.157, LEEPER, Banker 1979. p.77, 
MARPLE, Banker December 1977, p.47. 
6. For background to the trends in financing the petroleum and mining 
industries, see WHITE, N.A. op cH, Chapter 2, RAOETZKI, M. and 
ZORN, S. op cit, Chapter 4. 
7. See Section 11.3.1 for a discussion of their attitude to equity. 
B. Wilson Committee "The Financing of North Sea Oil" Research Report 
No. 2, p. 13. 
9. ,See LADO, E.H. Case Study: British Petroleum Co. Ltd. (0). 
Harvard Business School 1973. p.6. 
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NOTES (cont'd) 
10. See Section 9.6 for a discussion of completion guarantees and 
the-definition of completion. 
11. Off balance-sheet is perhaps a misleading term since it is very 
difficult to completely avoid disclosure. However. it is normally 
taken to mean situations where the liability is reported in a 
category other than 'long term debt'; this may include 
classification as a 'deferred liability' or as a note to the balance 
sheet under contingent liabilities. 
12. See Chapter 12 for the results of this survey. 
13. See House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts Eighth Report 
Session 1977-75 para. 36-45 (HC Paper No. 621). 
14. See Institutional Investor. 'The LDC Dilemma' October 1976. p.36. 
15. See for example FLEMING. A.E. & HOWSDN. S.K. Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin September 1960. p.313. 
16. See NADLER. R.S. Journal of Commercial Bank Lending. May 1976. 
17. See Chapter 10 for a discussion of the risk return tradeoff and 
bank's opinions on profitability. 
16. See for example. ANGELINI. A. et al, "International Lending. Risk 
and the Euromarkets" pp.174-5; LEVINE, 0.1. Euromoney December 1975 
p.21; and Lister quoted in CUDABACK, D. Institutional Investor 
July 1960, p.93. 
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. CHAPTER 4 
ROLES AND PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT FINANCING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the nature of the main roles that banks may 
play in project financing. namely advisor. lead manager and parti-
cipant. It also examines the roles that different types of banks 
have adopted and the reasons for this.· Finally. certain aspects of 
the organisation of project financing activities and the use of 
industry experts are discussed. 
4.2 ROLES IN PROJECT FINANCING 
There are three main roles that banks may adopt in project financing: 
advisor. lead manager and participant. The main focus of this research 
was on the first two areas. although two banks interviewed had only 
acted as participants (at least to date). 
As in many areas of project financing. it was found that these roles 
are by no means clearly defined. For instance. as regards advisory 
relationships. banks may act either as independent advisors or give 
advice with the option to lend. Moreover. lead management positions 
will involve a limited amount·~ of advisory work. In addition. the 
amount and type of advice given was said to vary. 
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4.2.1 Financial Advisors 
Not every project financing has involved the use of a financial 
advisor. or. as they are sometimes called. 'financial engineer'. 
Indeed. it was suggested that many borrowers feel that the benefits 
of an advisor are outweighed by the additional cost of his remunera-
tion. The advisor is appointed by the borrower and usually remunerated 
1 by way of a fee • Generally there is considerable 'competition for 
advisory positions which can involve a substantial amount of un-
productive work for the unsuccessful banks; 
Advisors were said to be most commonly employed when several alter,-
native sources of finance are available. Their primary function in 
these situations is to recommend an 'optimum' financing plan using 
the mix of sources of finance which is most advantageous to the 
borrower 2 and to coordinate the raising of these various sources 
of finance. In addition. the advisor will advise on the credit and 
loan structure of the project. as d·iscussed iOn chapters 8 a~d 12. 
It is not always the case. however. that an advisor will be appointed 
where multiple sources of finance are available. For instance. Inco 
Ltd. :arranged the financing and security for their nickel project 
in Indonesia without using an outside advisor. and De Gavre (1) gave 
several reasons for this: 
(i) Cost of outside advice. 
(ii) The Company is transferring to outsiders the knowledge and 
experience gained in putting together a financing plan which 
they would not be able to draw on in the future. 
---- -- - ~ ---- - ~- ----- ----- --- - - ---- ---
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(iii) Insiders are often better at vigorously and persistently 
pursuing the company's objectiyes and interests. 
Similarly, advisors have been used even when the financial package 
is relatively straight-forward. The Thomson Organisation employed 
S.G. Warburgs as an advisor for its Piper loan 3 and Morgan Grenfell 
is acting as advisor to Woodside Petroleum in th_e North West Shelf 
4 gas project in Australia Both of these projects were financed 
by a single eurocurrency loan. 
Advisors are frequently occupied on a prodect for several years. One 
bank interviewed said, for example, that they had been involved in 
a uranium mining. project for eight· years. 
When it comes to the provision of finance, there are several possibili-
ties. Some advisors are wholly independent and are not permitted to 
5 
act as lenders Other banks interviewed said that when they bid 
for an advisory position they' seek to establish with the borrower 
that this will not preclude them from consideration for a lending 
role. For these banks, as Clarke and Macleod (2) suggested: 
"The attraction· of becoming project advisor is not 
so much the fees, because of the intensity of the 
labour involved, but the opportunity to be on the 
inside track when the time arrives to arrange 
financings for the project." 
This latter possibility can, of course, give rise to a conflict 
between the interests of the advisor's clients and those of the bank 
as lender. As Morris (3) pointed out: 
~--- ---- ---------
---- ---;- ----- - ---- --- ------ - ~----~---
~65-
"The client's interest is to give as little security 
as. possible and to get as fine terms as possible. while 
the interest of his bank as lender must be to maximise 
both the lender's security and the bank's reward." 
-'.:.-:-.:.. ... -.. 
The banks interviewed were divided on this question of conflict of 
interest. Some banks. particularly certain U.K. merchant banks which 
undertook advisory work. believed that there was a real possibility 
of a conflict of interest and stressed the importance of an independent 
advisor. Other'banks. which preferred to lend as well as advise. 
considered that from a credibility point of view it was important to 
'put their money where their mouth is'. It was also suggested by two 
banks that some independent advisors have misjudged the state of the 
market and have negotiated higher interest margins or tighter security 
conditions than were necessary to attract lenders. This implies that 
in some cases an independent advisor may not be of any benefit to the 
sponsor. Furthermore. it was also pointed out that competition for 
lending positions should ensure that the terms are the best availabie 
even when an independent advisor is not employed. 
In cases where a bank is acting as an independent advisor it will 
only play a co-ordinating role in the financing. and other banks will 
be appointed ,to lead manage the financing. The function of the 
advisor at this stage was said to vary from project to project. In 
some cases. the advisor may be required to recommend a lead bank or. 
if the le~d position. is to be contested. to assist the sponsor in 
selecting the banks to be approached.' The advisor may also sometimes 
be retained during negotiations on loan terms. 
--~ -- --~~.-
---- -~--- ---------~-
------ -~----
- --- --- - ---
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4.2.2 Lead Managers 
Lead managers are· appointed to arrange a particular source of finance 
(e.g. eurocurrency loan or export credit). The distinction between 
lead managers and advisors can be somewhat vague because in cases 
where an advisor is not appointed. the lead manager will perform the 
. 6 
functions otherwise performed by the advisor 
As well as arranging the finance. the lead manager will also usually 
take a major participation in the loan. though it is apparently 
possible for U.K. merchant banks to lead manage while only lending 
. 7 
a small amount It is not possible to generalise on the percentage 
of the total loan amount that the lead manager must lend. This will 
8- --depend on the size of the loan . It was said however. that a lead 
bank must lend at least as much as any other participating bank. 
As remuneration. the lead manager receives a lump sum management fee. 
fixed as a percentage of the loan amount. together with the normal 
interest rate paid to lenders. The management fee was said to be 
higher. when an independent advisor is not employed. although banks 
were unwilling to give any indication of the actual level of manage-
ment fees. 
The process of arranging a eurocurrency project loan is much the same 
as for a straightforward eurocurrency loan. and it is not proposed 
·9 
to describe this process in any detail· One important activity 
for the lead manager is however. the preparation of the 'information 
(or placement) memorandum'. In the case of project finance loans 
this is quite a lengthy document which is provided to potential 
~~~- - "-- ---- --~-- --------
----- -------~-------~ 
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members of the loan syndicate. A revj_ew of several information 
. '. ~ , 
memoranda revealed that they contain information on the following 
broad areas: 
(i) Outline of the terms of the loan agreement (maturity. repayment 
fees and interest rate etc.). 
(ii) Summary of the agreements signed or to be signed which will 
provide the credit support for the project 
(iii) Details of the project and the sponsor(s) 
(iv) Financial analysis of the project. including cash flow forecasts 
(v) (Where applicable) Consultant's report on the geology of the 
oil or gas field. the amount of reserves and their recoverability. 
Although the information memorandum is theoretically provided by the 
borrower. in the case of project financing in particular, it is 
apparently prepared by the lead managers. 
The function of the information memorandum and the liability of the 
lead manager for information it contains has been the subject of 
litigation in the U.S. In the Colocotr-onis Case 10 seven U.S. parti-
cipant banks claimed against the lead bank inter alia: 
(i) It had special skills in ship financing on which the participant 
banks relied 
(ii) It had a special banking relationship with and special access 
to the borro~l8r which other banks did not have 
(iii) It was solely responsible for determining with the borrower the 
pricing and other terms and conditions of the loan. 
---- --------- --
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The banks claimed misrepresentation of material facts and omission 
to state material facts and hence a breach of fiduciary and other 
duties as lead manager. 
This case would seem to be particularly relevant to project financing 
since. as Leeper (4) pointed out: "In a project financing. participating 
banks will rely much more heavily on the information memorandum". 
The reason for this is that. unlike lending to an established company. 
information from sources other than the information memorandum is 
far more limited. 
The Coloctronis case was subsequently settled and so a judicial opinion 
on this problem is not available. As a result of the case. however. -. 
lead manage!"'s did tighten up the wording of their disclaimer clauses. 
and the information memoranda studied were found .to have clauses stating 
that ·the contents had been approved by the borrower. who had requested 
and authorised delivery of the memorandum,as well as a disclaimer 
stating that the lead managers cannot be held responsible for any 
omissions, and that credit decisions .should not be made purely on the 
basis of the memorandum11 • Lead managers said that they considered 
these disclaimers to be sufficient to avoid any liability for 
misrepresentation. 
-----
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4.2.3 Lenders· 
The decision on who to invite into a syndicate appeared to be one of 
the more difficult tasks for a lead manager. especially as project 
financing is very popular. Several lead managers stated that they 
prefer experienced energy lenders in view of the complexity of many 
of the deals. At the same time, borrowers may .. also wish to invite 
certain banks into the syndicate in order to maintain a banking 
relationship 12. 
The lender's remuneration is derived primarily from the interest 
spread, although in certain caSffi a participation fee is also offered. 
This is a lump sum calculated as a percentage of the amount lent. 
Generally, the lenders are uffered a participation. on a take-it or 
leave-it basis; the terms and conditions of the loan having been 
previously negotiated by the lead.manager, although lenders may be 
able to suggest minor amendments to the loan documentation. 
4.3 PARTICIPANTS IN PROJECT FINANCING 
The participants in project financing in the U.K. can be categorised 
as follows: 
(j) U.S. commercial and merchant banks 
(2) U.K. commercial banks 
(3) U.K. merchant banks 
(4) Other foreign and consortium banks 
(5) U.s. investment banks. 
-------
----------
_.- --------- ----~---
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4.3.1 U.S. Commercial and Merchant Banks 
These t~/O categories have been grouped together as it was found that 
U.S. merchant banks are subsidiaries of the commercial. banks. and 
tended to work together in project financing activities. 
The large U.S. commercial banks such as Bank of America. Chase 
Manhattan. Ci ticorp. and Morgan Guaranty have traditionally 
been the leaders in' proj'ect financing in the U.S. and this appeared 
to be equally true in the case of their U.K. based activities. Clarke 
and Martin (5) suggested that of .these four. Morgan Guaranty and Chase 
Manhattan were probably the most active. 
" It is also clear from an examination' of the lead managers in project 
financing that there have been relatively fe~1 eurocurrency loans that 
have not contained at least one American bank in the lead management 
13 Moreover. Cudaback (6) suggested that it.is generally group 
the American bank which carries out the negotiation and technical work. 
Most of the U.S. banks interviewed had acted. at one time or another. 
in all three project financing roles. Although a.few of the U.S. 
merchant banks interviewed were prepared to take independent advisory 
roles if necessary. they expressed a preference .for advisory roles 
which carried an option to lead manage as well. This was apparently 
because •. unlike .the U.K. merchant banks. the U.S. merchant banks had 
access to considerable lending power through the commercial banking 
arm. 
--------
----
---- --~ 
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4.3.2 U.K. Commercial Banks 
As noted in Section 3.2, the U.K. commercial (or clearing) banks did 
not become involved in project financing until the early 1970's with 
the need to finance North Sea oil developments, and the Forties field 
in particular. 
It was from the team working on the Forties loan that National 
Westminster formed an Orl and Gas department. Subsequently, this has 
been expanded and is now called the Energy and Natural Resources 
department. Barclays formed its own oil department in 1973, and since 
that time Midland and Lloyds have also developed expertise in project 
financing and energy financing generally. 
All of these activities are conducted in the International Divisions 
or companies of the respective clearing banks, though in some cases, 
sterling denominated project financing is undertaken by the Domestic 
Divisions. 
The British clearing banks were found to have reached different 
stages . as far as project financing is concerned. Barclays Bank 
International and National Westminster. were the most well established. 
They stated that .they are willing to take any of the three roles 
mentioned in Section 4.2. Both.banks 'said ,. however, that they 
would only consider advisory situations where they expected to be 
able to lend as well. 
Lloyds Bank International is said to be a relative newcomer to project 
financing but it is seemingly very aggressive 1"4 It has been involved 
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in project financing both as a participant and as a lead manager. but 
no advisory work appears to have been undertaken. 
Midland Bank has as yet only acted as a participant in project 
financing. However. they have recently established a separate Project 
Finance company which is intended to engage in advisory work. Again. 
the objective is to act as a lead manager as well' as advisor rather 
than' as an independent advisor. 
In addition to the English clearing banks. the Scottish clearing banks. 
and in particular Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland. have 
developed a presence in oil lending. Their focus of attention is 
however. mainly limited to the North Sea and they have only acted as 
participants in project financing. 
4.3.3. U.K. Merchant 'Banks 
The U.K. merchant banks interviewed typically had a separate project 
finance department or division. although two had established separate 
companies., Their project finance activities were seen as an outgrowth 
of traditional export credit business. and the arranging of export 
credits still constitutes an important part of their work. For some 
of the banks approached this represented the ,whole of their activities 
and they did not engage in any 'true' project financing as defined in 
this thesis. This was the case. for example. in Barings Brothers. and 
also at Lazards despite the fact that in 1972 they co-lead managed the 
Forties loan. However. the remaining U. K. merchant banks ./ere involved 
in 'true' project financing in addition to their export credit activities. 
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At various .times most of the banks had undertaken all three of the 
project financing roles. Their bias appeared to be towards advisory 
rather than lending activities, however. The U.K. merchant banks 
have a small lending capacity as compared with the commercial banks, 
in view of the small size of their balance sheet. Therefore, the 
pressures of competition have forced them.to concentrate on advisory 
, 
roles. 
The banks interviewed were willing to act either as an independent 
advisor or as an advisor and lead manager depending on the desires 
of the borrower. When acting as lead managers, however, they do not 
/ 
lend very much if anything. This is unlike the usual situation where 
the lead manager takes a substantial share of the loan. But the 
merchant banks suggested that lending is not so important to them as 
it is to commercial banks. particularly as they are seeking a return on 
their investment in personnel rather than a return on assets. Thus the 
advisory fee alone may be satisfactory remuneration for them while it 
is less so for.commercial banks. 
4.3.4 Other Foreign and Consortium Banks 
This section covers thre·e main groups of banks with experience in 
project financing - Canadian banks, European banks, and Consortium 
banks. 
--------------- --- ~-------
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The Canadian banks have been involved in the provision of project 
finance in Canada for several years and two Canadian banks - Royal 
Bank of Canada and Bank of Montreal - were found to be involved in 
project financing from their U.K. offices. Other Canadian banks 
(e.g. Toronto Dominion) apparently refer project financings to Canada 15 
..... 
The Royal Bank of Canada is involved in project financing through both 
its commercial and merchant banking arms in the U.K. and has advised, 
lead managed and participated in project financings. Again the 
advisory roles are apparently undertaken with a VItf:W to lending. The 
Bank of Montreal, on the other hand, has only acted as a participant, 
but when interviewed they said that they were seeking 
. .- .. 
lead management positions. Indeed, .they have recently obtained a 
co-lead management role in the Woodside project. 
Of the European banks, the most active appeared to be Cr~dit Lyonnais. 
Cudaback (6) reported that they beat 20 other banks, including Morgan 
Guaranty and Citibank, to win the lead management position for a 
$200 million loan to Agip to finance its share of the Maureen North 
Sea.oil field. The other major .French banks, Societe Generale·, and 
Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) are said to be less active in project 
financing 16. although BNP has obtained a co-lead management position 
in the Wood side deal. None of these banks were interviewed, however, 
as their project finance activities were found to be based in France 
and therefore fell outside the scope of this thesis. 
Other European banks which have been involved in project finance 
include Deutsche Sank, Amsterdam Rotberdam 8ank and Den Norske 
----~-~ --~--
---- ~------ -----~~-
---------
- -----~--~ 
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Creditbank. but to date this has primarily been in the North Sea and 
they were not considered by the banks·i~terviewed to be major 
competitors in project financing. 
Finally. among the many consortium banks in London two were found 
to have established a reputation in project financing and were 
therefore. interviewed. These were: International Energy Bank and 
European Banking Company. 
The International Energy Bank (IEB). was established in 1973 by six 
17 banks to enable these banks to participate in North Sea financings. 
Since then. its mandate has been extended to cover all types of energy 
financings worldwide. (though not restricted to project financing). 
It quickly made a name for itself in project financing by co-lead 
18 
managing four loans with the Republic National Bank of Dallas • 
However since 1976. when the last of these loans was signed. the IEB 
has not held any major lead management .positions for project financings. 
The IEB said that this was because of the great competition to lead 
manage deals. but elsewhere it was suggested.that. in common with many 
consortium banks involved in other activities. the problem is that 
shareholding banks have now also developed expertise in the same area 
and no longer refer business to the consortium·bank. As a result. the 
IEB now acts primarily as a participant. 
19 The European Banking Company established a project finance 
department in 1977. This was said to cover export finance. leasing 
and finance for projects. as well as project financing as defined in this 
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thesis. Initially the EBC only acted as.a participant. but now they 
are willing and able. to act. as lead managers and also as advisors. 
either independent or in addition to lending. 
4.3.5 U.S. Investment Banks 
The U.S. investment banks apparently play a significant part. in 
project financing in the United States. particularly as advisors. 
For example. an article on project financing by Burke and Schoch (7) 
referred only to investment banks. According to Burke and Schoch 
their particular area of expertise lies in arranging long-term and 
often fixed rate finance from institutions. particularly insurance 
companies. 
When the U.K. subsidiaries of four leading investment banks 20 were 
approached. however. it was found that project financing activities 
Were based in New York and therefore fell outside the scope of this 
study. 
4.4. ORGANISATION OF PROJECT FINANCING ACTIVITIES 
The organisation of project finance activities and related issues 
such as the credit approval systems used were not originally included 
·as part of the study. but it emerged towards the end of the research 
that it could be an important area .for further study. Some basic 
findings relating to the organisation of project financing are '.:.:: 
included. however. 
-- --~------- --------- -- ------- ----- ._--- -- ----
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Most of the commercial banks interviewed had established a separate 
oil and gas or similarly named department.to engage in energy lending, 
and within these departments project financing for the energy 
industries was undertaken in addition to more traditional lending. 
Most of the major U.S. banks also had a 'Project Finance' department, 
usually located in their merchant banking subsidiary. These were 
found to be used primarily for advisory work and also lead management 
in natural resource projects, while the commercial bank dealt 
with lead managing energy project financings themselves. 
National Westminster and Barclays Bank International had an Energy 
department while Lloyds and Midland had both a project finance group 
and an oil and energy group. Generally, the banks interviewed 
employed a few people recruited from the oil industry, while the 
majority of the staff ·had a banking 
·background. In addition, some banks employed various types of 
engineers to assist with the technical aspects of project./ evaluation. 
Most commonly this was a reservoir engineer, although some banks 
interviewed also had access to mining engineers and geologists, 
refinery engineers, and civil engineers. 
All of the American and Canadian banks interviewed had access to in-
house engineers. However, only one American bank employed engineers 
in London, while one Canadian bank said they were considering it. 
The rest of the banks were able to call engineers over from America 
or Canada when required. 
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As far as the British banks were. concerned, the Bank of Scotland, 
the International Energy Bank, Barclays Bank International and 
European Banking Company employed in-house engineers, though in the 
last two cases one of the engineers was:_ sel f employed and only ... worked 
for them as and when'required. The rest of the banks. did not have 
any in-house expertise and said they would use outside consultants 
where ,necessary. ,Some did admit that when it came to the engineering 
meetings the lack of an engineer.on the staff was a prob lem as 
the meetings were extremely technical .. In-house engineers were also 
seen as useful when bidding for lead management or advisory roles, 
when they can be used to undertake a preliminary study of , the project 
to ensure that it is viable and financeable. However, among the 
reasons given for not employing full time engineers were: 
.1. The danger of getting out of touch with technical development 
2. The problem of keeping highly paid people fully occupied 
3, The high degree of specialisation of engineers. 
Some of the American banks agreed that it was not worth having engineers 
in London because there were no small scale projects· to·keep them 
·Occupied i'nbetwe·e~ major p·roje'cts (as there are in the U.S.A.). 
In-house engineers were found to be used for evaluating the reports 
of independent conSUltants and to watch over the independent consultant 
and sponsor so as to ensure that the .right questions are asked. This 
was seen as an important function for two main reasons: 
1, Reservoir engineering is not an exact science and banks thought 
it was useful to have a way of checking on the assumptions made 
by the sponsor and consultants 
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2. More contentiously, some banks suggested.that it was not in the 
interest of consultants to produce a very unfavourable report 
since, though technically independent they are paid by the project 
sponsor. 
The in-house engineers are apparently. not, however, used to undertake 
a full-scale evaluation of say, the reservoir for the lending banks, 
both because it would involve too much work for a small team of 
engineers, and also because no lead bank wished to accept responsibility 
for providing a reservoir evaluation to other lenders. It was also 
suggested that lenders would prefer an independent report from a 
well known consultant rather: than a report from the lead bank. 
_. -----~ - - - _._-
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. The fee can be set in a number of ways. Among the alternatives 
suggested in interviews were: 
(a) man hours worked 
(b) a lump sum amount 
(c) a p.ercentage of total funds raised 
(d) some combination of any of the above. 
2. See Chapter 11 for a discussion of the various sources of finance 
available. and the objectives applied when structuring the 
financing plan. 
3. See Petroleum Review. December 1977, p.66. 
,4. 'See MONTAGNON, P. Financial Times 7 September 1980, p.1. 
5. This was the situation for both Warburgs and Morgan Grenfell in 
the projects mentioned. 
6. These will include the evaluation of project risks and advice on 
the terms and conditions which will be acceptable to lenders. 
7. In view of the small size of their balance sheets it is accepted 
by the market that the merchant banks can give their 'seal of approval' 
to a loan while only lending a small amount. 
8. Because of internal and prudential lending limits banks will take 
a smaller proportionate share in a large loan. 
I 1-----
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NOTES (continued) 
9. For a good description of this process see: TERRELL. H.S. & 
MARTINSON. M.G. Bankers Magazine (U.S.) November 1978. and WOOD. P. 
"Law and Practice of International Finance" Chapter 11. 
10. In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litigation. 420 F. Suppl. 998 
(J.P.M.D.L. 1976). See RYAN. R.H. Journal of Commercial Bank 
Lending January 1978 for a review of the facts and implications 
of this case. 
11. See WOOD. P. "Law and Practice of International Finance" p.260-61. 
for a discussion of these exclusion clauses. 
12. For further details on the marketing of syndicated loans see 
TERRELL & MARTINSDN op cit. p.37-38. 
13. One of the new exceptions was the $200 million Maureen field loan 
/ 
for Agip (U.K.) led by Credit Lyonnais (see MONTAGNON. P. 
Financial Times. 24 November 1980). 
14. This view is supported by CLARKE & MARTIN. Euromoney. October 
1980. p.240. 
15. See CLARKE & MARTIN. op cit p.240. 
16. See CUDABACK. D. Institutional Investor. July 1980. p.95. 
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NmES (continue_d) 
17. Its shareholders are: Banque de la Societe Financiers 
Europsenne 20% 
Bank of Scotland 15% 
Barclays Bank International 15% 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 20% 
Republic National Bank of Dallas 20% 
Banque Worms 10% 
18. These were loans to finance the Piper and Claymore fields for 
both Thomson Scottish Associates and Occidental Petroleum. 
19. A consortium bank owned by partners in the EBIC group. 
20. Goldman Sachs; First Boston; Salomon Brothersl and Loeb Rhoades, 
Hornblower & Co. 
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PART II 
PRACTICES IN PROJECT FINANCING 
~~-~~.~~~ ~~--~-~ 
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CHAPTER 5 
RISK AND PROJECT FINANCING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
When defining project financing in Chapter 2, one of its character-
istics was said to be the transference of some or all of the 
project risKs from the project sponsor to either lenders or other 
third parties. One of the functions of both advisors and lead managers 
is to determine how much risk can be borne by the lenders and how 
much should remain with the sponsors or be passed to third parties . 
. -. 
This Chapter provides the background to this process by discussing 
the concept of risk. bank lending risk~ and the theory of risk analysis. 
5.2 THE CONCEPT OF RISK 
It is not intended to enter into a discussion of the most appropriate 
1 definition of risk since the debate does not appear to have been 
resolved as yet. As a working definition, however, the one given 
by Rowe (1) Iolas adopted: "Risk is the potential for realization of 
unwanted negative consequences of an event". 
This notion of risk is what some have called 'pure' risk - any 
potential negative consequences (e.g. losses or reduced benefits) 
are considered. The definition is however still somewhat vague since 
the term risk may be used to describe simply the possibility of a 
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negative outcome no matter how remote, or to describe the probability 
of the negative outcome occurring. The following statement which 
can be made about project financing serves to illustrate this. It 
can be said that banks are only prepared to shoulder certain risks 
if the risk is low. In other words banks are prepared to accept 
the possibility of something going wrong if they believe that the 
probabili ty of it happening is low. Hoc..],,:.vq--, 'I (0'''' p<,*>c,b, \ cl ,;\, "u,,-':;_ 
(u" ..... h c ......... c...s'ScC:-i.~krl h ,c1h ,"lCS,S;\k,\€ '~'l:':J~+\"'''''''e c.\..~+,-.C\l""@ .·"'c ..... } (~~~c:.cl"-;e.I2_ 
~\-'\\\ ('\ "',qh :e~:fJ&'-''t(-'c\ \/<=.\\0(::" .0 V '\cSS: 
No satisfactory way could be found to avoid using the term risk to 
cover both situations but it is felt that the sense in which is used 
should be clear from the context of the sentence. 
Another concept that needs to be introduced is the distinction made 
by Rowe ((1) p.17-1S, between descriptive uncertainty and measurement 
uncertainty. Descriptive uncertainty was defined as "an absence of 
information relating to the identity of the variables that explicitly 
define a system", while measurement uncertainty is "absence of infor-
mation relating to the specification of value assigned to each variable 
in the sys tem" • 
5.3 RISK IN BANKING 
The risks to which banks are exposed may be categorised in numerous 
ways. Moore (2) for example, classified banking risks as follows: 
1.: Credit risk - the risk that the assets of the bank will not 
be repaid in full and on time. 
2. Liquidity risk - the risk that the bank will be unable to repay 
its depositors on time because it lacks 
------- ----------- ---
3. Interest rate 
risk 
4. Currency risk 
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readily available money (particularly 
because of maturity mismatching). 
the risks that the cost of liabilities rises, 
faster, or exceeds the earnings on, assets. 
- the risk of loss arising from the movement 
in the relative rates of exchange between 
currencies. 
5. Investment risk - the risk of the principal value of securities, 
bonds and debentures declining in value as 
interest rates rise. 
6. COIM'.ercial risk - the risk ,of fraud, operational error and 
mistakes, incompetence or forgetfulness. 
Project financing can give rise to exposure in all the categories 
of risk listed above, with the exception of investment risk. The 
present thesis is concerned solely ~Ji th the credit risk in pro ject 
financing and does not consider the other risks. These risks will 
be dealt with by the banks in the context of the overall management 
of their balance sheets, and they are not specific to project financing. 
nature 
No fundamental differences in the / of project finance loans were 
found which ~JOuld give rise to special problems of illiquidity, 
currency mismatching or interest rate risk that are not encountered 
in normal eurocurrency lending. The only possible exception to this 
was the fact, that many project finance loans generally permitted 
greater flexibility in repayment than is the case in normal loans, 
and this could therefore give rise to problems in managing liquidity 
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positions. However. since these loans would only constitute a very 
small proportion of a bank's total loan book the effect was thought 
to be small and therefore, not meriting a detailed study of liquidity 
management. 
As regards the amount of risk that banks should take, Crosse and 
Hempel (3) argued that: 
"Taking risk can almost be said to be the business 
of bank management . ....•• On the other hand, a bank 
that takes excessive risks, or, what is more likely, 
"takes them without recognising their extent or even 
their existence" will surely run into difficulty." (my italics) 
Thus it would seem to be accepted that banks should take certain 
.~- . 
risks, although not excessive risks, provided that they are aware 
of their existence and magnitude. This, as is discussed in section 
5.4, is the reason for a formal approach to risk analysis in project 
financing. 
Two factors (should) mitigate against banks taking excessive credit 
risks, however. Firstly, banks are highly geared organisations which 
finance their lending largely from borrowed funds. Therefore, if their 
assets fall in value by more than a small amount their cushion of 
profitability and capital will be eroded and the future of the bank 
jeopardised. 
Secondly, lenders are remunerated principally by a small and fixed 
2 
margin over their ,cost of funds. This means that: 
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"a bank normally has no 'upside potential' on its (loan) assets: 
if the project being financed is particularly successful, the interest 
rate received does not automatically rise" (4 ) • Un like an equity 
investor the lender cannot balance out failures and unexpectedly 
successful projects. If the project goes surprisingly well,the 
interest spread is unchanged, while if it fails the bank may lose 
its loan. 
These two considerations go a long \-Jay to explain the traditional 
conservatism of banks in lending generally and their approach to the 
analysis of risk in project financing in particular. 
5.4 RISK ANALYSIS 
During the review of the project financing literature, it became clear 
that the analysis of project risks waS an important aspect of project 
financing 3 ,Moreover, it was also evident that the ana lysis was 
more formalised than in traditional lending. It was therefore decided 
to use risk analysis as a framework to examine bank practices in 
analysing project risk. 
Revell (5)' reported that the theory, of ,risk analysis Was developed 
during the 1950's. It has been applied to several situations including 
the analysis of the societal risk of nuclear power stations and liquefied 
natural gas plants 4 a~qndustrial risk management 5 Revell also 
applied it to the analysis of risk in banking. 
----~ 
-- ------ --- ~--
----- -- --- -------- -~ ~----------- -----
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The processes involved in: risk analysis are shown in Figure 5.1 and 
may be summarised as follows: 
. 1. Risk identification - this is concerned with identifying the 
nature of the risks that a project. could be exposed to, thus 
reducing'descriptive uncertainty: 
2. Risk estimation - this involves measuring each risk in order to 
3. 
determine the likelihood of the risk occurring and the severity 
of ~he loss, thus resolving'measurement uncertainty: 
6 Risk control - this involves a decision on the best method of 
handling the particular risk. Horrigan (6) lists the following 
alternatives: 
(i) Risk avoidance - in a lending situation this would obviously 
mean declining to participate. 
(ii) Risk assumption - when looked at from the lender's viewpoint 
this means that the lenders will shoulder the risk. This 
may be planned or unplanned. 
(iii) Loss prevention or reduction - this involves attempts to 
reduce the chance of loss. An example in project financing 
might be the negotiation of a sales contract with a minimum 
floor price. 
(iv) Risk transfer - from the sponsor's viewpoint risks may be 
transferred either to lenders or to third parties by the 
use of insurance, government guarantees etc. 
(v) Hedging - an example in project financing is arranging 
finance in the same currency as project revenues to hedge 
an exchange risk. 
------ ----'- ----
--- ~- -~-- --- ---
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(vi) Combination - for project sponsors this may involve using 
a joint ventur~while for lenders it is the syndication 
of a loan among several banks. Pooling risk 
reduces the exposure of anyone bank or sponsor to project 
risks. 
The framework of risk analysis seemed to be sufficiently broad to 
cover the activities of advisors. lead managers and lenders. They 
all undertak" the same process of identifying. measuring and deciding 
how to control the risks. although the options available in the control 
of risk in particular do vary. The advisor is generally employed 
from the very start of the project and will have considerable flexi-
bi lity in choosing risk control methods. The lead manager on the 
other hand. may be presented with a situation in which .for example. 
the sales contracts have already been negotiated. Therefore. the 
options available may be reduced. Finally. lenders will be faced 
with only one risk control option - to accept or decline to lend to 
the proposition they are offered. They may also however. have some 
scope for varying the amount they are prepared to lend. 
It should also be emphasised that while the three elements of identi-
fication. measurement and control will always be present they may not 
be performed in such clearly defined sequential steps. .Firstly. many 
bankers have a clear idea of the risks which will affect a particular 
project and so do not have to formally identify them. Secondly. some 
of the risk control measures may have been taken before the banks 
become involved and so the risk measurement will take place using 
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the situation after, for example, long-term sales contracts have 
been negotiated, rather than being used to determine whether they are 
necessary. Thirdly, the process is iterative, and one in which the 
banks will have to negotiate with the borrower to obtain the.security 
or the terms that they require. Depending on the relative bargaining 
strengths of the borrower and the bank~certain options may not be· 
available and the bank will have to go back and consider other 
alternatives to arrive at a solution which is acceptable to both 
borrowers and lenders. It must be emphasised that the solution has 
to be acceptable not only to the lead manager; the real question is 
whether it will sell in the market. 
While the framework of risk analysis is an over-simplicat:Lon it was 
considered a useful way of highlighting the processes involved and 
presenting them in a clea·r manner. 
--~----- ------
- -~-
-----
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. For such a discussion see. for example. WOOD. O.G. Journal of 
Risk and Insurance. March 1964. 
2. A few project financings have involved the payment of a .royalty. 
however. 
3. HOFMANN. M.O. argued. for example. that ....... lenders to the 
project must be fully aware of the potential risks peculiar to 
each aspect of the project in order to analyse its overall 
credi tworthiness" • (AMR/Euromoney Conference on Project 
. .-" 
Financing. November 1979. p.5). 
4. See for example. KEENEY. R.L. et al Omega. Vol. 7(3]. 1979. 
p.191-2D5. 
5. See. for example. HORRIGAN. W. "Risk. Risk Management and Insurance". 
6. This is sometimes termed risk evaluation. but for reasons of 
clarity the term risk control is preferred. 
'. 
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CHAPTER· 6 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Risk identification is concerned with the removal of descriptive 
uncertainty and involves determining the type of risks to which a 
project could be exposed. 
6.2 PROCESS OF RISK IDENTIFICATION 
Horrigan (1) mentioned two broad approaches which are used by risk 
managers in industry. The first is the 'check list' approach whereby 
the risk manager inspects an existing or proposed project and 
determines which of the risks mentioned on the check-list apply in 
that situation. Secondly, there is the 'flow chart' approach which 
"is an attempt to itemise all the operations and services which are 
interposed between the suppliers of raw materials and the final 
consumer". (Horrigan., (1) p.18J. 
The approach adopted by banks appeared .to be more akin to the check-
list approach. At the same time, the process differed in several 
respects. None of the banks interviewed used a formal written check-
list of risks which was designed to cover all projects. The process 
of risk identification appeared to be far more intuitive. Secondly, 
unlike the industrial risk manager, the banks appeared to use much 
broader categories of risk. Thirdly, the industrial risk manager is 
primarily concerned with specific aspects of technical risks. Bankers 
----- -~-----.-~-~~-
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are not technical people nor have they the time to undertake a 
detailed review of the technical aspects of the project. To a large 
extent they are reliant on the ability of the project sponsor in 
this area. 
6.3 PRINCIPAL PROJECT RISKS 
This Chapter is concerned solely with the identification of risks. 
Discussion of the ways banks measure and control these risks is the 
subject of subsequent chapters. Much of the illustrations regarding 
the nature of project risks are drawn from North Sea Oil projects. 
This is simply because information "Jas more readily available for 
these projects, although the risk~,identified below can arise in any 
type of project. 
The principal project risks mentioned in the literature and by bankers 
may be summarised as follows: 
1;:' Completion risk 
2. Cost overrun risk 
3. ·Raw material risk 
4. Reserve risk 
5 • -Market risk 
6. • Operating risk 
7. Operator risk 
8. Consortium structure risk 
9. i Country risk 
10. Credit risk 
11 . 'Exchange rate risk 
12. Transportation risk. 
13. Legal risk. 
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Exploration risks are not 'included in this list as project finance 
is not used to finance exploration costs. Banks will only be 
approached for project finance once an oil field has been explored 
and is considered commercial. 
6.3.1, Completion Risk 
'Completion'is used in project financing to rnean much more than com-
pleUon of construction. lA project is only considered complete when 
"it"'is, built and producing at planned levels. 
, . 
The completion risk was thought by most bankers 'interviewed to be the ,mos! 
" ~gnif~,,-op,:,projep~I'~Sk faC:tor'. Completion risk covers not only non-
completion but also the risk of delay in completion. and the risk that 
the technology. once 'completed'. will be inadequate to produce the 
output in the quantities and/or qualities assumed. The risk will 
obviously be higher when new technologY is involved. but it is 
important in all projects N on-completion would clearly give 
risk to the largest potential loss. ( a half completed pipeline 
300 feet below the sea has very little scrap value), but the other 
aspect; are also Significant. ·S'ince~lenders-in 'project-financing are 
. ---- - - ~ ~ 
pr1lTlarHy -reliant on the cash flow from the project and ~ince this 
cesnf-low will not commence until the project is complEite.' any delay 
,--:--- -
in completion could have a serious effect on the ability of the 
proj'ect to meet planned repayments. Moreover. particularly at times 
of high interest rates. the additional interest charges incurred 
during the period of delay may be considerable and reduce the viability 
of the project. 
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C~stle (2) surveyed 29 project financings1 and found that one of the 
most/common problems was the inability to complete a project within the 
time span originally anticipated. Only 17 projects .had reached a point 
where they could be evaluated and of these 10 (59%) had experienced 
completion delays. These delays ranged from 1 month to 20 months and 
5 projects (29%) were delayed for 6 months or more. 
In certain areas the problems of delay are particularly severe. In 
the North Sea, for example, even the most experienced oil companies 
have encountered serious completion delays, particularly in the 
construction and installation of. offshore platforms. The float-out 
and installation of a platform requires very calm seas and this 
'weather window' is relatively short. If this is missed. installation 
may have to be delayed for almost a year. 
2 To give a few specific.examples of delay in the North Sea, the Frigg 
jacket sank while being tm-led into position; completion of the steel 
platform for the Piper field was delayed by 5-6 months by industrial 
disputes, and final delay was 19 months; and the Brent 'A' platform 
was delayed for 2 years owing to a combination of design problems, 
industrial disputes and an accident involving one of the key cranes. 
--------_._- ---------- ---- --------- ---~ ----~ .----------. - --------
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TABLE B.1 
SELECTED NORTH SEA' FIELDS START-UP DELAYS 
ORIGINAL(1) ACTUAL (2 ) DELAY 
PLANNED START-UP (MONTHS) 
START-UP OF PRODUCTION 
Argyll June 1974 June 1975 12 
Auk May 1974 December 1975 18 
Beryl November 1975 June 1976 7 
Claymore March 1977 November : 1977 8 
Dunlin Novembe'r 1976 August 1978 21 
Forties (3) November 1974 September 1975 10 
Heather July 1978 - October 1978 3 
Montrose July 1976 June 1976 -
Ninian(4) June 1978 December '1978 6 
Piper May 1975 December .: 1976 19 
Thistle February 1977 April 1978 14 
( 1 ) Source: Wood Mackenzie, North Sea Report, May 1976, p.7 
(2) Source: Offshore Engineer, Oil & Gas Activity Supplement, 
January 1980. 
(3) Start up date of first platform 
(4 ) Start up date of first platform 
---.,. - ---- . -_. __ ... 
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Table 6.1 analyses the expected and actual start-up date for certain 
North Sea fields which have been completed. Not all of these were 
project financing (Claymore, Forties, 'Piper, Ninian and Thistle were), buj; 
they, serve to illustrate the importance of 'completion risks. 
6.3.2 Cost Overrun Risk 
Cost overrun", or cost escalatio'l has been defined as: 
"The"difference 'between the original estimate of 
the final cost of the project and the final out-turn 
cost or latest estimate of the final cost" (3) . 
. -- .-
In project financing only the final out-turn cost is important. It 
should also be remembered that the original cost estimate 
already includffi an allowance for expected cost increases and also a 
contingency of, say, 10%, to cover unspecified increases, and that 
the cost escalation represents increases over this amount. The effect 
of unplanned cost overruns is clearly to give rise to additional 
financing requirements to enable the project to be completed. In the 
extreme this could cause a dilemma for lenders as they may have to 
increase their lending to enable the project to be completed and yet 
project cash flows may be insufficient to service the additional 
debt. 
In Castle's survey this proved to be the most common difficulty 
associated with new projects. Of the 17 projects in his sample, 12 
(71%) experienced cost overruns 3 These overruns ranged from 
-- - ~ -----
- ~----- -~--
- ----
-- ----
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TABLE 6.2 
FORTIES FIELD DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF 
DEVELOPMENT COST ESCALATION 
$M ESTIMATE ACTUAL MID 1972 COST 
Platform 499 1,540 
Drilling 116 520 
Pipeline 162 2B5 
Terminal 47 BD 
Multi purpose support vessel - 100 
Miscellaneous 
-
. 76 155 .. 
900 2,6BO 
--
Source: Wood Mackenzie 
------
----
- ---- ----~ 
.. _----
-------
---
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300% to 5% of original cost, and 8 projects (47%) had overruns of 
more than 20%. Moreover, most of these projects were completed before 
the acceleration in inflation rates from the mid 1970s onwards. 
Cost escalation in North Sea projects has been the subject of a special 
study commissioned by the Department of Energy (3). This study 
concluded that the cost escalation: 
"is best considered as a manifestation of the 
difficulties of managing, to a short time scale, 
the design, resourcing and fabrication of novel 
and complex structures and installing and 
commissioning them in a hostile environment." 
The Study found (p.35) that, taking the expected cost of all fields 
being developed in September 1973, the estimated cost (or out-turn 
cost) of the projects had increased by 144% in a period of 18 months. 
Of this, unanticipated inflation accounted for about 30%, and increases 
in the physical quantities of resources required accounted for about 
90%. 
To give just one example of cost escalation, Table 6.2 gives a break-
down of the costs associated with developing the Forties field. In 
1972 B.P. raised $930 million (in fact £180 million + $468 million). 
This figure \,as originally expected to be sufficient to finance the 
whole of the development cost, but in the event the actual cost was 
almost three times as much. Although B.P. had no difficult in meeting 
this cost escalation, and although the project was still viable, in 
different circumstances such cost escalation could cause considerable 
problems. 
----
----
----
--------
---
-----
---
-----
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Cost escalation in the North Sea was apparently due, in a large part, 
to the fact that oil and construction companies had little idea of 
the extent of the technical problems in developing a North Sea field. 
For example, Wood Mackenzie (4) reported that many designers under-
estimated the thickness of steel that was required for North Sea 
platforms. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that the extent of cost escalation is as 
great in current North Sea projects. As in most situations there is 
a 'learning curve' and even in 1976 Wood Mackenzie (4), p.B, said 
"Today, there are genuine reasons for believing that the average rate 
of escalation in North Sea development costs have been tempered ....... . 
.. ,-" 
At the same time, however, it is still an important risk area for banks 
to examine. 
6.3.3 Raw Material Supply/Price Risk 
This risk only appl'ies in processing and pipeline projects where, in 
order for the project to generate revenues, raw materials have to be 
input into the facility. The risk is that the required inputs will 
either be unavailable or only available at a much higher price than 
was assumed in the cash flow projections. In some cases, if raw 
materials are unavailable from the planned source, the project may be 
jeopardised. Smith (5), for example, pointed out that: 
"Ore from different mines sometimes differs sufficiently 
to require specific design variations in processing plant 
.which significantly limit, or even preclude, substitution 
between alternative sources of supply in the short-term". 
Just as important as the supply of physical raw materials (e.g. crude 
oil and ore) is the supply and price of the other inputs such as 
---
---
------
------
-----
-----
-----
------
-~ ---
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TABLE 6.3 
NORTH SEA OIL RECOVERY FACTORS 
U.K. SECTOR RECOVERY NORWEGIAN RECOVERY 
FIELD FACTOR SECTOR FACTOR 
(PER CENT) FIELD (PER CENT) 
Argyll 15 Albuskjell 52.5 
Auk 42.5 Balder 20 
Beryl 40 Cod 50 
Brent 47.5 Edda 31 
Buchan 25 Ekofisk 20 
Claymore 35 W. Ekofisk 35 
---
Cormorant S. 45 Eldfisk 14.5 
Dunlin 42.5 E. Eldfisk 16 
Forties 40 Hod 32 
Heather 40 Murchison 44 
Montrose 50 Sleipner 19 
Murchison 40 Statfjord 50 
Ninian 37 Tor 27 
Piper 40 Setor 21 
Statfjord 50 Valhall 24 
Tartan 37.5 
Thistle 50 
SOURCE: JOHNSON. C. "North Sea Energy Wealth 1965-85" 
V~o~1'.'1r.~p-.~3Z~~~---------------
(Taken from Wood Mackenzie figures) 
-._---- - --------
-
- -~---------
--------- -- -- -----"-- ---~---~- ------
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power supplies and labour. In certain processes such as the smelting 
of aluminium, the supply of electricity is of paramount impor.tance to 
the viability of the project. According to Hodson (6) "Up to half the 
cost of producing aluminium from the raw material, bauxite, is accounted 
for by energy used in the.processes". 
An example given by Kuczynski (7) illustrates another aspect of the raw 
material supply risk. The Trans-Andean oil pipeline was apparently 
undertaken before there were sufficient technical assurances from 
reputable sources that at least 300,000 barrels a day would be available 
to be put through the pipeline. In fact in 1977 at least, the likely 
flow was half the expected amount. 
6.3.4 Reserve Risk 
The equivalent of the raw material supply risk in extractive ventures 
(minerals and hydrocarbons) is the reserve risk. There are two main 
elements to this risk. Firstly, there is the risk that the reserves in 
place will not be as much as was originally expected. Secondly, there 
is the risk that not as much can be extracted as was planned. It is 
never economically or technically viable to recover 100% of the reserves 
in ·place. Tiratsoo (B) suggested that in gas reservoirs as much as 90% 
.. of the reserves in place can be recovered, while in oil reservoirs the 
recovery factor may be much lower. North Sea Oil recovery factors 
average about 40% in the U.K. sector and 30% in the Norwegian sector. 
Table 6.3 gives the recovery factors estimated by Wood Mackenzie & Co. 
for several North Sea oilfields. 
If recoverable reserves are less than forecast, then clearly the amount 
of project cash flow available to repay the loans will be reduced. 
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This became a problem in one of the projects surveyed by Castle (2). 
The amount of reserve risk was said to vary depending on the type of 
project. Thus in coal mining. it is relatively easy to determine the 
size of reserves. On the other hand. because of the high cost of 
drilling exploration and delineation wells, the reserve estimates in 
offshore oil and gas reserves are based on a relatively small amount· 
of information. White (9), for example, pointed out that while "in a 
typical U.S. field an oil company might drill 15 exploratory wells to 
prove a field, in the North Sea, where drilling costs may be ten to 
twenty times as high, oil companies are having to make do with four 
wells to prove a field". Moreover,· as Tiratsoo (S) stated: 
"Since many of the factors which are needed to 
calculate the volumes of oil or gas that were 
originally in-place in an accumulation will only 
be obtainable after a number of wells have been 
drilled into it and the field put into production, 
the extent of the reserves of oil or gas originally 
present and ultimately likely to be recoverable 
may not be calculable until an appreciable proportion 
of the field's life-history has elapsed". 
Since finance is required to drill the wells and put the field into 
production, banks are required to make decisions while there is still 
considerable uncertainty over the amount of recoverable reserves. 
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Because of uncertainty in'the measurement. reserves are usually 
classified as either 'proven'. 'probable' or 'possible' and are 
4 
defined as follows 
'Proven' reserves - those which on available evidence are virtually 
certain to be technically and economically 
recoverable. 
'Probably' reserves - those which are estimated to have better than 
50% chance of being technically and economically 
recoverable. 
'Possible' reserves - those which at present are estimated to have 
6.3.5 Market Risk 
significantly less than 50% chance of being 
technically and economically recoverable. 
This risk again has two elements. first. the risk that the output of 
the project cannot be sold in the planned quantities [marketability 
risk). and secondly. the risk that the market price will fall below 
the level assumed in the cashflow projections [price-risk). 
Any reduction in either market price and/or marketability of the 
product will have a direct effect on the revenues generated by the 
project and therefore. on the ability of the project. to service its 
debt. 
1970 = 100 1968 1969 
Copper (1 ) 87.7 103.6 
Nickel(2) 74.2 83.1 
Aluminium (3 ) 90.0 95.8 
(1) LME Settlement price 
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TABLE 6.4 
METAL PRICE TRENDS 
1970 1971 1972 
100.0 75.3 72.5 
100.0 101.5 103.1 
100.0 100.5 212.7 
--~ 
(2) Free market price. refined. delivered 
(3) Virgin ingots. delivered 
SOURCE: Annual ,Abstract of Statistics 
1973 1974 1975 1976 
123.3 148.8 9'4.6 132.2 
114.8 135.9 168.3 226.6 
234.0 174.0 156.7 342.6 
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Certain types of project are particularly susceptible to market risks. 
The prices of many minerals are particularly volatile (see Table 6.4 
for examples) and in addition. some minerals do not have a broad 
international market. Thus. for example. Radetzki & Zorn (10) 
suggested that in the case of refined copper. lead. zinc and tin. 
there will always be a market for the 'product at same price through 
the London Metal Exchange and so the price risk is the main element 
in the market risk. On the other hand. metals such as 
bauxite. iron, ore and copper,concentrates are less readily market-
able through the international metal exchanges. 
LNG projects face particular problem of marketability. They are 
.. - . 
designed as an integrated scheme from well-head to ultimate user. 
and. as Lewand and Meyer (11) pointed out. at present the ability to 
transfer to alternative markets is limited. The number of receiving 
facilities available to handle LNG imports is limited. and LNG ships 
are designed for specific routes and so may not be able to be switched 
to other routes. Transportation costs, may also preclude 
alternative routes. 
Natural gas projects may also face peculiar market risks in view of 
the fact that in many countries there is a monopoly over the purchase 
of gas. 
Crude oil appears to be one of the few commodities encountered in 
project financing which has a broad international market and is 
traded widely. 
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The market price risk proved to be a problem in one of the projects 
in Castle's sample. De Gavre (12) also reported that it was 
necessary to reschedule some of the debt for the Soroako nickel 
project in view of depressed world nickel prices. 
6.3.6 Operating Risk 
This heading covers the many problems that may be encountered once 
the project is in operation. Included in this section are risks 
such as fire, earthquake, blowout etc. which are sometimes termed 
'force majeure' risks. 
Operating risks may result in either interruption in production or 
higher operating costs and may. therefore" either delay or reduce the 
ability of the project to service its debts. 
Of the 17 matured projects in Castle's survey. 9 (53%) had severe 
trouble in this respect. Two ended in bankruptcy and six othe~s did 
not generate enough cash flow during some period of the financing to 
cover payments of principal. 
Projects in the North Sea have faced significant operating risks. 
In 1977 there was a 'blowout' on the Bravo platform in the Ekofisk 
field which interrupted production. In November 1976 
the Ekofisk 'A' platform caught fire which again interrupted produc-
tion. and a break in the Thistle pipeline caused production to be 
halted. 
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Stalvies (13) also pointed out that it is not known how the concrete 
used in large gravity platform will perform over a long period of 
time. as in the past it has not been possible to test it under the 
conditions to which it is now exposed. Similarly in the case of 
steel platforms there is a risk of corrosion. 
6.3.7 Operator Risk 
Closely allied to the operating risk is the technical and managerial 
ability of the operator to plan. commission and operate the project. 
As Hofmann (14) has pointed out: 
"All too often. lenders focus on the technicalities 
of the project and do not sufficiently examine the 
experience. integrity and commitment of the project 
management and do not sufficiently scrutinise the 
ability of the operator to optimise profitability .••• 
Granted a good operator cannot create hydrocarbon reserves 
itself. but it can certainly make the best of any given 
situation ....... ". 
In most lending situations bankers assess the integrity and 
experience of the borrower but in project financing. banks may also 
have to extend their assessment to other parties. When a joint 
venture or consortium is set up. one company is appointed as 
operator. While major decisions are approved by majority vote. 
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the operator will be responsible for the day-ta-day operations of 
the project. Since most partners will raise finance individually. 
the borrower may well not be the operator of the project. Indeed 
in the Piper and Claymore field. one of the partners. Thomson Scottish 
of oil projects. 
Associates had no previous experience/ The lenders were. therefore. 
reliant on the ability and expertise of Occidental. the operator. 
Moreover. while information on the reservoir. for example, is'examined 
by independent consultants, consultants have to rely on basic data 
provided by the operator. Thus the integrity of the operator is 
important. 
.-6.3.8 Consortium Structure RisK 
This risk applies when projects are joint venture operations owned 
by several companies. The first consideration here is that the 
borrower may only have a small share in the project and lenders to 
that company will therefore have no way of ensuring that the project 
is developed and operated as they wish. They are dependent on the 
decisions reached by a majority vote. While it is difficult to 
conceive of situations in which other participants would reach decisions 
which prejudiced the ability of one bank to repay, this is still a 
risk which is apparently considered. 
The second aspect to this risk is specific to North Sea projects; 
(similar rules may apply elsewhere but this is not known for certain). 
Davies (15) pointed out that U.K. petroleum production licences are 
issued jointly to all members of the consortium and no. member has 
a right to a divisible share of the licence. Thus a breach by any 
one member of its licence obligations could result in the Department 
of Energy revoking the licence without compensation to the non-
defaulters. 
The consortium documents are also likely to require that each member 
of the consortium is responsible for a pro-rata share of the obliga-
tions of a defaulting member. If the borrower is unable to meet this. 
it may then also be in default and therefore. 103e its interest in 
the field. Thus the lenders could face a dilemma between lending 
more to enable the borrower to meet the obligations of the defaulting 
member. or permit the .borrower to default as well. 
The result is that the lenders are closely concerned with the 
ability of all 'consortium members to meet both their financial 
obligations and licence obligations. 
6.3.9 Country Risk 
Nagy (16) defined country risk as: 
"Exposure to a loss in a cross-border lending. caused 
by events in 'a particular country. events which are. 
at least to some extent. under the control of the 
government. but definitely not under the control of a 
. private enterprise or individual". 
FIGURE 6.1 COMPONENTS OF POLITICAL RISK 
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Country risk can be further divided into two categories: 
(i)" Political risk 
(ii) Economic risk 
(i) Political risk 
The term political risk has been used to cover many different 
situations. 5 Some authors equate political risk with political 
change and instability - e.g. civil war, riots, coups etc. 
Others 6 define it more broadly to encompass the "possible 
occurrence of political events of any kind that cause a loss of 
profi t potential and/or assets........ This broader definition 
accorded more with the interpretation of political risk by the 
bankers interviewed. The components of this broader definition 
of political risk are summarised in Figure 6.1. Gebelein (17) 
divided up the components of political risk into two broad 
categories. Firstly, those actions which affect repatriation of 
either oil or revenues. Of these, the latter is probably of 
greater concern to the lender since if project revenues cannot be 
sent abroad, repayment of loans will be impossible. 
The second broad category covers political actions producing an 
inadequate return on investment. The most extreme situations are 
damage to facilities resulting from wars and riots, and sudden 
expropriation or nationalisation. !n addition, projects can be 
affected by more subtle forms of government interference, such as 
increased taxes or royalties: imposition of import duties on raw 
materials or restrictions on their importation: price controls: 
controls on production; and renegotiation of the sharing arrangements 
7 
under production sharing contracts 
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The U.K. government·s taxation policy is a significant aspect 
of political risk for North Sea Oil projects. The U.K: govern-
ment also has powers to control the rate of depletion of a 
field to ensure that oil companies do not deplete it too quickly. 
Although production plans are approved by the Department of 
Energy and they have given assurances that any use of their 
powers to cut production would 'recognise the technical and 
commercial aspects of the field in question' 8 • there is still 
a danger that controls could be introduced or some other regula-
tion added. A good example of the latter:is the restrictions 
on the flaring of gas. Frequently gas is found in small un-
economic quantities mixed with oil. If this gas cannot be 
collected or reinjected into the wel~ and if flaring is restricted. 
the only alternative is to reduce production. Johnson (18) 
reported. for example, that the Brent B platform had to be shut 
down from June 1977 till late summer 1978 because of restrictions 
on flaring. Shell estimated that the cost was £57 million in 
revenue postponed. 
(ii) Economic risk 
Economic risk refers to the ability of a country to generate 
foreign exchange either by a surplus on the current account of 
the balance of payments or new foreign capital inflows. A 
consideration of economic risk is of prime importance in balance 
of payments lending where repayment of foreign loans can only 
be achieved if foreign exchange can be generated. 
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In Section 3 •. 32 •. however. it was suggeste.d that economic risk could 
be avoi.ded. provided that the project was located in the export 
sector of the economy and therefore. generated its o.m foreign 
exchange with which to repay project loans. 
However. economic risk must be considered if. for example. the 
project carries a government guarantee. The lender is then 
concerned with the creditworthiness of the government and its 
ability to repay if called upon. 
Moreover. Eschenlauer (19) has pointed out that: 
"a host country in favourable economic circumstances 
will be less motivated to put pressure on the cash 
flows of a·petroleum project. which is why it is 
important to have a feel for the overall economic 
outlook for the country". 
Economic risk may. therefore. affect a project in two main ways: 
Firstly. when a government guarantor is unable to repay. and 
secondly. if the government if forced to use increas~in taxes 
(or impose exchange controls restricting remittance of earnings) 
to correct economic problems. 
6.3.10 Credit Risk 
Although. when defining project financing. it was said that banks 
treat the project as a separate entity. and although the non-
recourse aspects of p~oject financing are frequently emphasised. in 
many cases lenders are exposed to a corporate credit risk. 
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As was emphasised in Chapter 2. however. the corporate credit risk 
is accessory. or secondary. in project financing since it will only 
arise in the security given to support a project. 
Depending on the arrangements. banks may have to assess the credit 
risk of both the project sponsor and/or third parties. Exposure to 
credit risks will arise when such security as sales contracts. sponsor 
or third party guarantees. and completion guarantees are given. The 
reason why the credit risk is important should be clear - there is 
little point in taking a completion guarantee which requires the 
sponsor to meet cost overruns. for example. if the company is not in 
a position to do so. As noted in section 6.3.8. the credit standing 
of other consortium members in a--p-~oject is also considered important. 
6.3.11 Exchange Rate Risk 
This risk can arise if borrowing is denominated in one currency but 
the cash flows from which repayment is to be made is in a different 
currency. While the cash flow may be sufficient to service the debt 
at existing exchange rates. there is a risk that fluctuations in 
exchange rate could affect the ability to service debt. 
6.3.12 Transportation Risk 
This is a risk mentioned by Yassukovich (20). and involves the possibility 
that interruption in the availability of transportation facilities 
(pipelines. tankers. LNG carriers etc.). will affect the ability of 
the project to generate revenues and thus service its debts. We have 
already mentioned the risk of damage to pipelines under the heading 
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of operational risk. Transportation risk is also seen to be 
particularly important in LNG projects where the ships are highly 
specialised and are designed for,specific routes. If ships are laid 
up for maintenance or repairs, it may not be possible to find other 
ships to transport the LNG. 
6.3.13 Legal Risk 
The main aspect of legal risk involves the possibility that the terms 
and conditions of,the credit support and other agreements (discussed 
in chapter g) either contravene local laws or are inadequately drafted. 
This could leave certain loopholes in the legal structure of the project 
and give rise to problems for lenders at a future date. 
", 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. The type of projects and the exact definition of project 
financing were not stated, but the definition is believed to 
correspond to the one used in this thesis. 
2. Not all of these were 'project financing' situations but the 
nature and scale of the problem will be no different. 
3. The definition of cost overruns is not given but is believed 
to be the same as used here. 
4. Department of Energy "Development of the Oil & Gas Resources 
of the U.K." (1977). 
5. See GREEN, .R.T. Columbia Journal of World Business Spring 1974. 
6. For example, ROOT, F.R. in A. KAPOOR & P. GRUT (eds.) 
"Multinational Enterprise in Transition" Darwin Press 1972. p.57. 
7. It is reported in Offshore Engineer (September 1980, p.33) for 
instance that in 1975-6 Indonesia altered the production sharing 
terms from 60 : 40 to 85 : 15 in favour of the State oil company. 
8. The so called Varley Assurances - House of Commons Debates, 
Vol. 882, Cols. 648-650, 6 December 1974. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RISK MEASUREMENT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines the second stage of risk analysis- risk measure-
ment - which is concerned with the resolution of measurement 
uncertainty. 
7.2 PROCESS AND PURPOSE OF RISK MEASUREMENT 
Risk measurement in project financing was found to involve several 
processes. These are:-
1. Determining the likelihood of a particular risk occurring 
2. Determining the effect on the project of the occurrence of these 
risks 
3. Determining the effect on lenders of such risks. 
A distinction was made between the effect on the project and the 
effect on lenders of the occurrence of a particular risk as the results 
may not be the same. When structuring the project.:it is possible 
to take steps which either reduce the impact of a risk on project 
cash flow~ or ensure repayment even if project cash flows are reduced. 
The term risk measurement may imply a highly quantitative approach. 
and while this is true in other situations where risk· analysis is 
used. it was not found to be the case in project financing. Indeed 
many aspects of project risk are not capable of quantification. 
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Moreover. although the process of risk measurement·was divided into 
three elements above. these are not formal distinctions used by 
banks. Rather they represent a formalisation of a far more intuitive 
process. 
Risk measurement was found to be used for different purposes in 
project financing. depending on the type of activity the bank was 
undertaking. Advisors apparently used risk measurement to identify 
areas of particular ris~ with the objective of laying-off these risks 
to the most appropriate party to the satisfaction of both lenders 
and the project sponsor. Lead managers have much the same approach 
but. as was emphasised in Chapter 5. the flexibility may 
be more limited. as some of the structuring of the project may already 
.be completed. Lead managers also need to be aware of the riskiness 
of the project in order to set an appropriate level of remuneration 
commensurate with the amount of risk the lenders are shouldering. 
Finally. lenders ussdrisk measurement to assess the riskiness of the 
proposal in order to arrive at a decision on whether to participate 
or not. 
The process of risk measurement can be divided up into two main 
elements. although this again is not a formal distinction made by 
bankers. These may be termed: 
1. Technical assessment 
2. Economic assessment 
-- ._--- - --- ---- -- --- - . 
-127-
7.3 TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 
The technical assessment is basically a qualitative assessment of 
the technica) aspects of the project. It is primarily concerned 
with establishing the likelihood of a project risk occurring. Some 
technical aspects of the project will. of course. also be included 
in· the economic assessment if they are part of the project cashflow. 
The technical assessment will be considered under three main headings: 
reserve risKl country riskl and other risks. 
7.3.1 Reserve Risk 
The first element of reserve risk we identified in Chapter 6 was the 
oil in place risk. This is apparently not considered to be too 
serious a risk. at least when the geological structure of the field 
is not too complicated. The recoverability risk of a non producing 
field is. however. more difficult to assess. Parker (1) pointed out 
that: .. the optimum production rate cannot be accurately determined 
until production actually commences ...... .. 
Estimates for recoverable reserveS and the production profile of the 
field will be provided by the project sponsor (or operator). 'It is 
usual. howeve~for the banks to require reports from one. and sometimes 
two. independent consultants. Banks stated that these would be 
internationally known consultants (the most widely quoted example 
being De Goyler & MacNaughton). The report is prepared from basic 
data·1 provided by the project sponsor. and is therefore only 
an independent interpretation of the results obtained by the sponsor. 
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In addition to information on the reservoir, the consultant's report 
may also include a full cash flow forecast. Some independent 
s. 
consultants also carry out simulations of the reserves and sentivity 
" 
analysis of cash flows. 
Many American banks and some other banks were found to have access to 
in-house engineers, either in London or more usually in America. 2 
, 
These engineers are used to assess the independent consultants report, 
since many banks emphasised that reservoir engineering is far from 
an exact science. In one project that was studied, for example, two 
, 
independent consultants reports were produced. One of them gave a 
figure for recoverable reserves _1.] times higher than the other. 
However, since the amount of reserves required to repay the loan was 
only 30% of the lower estimate the risk to lenders was considered 
small. 
Banks then assess, on the basis of the above information, the 
magnitude of the reserve risk. In addition, if it is thought likely 
that reserves may be less than expected, banks said that they might 
also assess the impact of changes in the production profile on the 
viability of the project as part of the economic assessment. In this 
assessment banks usually err on the side of caution and only include 
'proven' recoverable reserves in the cash flow forecast. 
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7.3.2 Country Risk 
No direct questions were asked regarding the methods used to evaluate 
the political and economic risk of a country. This evaluation is 
performed as part of the bank's total international operations and 
is not specific to project financing. Therefore, it was thought 
appropriate to 'exclude it from the interviews. Some general comments 
were, however, made during interviews. 
When evaluating a project. a report on the political and economic 
risks of the country concerned will' be prepared by the bank's country 
risk experts. This report will assess the political stability of the 
country; its economic situation; and the importance of the project to 
the country as a whole. From thi~ banks can assess the likelihood of 
political risks occurring. As part of the economic assessment banks 
may also examine the impact of changes in taxation, royalties, production 
sharing contracts and depletion controls on the ability of the project 
to service its debt. 
7.3.3 Other RiSKS 
In order to establish the likelihood of other risks occurring banks 
stated that ,they might also require reports on other aspects of the 
project. Firstly, many banks had access to in-house experts and 
economists specialising on particular industries. These could be 
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called upon to report on such things as future price expectations, 
and marketability of the product. Particularly important in the 
case of mines is the question of whether it is a 'low cost' or 'a 
high cost' mine. If the market was to suffer from over capacity, 
a low cost mine is clearly better placed to continue selling and 
making positive· cash flows than a high cost producer. .",. 
Some banks also said that, in the case of processing facilities, they 
might commission an independent market study covering the supply and 
demand prospects of the project. 
In some cases construction engineering consultants have also been 
used to report on the construction· schedule and costing of the project 
to ensure that these are not over optimistic and that the project is 
therefore likely to encounter delays and cost overruns. 
In-house credit.analysts will be used to assess the credit risk of 
the sponsor and other parties as well as the technical and managerial 
abili ty of the operator of the project. 
7.4 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
The economic assessment is primarily concerned with measuring the 
likely effect of the occurrence of, project risks on the ability of 
the project to service its debt, using the cash flew forecasts of the 
project. This section examines some of the techniques available for 
making this economic assessment and the use made of them by banks. 
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7.4.1 Cash Flow Forecasts 
The first step in the economic assessment is clearly to obtain a 
cash flow forecast. For advisors and lead managers the basic data 
""," provided by the project sponsors and/or independent engineer-
ing consultants. while for lenders a cash flow forecast will be 
included. in the information memorandum. This is taken to be the 
'best' or 'most likely' estimate of future cash flow and is used as 
the 'base case' in subsequent evaluation. 
In some cases. however, banks may use a more conservative cash flow 
forecast than that provided by the project sponsor. In the case of 
oil and gas projects. banks will usually only include 'proven' reserves. 
and if their view of future costs or prices is more pessimistic 
than that assumed by the sponsor they will use the more pessimistic 
view. 
In addition. if the cash flow is highly uncertain it will probably 
be excluded from the calculation. This was the case. for example. 
in an oil and gas project that was studied. The gas was to be delivered 
to an LNG plant owned by the government but there was considerable uncertainty 
regarding completion of this plant. Therefore. as well as evaluating 
the project as planne~ the banks also evaluated the project on the 
basis that only oil was produced. 
Most banks interviewed had relatively sophisticated computerised cash 
flow models and experts to construct such models for particular 
situations - e.g. North Sea U.K. sector, Malaysia etc. This means 
that the model will take account of the specific tax regime in that 
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country. Only one bank interviewed did not have computerised 
models, and this bank had only acted as a lender to date. 
7.4.2 Discounted Cash Flow 
The primary concern of banks when evaluating cash flow forecasts is 
with the ability of the project to generate sufficiElnt cash flow 
to be able to service its debts. While many banks emphasised this 
point, it was found that several banks used measures of profitability 
in their assessment. In particular many banks used discounted cash 
flow techniques to calculate either the 'Internal Rate of Return' 3 
4 
of the project, or more usually, the 'Net Present Value' These 
are both measures of profitability for the project sponsor and there-
fore of no direct relevance to a lender. While profitability and 
debt service capacity are to a certain extent interrelated this need 
not necessarily be the case. Indeed, it is possible to conceive of 
situations where a project has a satisfactory NP~ but is not accept-
able to lenders. This could happen if very large cash flows were to 
arise towards the end of the project's life and which would therefore 
require loans for a maturity longer than the banks were willing to 
provide. 
Several reasons were given by bankers to justify their use of discounted 
cash flow techniques. 
Firstly, some banks said that calculating the NPV served as a check 
on the evaluation made by the project sponsor to ensure that the 
project will be beneficial to him. This may be true in some cases, 
but it should be pointed out that frequently the banks are dealing 
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with major multinational companies and they will not have madoe the 
decision to proceed with the project without carrying out extensive 
studies themselves. 
Secondly, some banks said that they like to see a high NPV es it 
shows it is a good project and one to which the project sponsor is 
likely to have a high degree of commitment. 
Thirdly. severalo banks used the NPV not as a measure in itself, but 
as a way of facilitating other calculations. particularly coverage 
5 factors. 
Fourthly. it was suggested by oneobank that a low profitability 
measure may increase the political risk of projects located in develop-
ing countries. In the event of a new government taking over it was 
thought more likely that it would repudiate debts incurred for bad! 
unprofitable projects. This seems a rather tenuous argument and 
indeed. it would seem more likely that a very profitable project 
would face greater political risk. either through expropriation or 
at least higher taxation or renegotiation of the concession agreement 
Finally, and perhaps most reasonably. some banks said that the NPV 
calculation can be used to show the sponsor the benefit to him of 
structuring the project in a certain way. 
Another important issue that was raised with banks which were using 
discounted cash flow (and NPV in particular) was the choice of the 
interest rate to be used in discounting. It was found that all banks 
used an arbitrary discount rate ranging between 10% and 15%. They 
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all acknowledged that this Was a purely arbitrary figure though 
two banks said they were attempting to formulate a policy on it. 
In fact none of the theory of capital budgeting is any help in 
resolving this problem. The theory suggests that the financing and 
investment decisions should be treated separately and that the 
appropriate discount rate is the company's 'cost of capital'. How-
ever, using the company's cost of capital would not seem appropriate 
in project financing since the project is treated as a separate 
enti ty, and may have more than one proj ect sponsor. More recent ly. 
Keane (2) has proposed that the discount rate for a specific project 
should "refer to the rate on a publicly traded asset of like maturity 
.- . 
and risk, and this effectively implies reference to the corporate 
bond market". But this proposition has also been criticised 6 and 
it would therefore appear necessary to conclude that an arbitrary 
discount rate is the best choice available. Moreover, the question of the 
appropriate discount rate is cnly really important when making the 
capital investment decision, since it is only then that the NPV 
calculation is used as a measure of profitability. 
7.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
This was found to be the most frequently used technique· for assessing 
the effect of project risks on the ability of the project to repay. 
All of the banks with computerised cash flow models said they performed 
sensitivity analysis on project cash flows. Among the variables 
subjected to such analysis were: delays in completion; interruptions 
in production; and changes. in pric7!operating costs, tax rates and 
production profiles. 
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Rappaport (3) defined sensitivity analysis as: 
"a study to determine the responsiveness of the conclusions of an 
analysis to changes or errors in parameter values used in the analysis". 
Normally in capital investment analysis. sensitivity analysis is used 
to determine the degree of change in either the IRR or NPV of the 
project when key variables in the project are exposed to (unfavourable) 
variances. The objective is to answer 'what if?'questions - e.g. 
what if completion was delayed for one year? Normally no attempt is 
made to determine the likelihood of these events occurring; the 
objective is simply to indicate the areas where the project is most 
sensitive to change. usually with the intention of investigating these 
areas in greater depth. 
The use of sensitivity analysis in project financing varies somewhat 
from this process described above. Firstly. some banks performed 
sensitivity analysis on undiscounted annual cash flows rather than 
on the NPV. while others used the NPV. The argument put forward· for 
the use of undiscounted cash flows was again that banks are primarily 
concerned with the ability of the project to service borrow-
ing and the effect of changes in key variables an this ability. In 
particular undiscounted cash flaws were seen as useful as they permit 
the bank to identify years when the coverage of debt service is low. 
This can then be used when setting covenants in loan agreements to. 
ensure the banks are adequately protected in those years. 
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Secondly. it appeared that most banks did not vary each element of 
,project cash flow by an arbitrary figure of say 10%. but rather made 
some assessment of the likely magnitude of any change and used this. 
Thus for example. it was said that the amount of variation applied 
in the case of mineral prices would be large (e.g. 40-50%) while in 
the case of oil projects it would not be a question of lowering oil 
prices but rather reducing the escalation factor or holding them CL 
constant in money terms. 
Thirdly. the objective in using sensitivity analysis is generally not 
to identify key risks and then seek additional information on these 
areas so as to reduce the measurement uncertainty. In fact. 'there appeared 
_ . C\ ncd 'I $1 S 
. to be two ways in.which sensitivitYA is used. 
(1) To identify risks ;to which the project is particularly sensitive 
(in terms of its ability to repay debt) with the objective of 
laying these risks .off. This appears to be the way in which 
financial advisors use sensitivity analysis. The 
methods of laying-off risk may either reduce the risk to the 
project (e.g. by negotiating sales contracts with floor prices) 
or they may reduce the exposure of lenders to that risk (e.g. 
by taking a completion guarantee). 
(ii) To determine a 'worst case' situation with the objective of 
ensuring that project cash flows are still sufficient to service 
debt. 
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This approach appeared to be the main way in which sensitivity 
analysis was used by lead managers and ,lenders. In this case they 
alter not one but several variables at a time and the outcome 
is perceived as the worst case that is likely to occur with a reason-
ably high probability. In other words. the 'worst case' is not an 
absolute disaster situation which is very unlikely to materialise 
but a reasonably pessimistic view based on previous experience of 
similar projects. Alternatively. some banks approached this slightly 
differently by assessing the extent to which the project needs to go 
wrQng before it is unable to service its debts. together with a 
subjective assessment of the likelihood of this occurring. 
7.4.4 Monte Carlo Simulation 
This approach to risk analysis was first suggested by Hertz (4). 
Basically it involves estimating a range of possible values for each 
variable comprising the project cash flow. To each value a probability 
is assigned. giving a probability distribution for each of the" ".' 
variables. Then using the Monte Carlo procedure. random values 
are selected for each variable and used to compute the IRR 
or NPV for the project. This process is repeated numerous times. 
each time selecting a new value for each variable. and generating a 
new figure for the NPV. These are then usually represented graphi-
cally in the form of a probability distribution representing possible 
outcomes for the project NPV. Figure 7.1 represents two hypothetical 
distributions. 
FIGURE 7.1 
PROBABILITY 
o A 
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PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIoNS FOR TWO 
HYPOTHETICAl pROJECTS 
B IRR (or NPV) 
Project 1 has a lower expected (or mean) IRR than project 2 (as 
shown by points A and B respect:Lv~ly), but it is less risky, as Project 
2 has a b\~\he'" -VCl"';C\I'!~of possible outcomes than project 1. 
Only one bank interviewed used Monte Carlo simulation in the analysis 
of projects and even here the reaSon for using it did not appear to 
be clear. The problem with the technique is that it measures profit-
ability and as we have argued earlier the banker is primarily con-
cerned with the debt service· capacity of the project. When this 
point was raised the response was that they believed it· was usefut to 
determine the likelihood of a project having a low return. This bank 
also thought it could be useful in showing the benefit to the project 
sponsor of alternative structures. It would seem however, that in 
assisting lenders it is of less use. Although it does give an overall 
measure of the riskiness of a project it appeared from the interviews 
that banks are more concerned with analYSing the individual 
elements making up this overall riskiness. Certainly, other banks 
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did appear to be aware of Monte Carlo simulation but did not 
consider that was useful.' In addition to the point made above it 
was also suggested that it is extremely difficult to generate 
reliable subjective probability estimates to be applied to the values 
for each variable. This is seen as a problem even within major 
industrial companies as m~nagers are said to be reluctant to produce 
probability estimates. It becomes even more problematic when a bank 
is performing the simulation, since they will be required either to 
invent their own probability distributions or use ones provided by 
third parties. A third possibility is to use one of the more common 
probability distributions as an approximation to the actual distribution. 
In all cases there will be considerable subjectivity which many banks 
-' . 
fel t would reduce the usefulness of the model. At present it appears 
that banks only go as far as to get experts to state the likelihood of 
certain events such as cost overruns or delays occurring, without 
incorporating this into a formal model. 
7.4.5 System Dynamics 
Brzozowski (5) has sugge'sted that system dynami cs may have an 
application in project financing, and gave as an example of its use, 
the evaluation of a petrochemical plant. Coyle (6) has also developed 
a system dynamic model for an underground mine. However, no banks 
interviewed were using this technique. In fact, in many ways system 
dynamics is similar to sensitivity analysis. As Brzozowski ((15) p.41) 
argued: "The use of such a technique allows a manager to vary policies 
and assumptions one at a time in order to note how sensitive the system 
behaviour is to each individual modification". 
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The only fundamental difference between system dynamics and 
sensitivity analysis is that,the former is dynamic. Since no bank 
~tas using it. the'techniq'ue is not discussed further. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1. Basic data might include seismic information. well-test results. 
core analyses and electrical logs from the delineation wells 
drilled to date. 
2. See section 4.4 
3. The 'internal rate of return' (IRR) is defined as the discount 
rate that equates the present value of expected future net cash 
flows to the capital outlay i.e. the·discount rate where NPV = O. 
4. The net present value (NPV) of a project is defined as the 
difference (in money terms) between the present value of net 
cash flows and the capital outlay of the project when discounted 
at some appropriate discount rate. 
5. See section 11.3.2 for the methods used to calculate coverage 
ratios. 
6. See for example. GRINGER. J.R. "Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting" Vol. 7(2). Summer 1980. 
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RISK CONTROL 
B.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the process of risk control and the alter-
natives open to banks when deciding on how to deal with each project 
risk. It also examines some of the situations in which lenders may 
be willing to shoulder particular risks. 
B.2 PROCESS OF RISK CONTROL 
This is the final step in risk analysis and involves determining 
the best way of handling the risks once they have been identified 
and measured. The best way of dealing with each risk will clearly 
vary from project to project and depend on the nature of the project. 
the objectives of borrowers. and the attitude of lenders. As 
Nevitt(1J has suggested: 
"the key to successful project financing is structuring 
the financing of a project with as little recourse as 
possible to the sponsor while at the same time providing 
sufficient credit support through guarantees or under-
takings of the sponsor or third party so lenders will be 
satisfied with the credit risk." 
It was frequently emphasised during interviews that the process of risk 
control is not as simple and mechanical as the theory might suggest. 
In particular the laying-off of risks will involve extensive negotiations. 
For example. if the price risk was considered unacceptable. a sales 
contract wi th a floor price would appear to be the obvious I"ay of 
avoiding this risk. In practice the availability of such contracts 
and the strength of their terms and conditions will depend on such 
factors as the state of demand for the· product and the bargaining 
strength of the sponsor or third party. Moreover. in certain 
situations the most desirable form of security may not be available 
for a variety of reasons. For example. ·Spanish law prohibits all 
forms of mortgage or lien over hydrocarbon products. It is there-
fore. impossible to mortgage production facilities or assign sales 
contracts or sales proceeds to banks. 
One important area that was explored in the research was the willing-
ness of banks to shoulder project. risks. Hammar. for example. is 
reported by Cudaback(2) as saying:--
" •.. if a bank is capable of financing a project. and 
can analyse the risks. it should be prepared to assume 
all those prudent risks and be compensated for them." 
This view was supported by most banks interviewed. Many stated that 
no project risks ;,it¥o'1 intrinsically unacceptable to lenders. although 
some banks did add that certain risks would require very special 
circumstances before they would be shouldered by lenders. Again. 
however. it is not necessarily the case that all risks which are 
acceptable to lenders will be shOUldered by them. Oeverell(3). 
writing about the reserve risk. for example. stated: 
" •.. borrowers themselves sometimes feel that this is 
the least appropriate of all the risks for lenders to-
take. This is because they may consider that th'ey will .. 
always be better equipped to evaluate such technical 
risks." 
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Here again there is the concept of a 'comparative advantage' in 
risk bearing. It was suggested that lenders are likely to require 
a higher interest margin than borrowers are willing to concede for 
taking this risk. given their differing perceptions of the amount 
of risk involved. 
In the·following sections the various methods of dealing with project 
risks are examined. Detailed discussion of some of the credit 
support obligations is reserved for Chapter 9. Again. it was 
emphasised in interviews that there are no set techniques for dealing 
with rhks and the solutions are limited only by the ingenuity of 
the advisor or lead manager. The examples given therefore represent _. 
only some of the possibilities that have been used to date. 
8.2.1 Completion risk 
Johnson(4) argued that "the. completion risk is generally considered 
the most difficult for banks to assume; it has normally been felt that 
such risks should be undertaken by equity participation ... ". This 
view was supported by all of the banks interviewed. . It was argued 
that until the project is actually producing,the risk is really an 
equity risk and therefore not appropriately borne by commercial bank 
lenders. Certainly the early experience in the North Sea suggests 
that in cases of new technology particularl~ the completion risk is 
very high. 
Some banks did say that they would consider taking the completion risk 
if the operator and construction contractor were experienced. the 
technology was proven and the construction period was short. One example 
where this occurred was in the $100m loan to Marathon Petroleum Ireland 
-146-
Ltd. to finance the Kinsale Head gas field 1 • When asked why the 
lenders were prepared to shoulder the completion risk in this case. 
banks replied that the project was very near to completion and had 
an experienced operator. The major- risks of delay associated with 
the fabrication of the rigs and the float out had therefor-e passed. 
The rigs were in place and all that r-emained was the piling,' and 
drilling of production wells. 
It was found that where the completion risks are unacceptable the most 
usual way to layoff the risk was to r-equire a completion guarantee 
from the project sponsor. This means that until the project is 
"complete" the project sponsor shoulders all risks and lender-s are 
only exposed to a cor-porate credit r-isk. However. a completion 
guar-antee can be drafted in many different ways and not all completion 
guarantees enable the lenders to avoid all completion risks. Fi~stly, 
there may be a provision in the credit agreement permitting repayment 
of the loan to be deferred for a certain length of time if completion 
is delayed. Usually if the project is not completed by a stipulated 
date, repayment must commence regardless and will therefore be paid 
by the sponsor. This 'means that the banks are taking a limited risk 
that their income will be deferred. but are guaranteed that they will 
ultimately be repaid even if the pr-oject is never completed. 
Secondly. there appears to be a trend towards less tight definitions 
of completion with the result that completion guarantees fall away 
earlier than previously. This point is discussed further- in section 
9.6. 
Some banks also believed that increasingly in the futur~ banks will 
be more prepared to shoulder the whole completion risk. This appears 
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to have been the case in the Woodside North 'West Sh,el f gas project 
where the lenders are reportedly taking the completion risk. Exact 
details are not known as information on the loan terms is not yet 
available. 
6.2.2 Cost Overrun risk 
This is'also considered to be a very significant risk in most projects 
and one which lenders are generally not prepared to shoulder. This 
risk is again usually laid off to the p~oject sponsor by means of 
a completion guarantee containing a requirement that the sponsor should 
meet all cost overruns from equity. In this situation it is clearly 
.- ' 
important to ensure that the company giving the completion guarantee 
is able to meet any potential cost overruns. The example of the Cuajone 
copper project in Peru given by Beim(S) illustrates this risk. Here a 
completion guarantee was executed by the project company - Southern 
Peru Copper Company - but not by the ultimate sponsors. Cost overruns 
exceeding $100m were incurred, the project company was unable to meet 
them and the sponsors refused to meet more than a fraction. The banks 
were therefore required to lend the balance to enable the project to 
be completed rather than lose their existing loans. 
Deverell(~ p.4: suggested that in the case of North Sea projects: 
" ••• where there have been doubts about the borrower's 
ability to perform. there has either been an insistance 
that the borrowers should arrange additional loan 
faci li ties in advance. or else .. ' the borrower's 
parent has had to guarantee performance of the completion 
covenant. " 
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In some cases banks may be willing to lend an additional amount 
to. finance cost overruns and standby faci·lities will be arranged 
in advance .. This has apparently been done in the case of the North 
West Shelf project where a standby facility is available from lenders 
to finance initial cost overruns up to A$300m. In addition. equity 
underwriting commitments for $150m each have been obtained from 
Shell and Broken Hill Proprietary. These will ensure that equity 
is available to finance cost overruns over $300m. If cost overruns 
,exceed $600m. however. there are no formal arrangements to cover the 
situation. 
A third alternative for dealing wi'th the cost overrun risk is to have 
a turnkey construction contract either for a fixed price or for a 
given price plus the first x% of any cost ·overrun. In this case the 
risk of cost overruns would be passed to the contractor. These contracts 
are apparently extremely rare in today's inflationary environment so 
• 
this is not usually an alternative. 
6.2.3 Raw material supply/price risk 
This was a risk which banks were apparently willing to take since it 
was usually not considered to be too great. In principle the supply 
risk can be avoided by having raw material supply contracts and the 
price risk by setting a ceiling price in the contract. This contract 
could be given either by the sponsor or third party. However. few 
banks interviewed had seen such contracts and even when they had been 
taken. they were generally short term contracts at market price. 
Other forms of contract that have the effect of ensuring adequate 
supplies to operate the facility include the throughput agreement 
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(used for pipelines) and the processing agreement or tolling 
contract (used for refineries etc.). Both are contracts to put 
raw materials (usually crude oil or gas) into a facility and take 
it out at the other end. 
A throughput agreement was considered essential for pipeline projects 
because of their high level of fixed costs and the consequent 
sensitivity of cash ·flow to below capacity operation. 
In other cases formal raw material supply contracts were not taken as 
the risk was dealt with in other ways. In one example studied the 
J 
sponsor owned a mine as well as the processing facility and the two 
projects were linked together so that access to raw materials was 
assured. Finally in an aluminium smelting project that was studied, 
the project sponsor was required to assure the delivery of sufficient 
alumin~or indemnify the banks for any reduction in smelter cash flow 
resulting from inadequate or late deliveries of alumina. This project 
did however have a 25 year electricity supply contract as the supply 
and cost of electricity was considered vital to the viability of such 
a project. 
8.2.4 Reserve risk 
Castle(6) argued that 
" ••• when a project loan involved (lenders) taking the 
so-called "reserve risk", I would not suggest a non-
recourse project financing unless the reserves are 
classified as proved producing ...• If the financing is 
backed by a guarantee of completion and the reserves 
are classified as proved nonproducing it is not unusual 
for the lenders to take the reserve risk in a project 
loan if a hard-mineral reserve is being developed. It 
is possible - but more difficult - to arrange such a 
financing if the mineral is oil and gas." 
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In fact it was suggested in interviews that banks in the UK are 
prepared to accept reserve risk either from the start or after a 
(relatively short) period of production in many cases, as the reserves 
reserve risk was perceived to be low, 
In some cases, however, they may only be wi lling to take. one part of 
the reserve risk. For example. in the loan to BP to finance the 
Forties field2 the banks were willing to assume the oil in place risk 
but not the recoverability risk. This was the first North Sea 
financing and although the banks were happy with the oil in place -
two independent consultants had re.ached very similar conclusions -
there was greater uncertainty concerning the recoverability factor. 
BP therefore guaranteed a minimum recovery factor of 44% which meant 
that if there was oil in the reservoir but it could not be extracted, 
BP would have to repay the loan. 
In other cases banks are prepared to take the reserve risk once 
certain production tests, defined in the completion guarantee, have 
been achieved.·· Bankers considered, however, that·· the length of time 
over which minimum flow rates had to be achieved (usually a maximum 
of 6 months) was inadequate to demonstrate the ability of the reservoir 
to continue producing at these rates. They suggested that this test 
only ensures that the· facilities are capable of operating at these flow 
rates. 
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In situations where the lenders are taking the reserve risk 
Castle (6(p.29JJ suggested that the repayment of the loan should 
be by a dedicated percentage of cash flow rather than by a fixed 
repayment schedule. It appeared from the projects studied that 
this is also usually the case in UK project financing. This avoids 
the risk that reserves w!.ll be depleted faster than planned and leave 
part of the loan outstanding when reserves are exhausted, as might 
be the case if a fixed repayment schedule is used. An analysis of 
the alternative repayment schedules used is given in section 11.4.2. 
8.2.5 Market risk 
The willingness of lenders to assume the marketability and price 
risk was found to vary depending on the type of project. In oil 
projects, banks said they were always prepared to shoulder the 
market risk as crude oil is a commodity which is widely traded, and 
the risk of a sUbstantial fall in market price was considered remote. 
In other types of projects lenders were less prepared to shoulder 
market risks for the reasons given in section 6.3.5. In gas projects 
the gas is usually pLrmased by a monopoly, and is often transported by 
pipeline. Therefore the ability to switch to other markets is limited. 
In LNG projects alternative markets are also restricted because of the 
limited· number of receiving terminals and problems of transportation; 
and in many mining projects prices are volatile and marketability 
limited? Finally, as regards processing facilities, White(7J suggested 
that lenders are unlikely to bear the market risks as demand for refined 
products and petrochemicals is variable and the differential between 
the price of the raw material and the price of1the output may either 
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be negative or at least insuffici·ent to cover operating and finance 
costs • 
. In these situations. banks said that it was common to find some 
form of support to ensure there are adequate revenues. Frequently. 
this is by way. of a long term sales contract.. One bank went so far 
as to say that in LNG projects the sales contract is the only thing 
that makes the project viable. In some cases the contracts may also 
include a floor price. but banks said that this was increasingly 
rare. 
In· the case of pipelines and processing facilities the market risk 
can also be avoided by the use of throughput agreements and 
processing agreements respectively. 
Sometimes a formal contract is not signed. but the sponsor may guarantee 
to provide raw material at one end and take the processed product 
(this was the case in one project examined). Another possibility. (used 
in another of the projects studied) is for the sponsor to guarantee a 
minimum price so that if the market price falls below a certain level 
the sponsor will make up the difference. An aluminium smelting project 
·that was studied left the bank shouldering. the price risk but the 
, 
project sponsor effectively guaranteed the marketability risk. This 
was done by defining cash flow available for debt service as world market 
price multiplied by the productive capacity of the plant less operating 
costs. The sponsor was com~itted to maintain this cash flow regardless 
of actual sales or production levels. 
- ' .. . ': .~:.. :~.: 
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Many of the elements in this risk appeared to be unacceptable to 
lenders. The risks of blowout and fire that were included under 
operating risk (but which are sometimes termed force majeure risks) 
are usually covered by insurance. 
In cases where project sponsors chose not to insure against these 
4 
risks, or where total cover is not available, it is apparently 
common for lenders to require the project sponsor to indemnify them 
and pay over an amount equivalent to what would have been received 
had insurance been taken out. As Deverell(3(p.5)) pointed out 
·We feel that lenders should not be expected to assume 
uninsurable risks, and hence we look for covenants, with 
performance guaranteed by parent companies if necessary, 
to ensure re-completion." 
As regards the risk of operating costs rising, lenders often apparently 
shoulder this risk. However, banks said that in some completion 
guarantees a test was included to ensure that the economics of the 
project had not changed radically before the completion guarantees fell 
away. This has apparently been used in a few mining projects 'where 
the completion ·test requires that x tons of product, of y quality, be 
extracted at no more than z operating cost. This obviously only covers 
the situation at completion and operating costs could rise thereafter. 
Lenders mayor may not take the risk of interruption in production. In 
the Forties loan, (see Appendix IV), th~took this risk to a limited 
extent. If production was interrupted prior to 1978 (subject to the 
presence of recoverable oil) repayment could be suspended for up to 
one year. After 197.8 BP was required to make payments to keep repayment 
-- ,--
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'on schedule. 
B.2.7 Operator/Consortium structure risk 
There is really no alternative but for lenders to shoulder these 
risks or to refuse to lend, since there is no way to lay it off. 
Lenders therefore ensure that the operator has sufficient 
managerial and technical expertise to complete and operate the project. 
Similarly for the consortium structure risk lenders can only ensure 
that co-participants in the project are capable of meeting obligations 
or have prearranged lines of finance to enable this to be.possible. 
B.2.B Country risk 
We suggested in Chapter 3 that one of the major reasons for the use 
of project financing was the desire to share political risk. 
Woicke(Bl, for example. suggested that 
"the laying off, or at least sharing of political risks 
with lenders has lately become more and more popular in 
energy financing." 
The first way in wh1ch political risk can be layed off is to use 
political risk insurance such as that provided by ECGO. This provides 
cover against expropriation or nation~lisation; war damage; and 
currency inconvertibility for a premium of 1% of themsured amount. 
Clearly, however, this insurance does not cover all of the political 
risks mentioned in section 6.3.9, and moreover, it is relatively 
expensive in comparison with the additional spread a bank might require 
in return for shouldering political risks. 
In several recent project financings the main objective of borrowers 
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has been to pass the political risk to the lenders. and all banks 
interviewed appeared ready to shoulder the political risk in'most 
situations. provided there was 'room within their country lending 
limit. In one project that was studied the banks took no other 
risks besides the political risk (and the credit risk of the sponsor). 
In this case the sole objective was to put the banks at risk if the 
host government took any political action against the project. This 
was achieved by the sponsor guaranteeing a hypothetical cash flow. 
based on its forecast; of the revenues and costs of the project and 
the current royalty and tax rates. This was' effectively the maximum 
cash flow available to service the debt ~nd if the government increased 
taxes or royalties the banks would immediately suffer. firstly by a 
delay in repayment and later by a'-loss of interest payments. 
In other cases. however. lenders have declined to shoulder political 
risks and the risk had, to be borne by the sponsor. This was particularly 
true in the mid 1970s in the UK sector, of the North Sea. when there 
was considerable uncertainty over the government's energy policy. 
Argyle(9). for example. reported that in the case of the loan to 
Dccidential to finance the Piper field in 1974. nationalisation and loss 
of licence were the only events that Occidential Petroleum Corporation 
was required to guarantee after completion. Since that time. however. 
fears over political risk on the North Sea have subsided and banks now 
appear willing to shoulder all political risks. Despite the present 
government's oil taxation policy. banks believed that the government 
would not threaten the viability of fields once they had granted a 
production licence. 
It was pointed ou't during interviews. however. that banks do take 
certain steps to reduce political risk. Banks considered it important 
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to give notice to the Finance Ministry or central bank in the 
host country of their interest in the project. They also apparently 
check that the project has received governmental approval and that 
it is·a priority project. This is thought to reduce the likelihood 
that the government will take action against the project. One bank 
also suggested that lenders should ensure that the project complies 
. not only with the letter of the law but also with its spirit, thus 
acting in anticipation of any future changes in say pollution laws 
which could cause problems at a later date. In the UK North Sea, 
banks have also sought various assurances from the Department of 
~ . 
Energy to ensure that their position is not threatened by the exercise 
of governmental powersS. 
In order to avoid the risk· of a ban on the remittance of foreign 
exchange use is sometimes made of an external escrow account (trustee 
account). This enables earnings from exports to be paid into a bank 
account located outside the host country and operated by a trustee. 
8.2.9 Credit risk 
Lenders will be exposed to a corporate credit risk to the extent that 
the project sponsor or third parties have provided credit support 
obligations. These risks are therefore ones which the banks must 
usually either accept or decline to lend. 
When structuring the project· however. it is possible to reduce the 
magnitude of the credit risk which banks will be. exposed to. If. 
for example. the project sponsor is not considered sufficiently 
creditworthy it may be possible to find a third party guarantor. 
This was the case in two North Sea loans. Tricentrol obtained the 
UK government's guarantee for the first of its loans to finance 
6 the Thistle field. while Ranger Oil obta-ined the guarantee. of 
Chevron for its Ninian field loan? 
In other situations the credit risk of the borrower may be 
unacceptable in which case the lenders may require a guarantee of 
the borrower's obligations from the parent company. In other 
cases support from the parent company is not in the form of a 
direct guarantee but rather some form of indirect guarantee such 
as a throughput agreement or take or pay contract. or even perhaps 
some form of comfort letter which does not carry the full weight 
of a guarantee. 
8.2.10 Exchange rate risk· 
Banks apparently seek to ensure that the project is not unduly 
exposed to an exchange rate .risk. The usual way of achieving this 
is to denominate the loan in the same currency as project revenues. 
oavies(10) suggested that if. for example. a dollar loan is made to 
finance dollar expenditure on a project whose output is to be sold 
to German buyers. the lenders could insert a currency option in 
the credit agreement permitting the borrower to convert the loan 
once and for .all into deutschemarks so as to reduce the exchange 
risk. It was also pointed out by one bar:k that in the case of oil 
projects. even if a loan is denominated in dollars and cash flow 
is in sterling there is little exchange rate risk since the world 
oil price is set in dollars. 
8.2.11 Transportation risk 
It is not known how banks usually deal with the transportation risk 
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in the case of LNG projects. Generally there will be a transc 
portation contract under which the shipp~r·agrees to transport 
a specified annual volume of LNG. 
In the case of pipelines the transportation risk appears usually 
to be taken by the obligor under the throughput agreement since there 
is frequently a requirement for the company to make payments even if 
the facilities are not operational. 
8.2.12 Legal risk 
Legal risks can be avoided by careful drafting of the loan agreement 
and other contractual obligations. In addition it is usual for lenders 
. .- .. 
to require formal legal opinions confirming the legal validity of all 
documents. This is particularly important since a number of different 
legal systems are likely to impinge on a project financing, including 
the laws of the borrower's domicile; the lender's domicile; the place 
of contracting; the place where the project is located; and the domicile 
of any parties to c~ntractual obligationsB• 
B.3 OTHER METHODS OF RISK CONTROL 
Even when· lenders shoulder project risks they frequently take steps to 
reduce the impact of such risks on the ability of the project to service 
its debts. This is achieved by ensuring that there is a sufficient 
safety margin of excess cash flow over and above that required to 
service the debt. The various methods used by banks to calculate this 
'coverage' are examined in section 11.3.2. 
Banks suggested that the size of the safety margin depended on their 
perception of the riskiness of the project. Thus risky projects will 
require a relatively high safety margin. This is achieved by reducing 
-------_. --~--
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the total amount banks lend to the project. 
It was also suggested that borrowers face a tradeoff between the 
amount of risks they can layoff to lenders and the debt/equity ratio 
of the project. The fewer the risks that are shouldered by banks 
the more banks will be prepared to lend. This appeared to be for two 
reasons. Firstly, the more risks that are shouldered by lenders the 
greater the cushion of excess cash flow they will require for protection. 
Secondly, banks wished to ensure that the sponsor is financially 
Committed to the project. If the lenders take no risks (Le. the 
project is fully guaranteed) they might lend 100% of the cost as the 
sponsor is committed via its guarantee, while if lenders shoulder all 
the project risks they will require. the sponsor to inject more in the 
form of equity. 
Several loan agreements studied had cash flow coverage tests which were 
guaranteed by the sponsor. This ensured that if project risks occurred 
which reduced project cash flow below a certain multiple of debt, the 
sponsor was required to inject equity into the project with which to repay 
some of the loan and restore the coverage ratio. 
B.4 TRENDS IN RISK CONTROL 
Table B.1 summarises the risks that .banks are known to have shouldered 
in certain project financings for which information was avai lab le • It 
is clear that over time the willingness of lenders to shoulder project 
risks has increased. In the first project financing in the UK - Forties -
the only significant risk shouldered was the oil in place risk. Since 
that time, banks suggested that they have become more familiar with 
the nature of project risks and so have also become more willing to 
shoulder them. 
TABLE 8.1 RISKS SHOULDERED BY BANKS IN SELECTED PRDJECTS 
COST COMPLETION MARKET 
SPONSOR-PROJECT CATE OVERRUN DELAY PRICE QUANTITY 
BP - FORTIES 1971 
-
limited limited sales 
deley in contract 
repayment 
CQNSORTIUM EKQFISK 1973 
- - - -
THQMSQN-PIPER 1974 relied on covenants X limited 
from Gce1 entel lOan 
QCClOENTAL-PIPER 1974 
- -
X X 
THDMSON-CLAYMORE . 1976 X X X 801es 
controct 
QCCIDENTAl-CLAYMORE 1976 - - X X 
ICI-NINIAN 1976 
- - - -
MARATtiON- KINSAlE HEAD 1977 X X Sales X 
cont-
ract 
TRICENTROL-THISTLE 1976 loan 
- - - -
1976 loan corn, lete X X 
M08IL-ARUN I~~ONESIA 1977 1 Borne X -
TEXACO-TARTAN 1979 I I X X 
TRANS TUNISIAN 1979 - - - -PIPELINE 
OPE.'1A TING COST OIL IN 
& TECHNOLOGY PLACE RECOVERABILITY POLITICAl 
-
X limited delay -
1n repayment 
- - - -
X X X 1 
X X X -
X '. , X X 1 
X X X 1 
- - - -
X X X X 
- - - -
X X X X 
X· X X X 
X X X X 
- - - -
.' 
FORCE 
FISCAL MAJEURE 
- -
- -
1 1 
X 1 
1 I 
1 1 
- -
X 1 
- -
X , 
X 1 
X 
, 
1 
- -
CREDIT 
RISK OF 
SPONSOR 
X 
X 
-
X 
-
X 
X 
-
-
-
-
X 
.. 
. I 
~ 
Cl 
CJ 
I 
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Certain caveats should. however. be borne in mind when discussing 
such trends. in view of the nature of project financing. 
Firstly. the table is in many ways an over-simplification. since the 
extent of the risk shouldered under each category can vary from 
project to project. 
Secondly. while there may be an increasing predisposition to shoulder 
'project risks. the decision on whether lenders actually shoulder a 
particular risk in particular projects will depend on both the magnitude 
of the risk and the desire of the borrower to layoff that risk to 
lenders. Thus it is not possible to conclude that because lenders have 
now taken a certain risk they will- always do so in future. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
1. See CONNELLY. J. Institutional Investor Vol.12(7J 1978 p.113 
2. See Appendix IV for a summary of this loan. 
3. As in all cases generalisations are difficult. and it is 
conceivable that a mining project might be financed without 
a sales contract if the mine was a very low cost producer. 
4. Frequently commercial insurance premiums for some risks are 
considered too high and so insurance is not taken. 
5. For a very detailed discussion of the type of assurances given 
and their legal validity see ARGYLE. R.E.S. Governmental Powers 
and Project Financing in the North Sea : the UK Experience,pp.46-64 
6.' See Appendix VIr for detai~s.of the Tricentrol financings. 
7. See Wilson Committee "Financing of North Sea Oil" Research 
Report No.2. 
8. For a discussion of legal opinions see WOOD. P. "Law and Practice 
of International Finance". chapter 1 8. 
-163~ 
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 8 
(1) NEVITT, ri.K. "Project Financing" Euromoney Publications 1979, p.13 
(2) CUDABACK, D. "The Energy Financing Battle Heats Up", Institutional 
Investor, July 1980, p.91 
(3) DEVERELL, M.C. Address to West Coast LNG Symposium, Perth, Dec. 1977· 
p.4. 
(4) JOHNSON, A. "Banks Willing to Consider Risks for 'Appropriate 
Remuneration" Offshore Engineer, Oct. 1979, p.59 
(5) BEIM, 0.0. "International Mining Projects: Risks and Rewards" 
Journal of International Law and Economics. vol. 12, 
1978, p.213 
(6) CASTLE, G.R. "Project Financing - Guidelines for the Commercial Banker" 
·Journal of Commercial Bank Lending. April 1975. p.21. 
(7) WHITE, N.A.. "Financing the International Petroleum Industry", 
Graham & Trotman. 1979, p.120. 
(8 ) WOICKE, P. "Staggering Investment Needs Inflate Oil Companies 
Dependence on Banks", Offshore Engineer, Dec. 1978. p. 46 . 
. (9) ARGYLE, R.E.S. Governmental Powers and Project Financings in the 
North Sea: the UK Experience, Dundee University Centre 
for Petroleum & Mineral Law Studies Occasional Paper 
1980, p.18 
(10) OAVIES, R. G. Loans.- A review of the legal considerations, Energy 
UlW ':;cl'i/J'4-i\. C·ifFIf;'?lbr€· ("79. 
-164 -
CHAPTER 9 
CREDIT SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines in greater depth the contractual obligations 
outlined in chapter 8 with the objective of highlighting some of 
their strength and weaknesses as security. 
9.2 RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY CONTRACT 
Few bankers interviewed had seen raw material supply contracts used. 
This appeared to be partly because of the relatively few project 
financings involving processing facilities and partly because in many 
... -
cases the particular circumstance of the project meant that the 
raw material supply risk had been controlled in other ways. 
Since a raw material supply contract for a processing facility is 
the same as a sales contract for a mine the usual terms and conditions 
of both types of contract will be dealt with in section 9.5 covering 
sales contracts. 
9.3 THROUGHPUT AGREEMENT 
Throughput agreements are usually given. to provide security for 
lenders when financing pipelines. Whalley(1) suggested that the 
throughput agreement was devised as a way of enabling the sponsor 
to provide what amounts to an unconditional guarantee. while avoiding 
the balance sheet impact of such a guarantee. The fact is that 
guarantees must be included as a note to the company's balance 
sheet and the amount of the potential liability quantified. The 
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accounting disclosure requirements for throughput agreements 
are less well established1 • 
Fowler(2) defined a throughput agreement as: 
" ••• an agreement to put a specified amount of product 
through a production facility in an agreed time period 
or. if not. to pay for the availability of the facility". 
This definition in fact described a 'strong' throughput agreement 
and there are apparently many varieties of throughput agreement. 
Firstly. they may be given eithe~by the project sponsor (or a 
related group company) or by third parties. It appeared that it 
is more usual in project financing for the throughput agreement 
to be given by the project sponsor. although third party agreements 
are not unknown. It was suggested. for example. that one way of 
financing the proposed UK.gas gathering system would be for the 
British Gas Corporation to enter into a throughput agreement with 
the pipeline owner. Third party throughput agreements are apparently 
more common in the USA. 
It is. of course. possible for more than one throughput agreement to 
be given. For simplicity however. we will deal only with the more 
usual case where one throughput agreement is used. 
There are two possible types of throughput agreement. One is termed 
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the 'put or pay' agreement which is of the type defined by Fowler 
above. The alternative is to have a 'put and pay' where tariff 
payments are only made if product is put through the pipeline. 
Usually it appears that the throughput agreements used in project 
financing are of the 'put or pay' type, particularly as they are 
generally given by the sponsors. It is less likely that third 
parties would accept an unconditional obligation to pay. 
The tariff payments for the use.of the pipeline are usually designed 
to cover all operating costs and debt servicing. This may be 
.achieved either by specifying a formula in the contract or more 
simply by stipulating that the tariff must be sufficient to provide the 
pipeline owner with sufficient funds to meet all obligations due 
in that period. 
In the case of a put or pay agreement the shipper is obliged to pay 
the agreed tariff even if he does not ship any produce through the 
, 
pipeline or even if the pipeline is not operational. Payments made 
in these circumstances are usually stated to be advance payment for 
future shipments over and above the future obligated amounts. The 
obligation to make advance payments is taken to be a normal commercial 
commitment for accounting purposes, while from the lender's viewpoint 
it is effectively a guarantee. Cash flow will be generated regardless 
of whether the pipeline is being used up to its planned capacity) or 
indeed,regardless of whether the pipeline is operational. 
An example of this obligation is the following clause taken from one 
of the project financings studies: 
FIGURE 9.1 
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PIPELINE PROJECT STRUCTURE 
PIPELINE 
COMPANY 
THROUGHPUT 
AGREEMENT 
PROJECT 
SPONSOR 
ASSIGNMENT 
OF 
THROUGHPUT 
AGREEMENT 
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"Regardless of whether or not (the pipeline company) 
is at fault, and regardless of the extent to which the 
Pipeline is constructed, the obligations of the Shipper 
under this Agreement shall not be affected or invalidated 
by any circumstances including but not limited to the 
failure,impossibility or impracticability to have gas 
shipped through the Pipeline for any reason whatsoever, 
including but not limited to the total destruction, damage, 
non-functioning or change in ownership or control of the 
Pipeline •.•• " • 
The result in this case was that lenders were able to avoid all project 
risks including political risk. The only risk they faced was the 
corporate credit risk of the shipper being unable to meets its obligations. 
In a few cases, however, banks stated that force majeure clauses have 
been used in throughput agreements. This means that in situations where 
the pipeline is out of action·for reasons defined as force majeure, the 
shipper is not obliged to make advance tariff payments. In these 
cases therefore the banks will be shouldering other risks besides a 
credit risk. 
A simplified structure for a pipeline financing is shown in Figure 9.1. 
A nominally capitalised pipeline company is usually established to own 
pipeline. It will also enter into a throughput agreement with the 
shipper who wishes to put gas or crude oil through the pipeline. This 
agreement is assigned to the banks, thus giving them the right to 
2 
enforce the throughput agreement 
One issue that has been raised by several authors 3 concerns the 
possibility of· frustration of the contract. In the U.K. the Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 provides that parties are 
discharged from their obligations if the contract has become impossible 
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to perform or has been otherwise fr~strated by events outside their 
control. The general view appears to be. however. that the Act 
could not be used to avoid obligations under throughput agreements. 
Argyle(3J for example argued that: 
"It is fundamen;al to the operation of the doctrine 
of frustration as developed by the Courts that the 
frustrating circumstance arises without fault of either 
party and was not contemplated or taken into account by 
the parties at the time of formation of the contract ...... . 
Since the whole objective of taking a throughput agreement was to lay-
off the risks to the shipper it is clear that the frustrating 
circumstance was contemplated. T~.is means that a put or pay throughput 
agreement will provide as much credit support as an unconditional 
guarantee given by the same company. 
9.4 PROCESSING AGREEMENT 
This is very similar in form and effect to a throughput agreement. 
Processing agreements are generally used in refineries. petrochemical 
plants etc. where the output is in a different form to the input. 
These agreements may be given by either the sponsor or third parties. 
but one of the projects studied had a processing. agreement given by 
a third party. The obligations of the company putting the feedstock 
through the facility under this processing agreement were further 
guaranteed by its parent company. In this case the tariff payment 
consisted of the actual cost of processing the feedstock plus an amount 
sufficient to service the debt. The obligation to pay the second 
element of the tariff was again unconditional - i.e. it was a put or 
pay obligation. 
-170-
9.5 SALES CONTRACT 
These are normally taken. in mining, gas and LNG projects. It is 
apparently relatively easy to obtain some form of sales contracts 
in these cases,as trade has historically been conducted with the 
s.upport of long term sales .contracts. If the market risks are to 
be completely avoided the pales contracts should have the 
following characteristics: 
1. The length must be at least as long as the maturity of the 
loan. 
2. The revenues generated must be sufficient to pay operating 
costs and service debt. 
3. The obligation to pay must be unconditional and payments 
made whether or not the. product is actually delivered. 
This would, however, be an ideal contract and banks interviewed 
suggested that it was rare to find a sales contract with all of the 
above characteristics. As with throughput agreements, sales contracts 
may be given by either the project sponsor or third parties. Strong 
'take or pay' contracts are unlikely to be available from third parties, 
but banks suggested that some sponsors are willing to enter into such 
agreements. Banks regarded these 'take or pay' contracts as indirect 
sponsor guarantees, while they have the advantage for sponsors that 
·they are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements than 
unconditional guarantees. 
Although strong 'take or pay' sales contracts are attractive to lenders, 
it was emphasised that it is not ah.ays possible to obtain such contracts. 
For example, De Gavre(4) reported that in the case of the Inco nickel 
project in Indonesia the sales contract given by the sponsor was at market 
prices and subject to availability of the product. 
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Batkin and Goodspeed(S) suggested that in the case of LNG projects 
third party purchasers may be willing to enter into take or pay 
contracts where they are effectively guaranteeing the project. since 
"the need for a captive source of LNG will often justify such a 
financial commitment by th"e distributor". In most other cases. 
however. banks thought that take or pay contracts from third parties 
would either be unobtainab le or would be on terms disadvantageous to 
the project. As Beim(6) pointed out, the take or pay contract has 
been used " ..• where the customers and sponsors were identical. but it 
has not been accepted in any significant way by arms length customers. 
If they were to accept the risks of guaranteeing the" debt. they 
may as well get the rewards of a project sponsor". 
It is important to distinguish between take ~ pay contracts and 
take and pay contracts. Fowler(Z) defined a take or pay contract as 
"an unconditional guarantee to buy an agreed amount 
.of a product or service whether or not it is delivered" 
whereas a take and pay contract is 
"where the guarantee to purchase the product or 
service is conditional upon it actually being delivered". 
In the case of a take and pay contract the lender must analyse the 
ability of the producer to supply the product. The operating risks 
will not have been laid off to the purchaser. Moreover the banks 
could also be exposed to a political risk - e.g. a ban on the export 
of uranium. With a take or pay contract. however. the only risk the 
lenders face is that the purchaser will be unable to make the 
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guaranteed payment. 
Where banks considered a sales contract was necessary they said 
that they would generally-prefer to have a take or pay contract, 
although it was pointed out that it was not always possible to 
obtain one. 
If,_Jhe market risk is to be completely avoided, the contract must 
~lsQ be for at least the length of the loan, and banks aim to 
achieve this where possible. Again not all sales contracts will 
be long term and banks have taken ones for less than the life of 
the loan. in which case they are exposed to a market risk. In 
th~_!;gJs"e .of severa I commodities, however, very .l.ong"term contracts 
are the norm. LNG contracts may be for over 25 years; contracts 
-'J""" --
in excess of 25 years are .also apparently available in the case of 
bauxite4 ; and many gas sales contracts are also long term - the 
Western Australia State ElectriCity Commission has signed a 20 
year natural gas contract for. the North West Shelf gas projectS 
These contracts are clearly well in excess of the normal maturity 
,of.6eur:o,currency loans (12 years maximum). 
A further important aspect of a sales contract is the pricing arrangement. 
There are several possible alternatives: 
1. Fixed price - this is unlikely as it means the producer is 
unable to pass on any cost increases. 
2. Escalated price - here one element of the price is fixed while 
the rest is escalated by reference to some agreed 
• price index (e.g. labour, materials etc.). The 
escalated proportion may be 100% in some cases. 
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3. Cost, plus price - here the producer is able to pass. on 
100% of all cost increases and earns a given 
rate of return. 
4. Market price - where there is a World market price quoted 
for the product the contract price can be linked 
to this and adjusted, say, every 1 or 3 months. 
5. .F~oor price. - here the contract price is, again linked to 
market price but with some minimum price below 
which the contract price cannot fall. 
6. ·Negotiated price - here the price to be charged is negotiated 
annually • 
... -- .. 
It· was said during the interviews that if the supply contract is 
gi\ien~by,. the project sponsor it may be possible to obtain a cost plus 
price~which ensures that revenue is sufficient to cover operating 
cost~ and debt servicing. On the other hand, third party contracts 
are often linked to market price in which case the banks are taking a 
price risk. In order to limit this price risk it is sometimes possibla 
to include a floor price in the contract, or alternatively to obtain 
a guarantee from the sponsor to make up the difference between the market 
price and some agreed price. In these cases the floor price should be 
sufficient to service the project debt. LNG and gas prices appear usually 
to be fixed on an escalated price basis. 
The third main aspect of sales contracts which banks examine is the 
quantity requirements. To avoid the marketability risk it is necessary. 
for the contract(s) to cover the whole of the planned production. At 
the same time it is important to ensure that there is a certain amount 
of flexibi lity in. the contract. Apparent ly, the terms are usually set 
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either as a minimum quantity plus an option to take more if both 
sides agree, or alternatively as a 'target amount with an option 
for the purchaser to vary the amount by say + 5-10 per cent. 
Several bankers interviewed considered that third party contracts 
_~"'-'~'i"' 
rarely provided much credit support for the project, firstly because 
the terms are usually flexible, and secondly b,ecause there is a risk 
of reQeget'iation. Ferguson and Haclin (7J argued that "the numerous 
~!.~~ 
renegotiations of long-term purchase contracts during the period when 
\ 
l~ans are outstanding have reduced the collateral value of these 
arrangements for project lenders". Although no bank interviewed had 
experienced the renegotiation of ~ ,sales contract taken as security, 
they accepted that in the event of a slump in demand there was a 
distinct risk of renegotiation, particularly over quantity. Although, 
renegotiation may well be an event of default in the loan agreement this 
is of little use since it is doubtful whether the loan could be repaid. 
Banks therefore felt that they would have little alternative but to 
accept the renegotiation. 
When a sales contract is entered into the arrangements are basically 
the same as for a throughput agreement. The contract is between the 
project company and either the sponsor and/or third parties as the case 
may be. This contract is assigned to the lenders, giving them the 
right to receive proceeds and to take, steps,to enforce it. 
9.6 COMPLETION GUARANTEE 
This was found to be the most common form of security required in 
project financing, and most projects contained some requirement regarding 
completion. The completion guarantee is defined by Fowler(Z) as: 
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"An undertaking to complete a project within a 
certain time period and, usually, to provide funds 
to pay for all cost overruns. Generally completion 
involves much'more than the mere completion of the 
construction of the facility". 
The-ieompletion. guarantee is provided by _the project sponsor, and banks 
ensure that it is sufficiently creditworthy to meet any potential 
obligations. Completion guarantees therefore involve what the Wilson 
Committee Research Report(8) terms 'release of balance sheet in lending'. 
,§e9ks. have full recourse to the sponsor .until completion ,and thereafter 
no recourse (or'possible limited recourse). Project sponsors are 
... " 
thought to find this arrangement advantageous as compared with an 
uncond,j,tional guarantee for the 11 fe of the loan, as it enables them 
to 'piggy-back' their credit support from project to project. 
The important elements in a completion guarantee would seem to be 
as follows:-
1. Completion date 
2. Cost overruns 
3. Definition of completion. 
1. Completion date. 
Generally the loan agreement states that repayment of the loan will 
commence on completion. However, the lenders usually wish to avoid 
the risk that repayment will be delayed indefinitely and therefore 
include a final date at which time repayment must commence even if 
the project is not complete6 . 
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2. Cost overruns. 
It is usual' to stipulate in the completion guarantee that aa cost 
overruns should be met by the guarantor. Alternatively lenders 
are sometimes willing to lend an additional amount to cover cost 
overruns. 
3. Definition of completion. 
This probably the most important aspect of the completion guarantee 
and the definition of completion is the subject of considerable 
negotiation. Comp.letion ,usually involves much more. than the mere 
completion of construction work. Banks did however. suggest that 
competitive pressures have led to the acceptance of less rigorous 
definitions of completion. 
In the case of an oil or gas field development. the typical 
. requirements have been as follows: 
(i) Rigs are in position and facilities installed. 
(ii) All production wells (or a stated number) drilled. 
(iii) The field has achieved an agreed minimum level of continuous 
production for a stated time period (say 1 BD or 90 days). 
and possibly 
(iv) An evaluation of the reservoir by an independent consultant 
to ensure that the reserves are still adequate to service 
the loan. 
The supposed reason for requiring a production test over a stated 
period is to enable the characteristics of the reservoir to be better 
assessed. Some banks doubted. however. whether this was possible. 
particularly as the length of the production test has been progressively 
shortened and some projects may require only a 1 month production test. 
The trend towards less stringent completion tests seems to have been 
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carried to an extreme in a recent North Sea project financing 
mentioned in interview, where the completion guarantee apparently 
fell away after the sponsor had invested a certain amount in the 
project. This appears to be the situation mentioned by Sarmet(9J 
when he suggested that: 
" ••• one could imagine that after a minimum amount of 
investment. and on condition that th~ anticipated 
cash flow remains satisfactory, the credit structure 
could be changed, i.e. an increase in the portion 
without recourse, and the replacement of the financial 
guarantee during the period of construction by a 
simple commitment to cover cost overruns." 
The rationale for this appears to-be that if substantial amounts have 
been expended on the project the risk of non-completion is small . 
. Lenders would still be at risk from delays in repayment. however, 
and most banks doubted whether the above arrangment would become 
widespread. 
In the case of mining projects the production test may be in terms 
of an absolute amount of'production during a stated period, since 
rates of flow are less important. There is also frequently a require-
ment regarding the quality of the output and sometimes a test to 
ensure that operating costs.do not exceed a stated amount. The operating 
cost test is more necessary in mining projects than in oil projects, 
since operating costs are a higher percentage of gross revenues in 
mining than in oil. 
For processing facilities the test may be that the project is working 
at say 85% capacity without any problems, and in the case of an aluminium 
smelter project that was studied, the completion test required continuous 
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production for 4 months during which time the project must 
have produced not less than x tons of aluminium while using less 
than certain stated quantities of raw materials such as alumina. 
coke and electricity. 
According to Radetzki and Zorn(10): 
"In addition to the normal completion requirements 
of bringing a project on stream at a specified 
production level. project sponsors are now also 
being held liable for achieving specified cash 
flow targets". 
The ..r.ationale for this would seem" to be as follows. WhU·e production 
l~vels are clearly important. banks are repaid from cash flow. and 
. there",is always a risk that the economics of the project might have 
altered during the construction period so that even if the project 
passed the required production tes~ it would not be able to service 
its loans. It appeared from the interviews that in fact such cash 
flow tests are rarely included in the completion guarantee. Banks 
. argued that it would be unlike ly for a project to be. unable to service 
loans if production was possible. One North Sea project financing 
that was studied did, however. include a discounted cash flow test 
whereby. before the completion guarantee fell away. the present value 
of cash flows. discounted at a prescribed rate had to exceed by a 
stipulated multiple the amount of the loan outstanding. 
Another issue that was raised with banks concerned their willingness 
to incorporate force majeure clauses into the completion guarantee. 
Rendell(11) for example. argued that 
"the sponsors will certainly want to exclude political 
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risks from the scope of the completion guarantee. 
They will argue that political events which delay, 
increase the cost or make it impossible to complete 
the project should exclude them from responsibility 
under the guarantee". 
This sort of' exclusion does appear to have been obtained by Inco 
for,its Indonesian nickel project7 ,.but generally banks said that 
they would not be prepared to shoulder political risks prior to 
completion. 
9.7 GUARANTEES AND OTHER UNDERTAKINGS 
Guarantees may be obtained from various sources. the two most 
common being from the sponsors an9. ,from the host government. Such 
guarantees can vary considerably in their coverage. Unconditional 
guarantees given by the project sponsor are excluded from 
consideration since such situations do not fall within the 
definition of project financing adopted in this thesis. 
It is not uncommon, however, for the project sponsor to give a 
limited guarantee covering certain specific risks which are 
unacceptable to lenders and which cannot be laid off to other parties. 
If repayment of the loan is, affected by the occurrence of these 
risks the guarantor will be liable to repay. whereas if the loan 
goes into default for other reasons there is no such obligation. 
One example of this was the guarantee given by Dccidental in respect 
of the risk of nationalisation or loss of licence in the Piper 
field. These were the only risks which would activate the guarantee 
after completion8 . 
It is also common to obtain a guarantee from the project sponsor 
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of the obligations undertaken by the project company and other 
subsidiaries. This was the case, for example, in the Ekofisk 
transportation facility loans, where subsidiaries of major oil 
companies entered into a throughput agreement with the pipeline 
company and their obligations under this agreement were guaranteed 
by the parent company. 
In many cases the sponsor also gives various undertakings which 
fall short of a full guarantee. One such .example is a comfort 
letter where the parent company may undertake to supervise a 
subsidiary involved in a project, without assuming legal responsibility 
for the subsidiary'S contractual obligations9 • 
, The second main source of guarantees is from the host government. 
These guarantees can take many forms, ranging from financial to 
political. One example of a financial guarantee was that given by 
the U.K. Department of Energy for Tricentrol's first Thistle field 
loan. This guarantee was in fact only given for four years to 
cover the development phase of the project. This waS apparently 
the only way that Tricentrol was able to borrow at the time, in view 
of its small size and the high perceived political risk. It is 
also often possible to obtain a government guarantee in many less 
developed countries, although some countries (e.g. Indonesia1D ) are 
reluctant to give guarantees as they wish to preserve their borrowing 
capacity. 
Where,financial guarantees are unavailable it was suggested by some 
banks that lenders should obtain what may be described as a political 
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guarantee. This could be. for example. an .undertaking that the 
government will not close the plant down for political reasons 
-.. '- ..;.-
or at least not without adequate compensation. Various undertakings 
-.. ~
of this nature have also apparently·~een obtained by banks from 
the U.K. government in respect of North Sea financings 11 These 
again fall short of guarantees particularly as the Department of 
Energy considers that "the form of assurance devised in terms of 
current 'Government agreements' does avoid fettering the Secretary 
of State's discretion" (Argyle (3) p.S6). Argyle did suggest. 
however. that these agreements " •.• are accepted by the banks as carry-
ing the 'full faith and credit' of Her Majes ty' s Government". 
Finally. in certain very limited cases guarantees from other third 
parties may by available. Nevitt(12) suggested that they may be 
available if suppliers require a market, or users require a source 
of supply. They may be willing to assist a project by providing a 
guarantee even if they are unwilling to commit themselves directly 
as an equity participant. In fact such third party guarantees rarely 
appear to be used. The only case encountered in project financing 
was a guarantee given by Standard Oil Co. of California (Chevron) 
in respect of a loan to Ranger Oil. In return. however. Chevron 
received a royalty of 6% over the life of the Ninian field together 
with the right to purchase the remainder of Ranger's share of Ninian 
oil. Clearly such a guarantee is only a last resort in view of the 
considerable cost i./;; involves for the borrower. 
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9.8 INSURANCE 
Hofmann(13) argued that 
"proper insurance and the investigation to make 
sure such insurance is in force is a vital part 
of any proj ect finance 'scheme ". 
Although insurance can be used to layoff many force majeure risks, 
there are certain limitations to this. The first problem is that 
many installations, particularly in the North Sea cannot be fully 
insured because of capacity problems in the insurance industry. 
Johnson(14) reported that the Statfjoro A platform could only be 
insured for about $9DDm against a·total value of $1.2 billion at 
end-1978. Moreover, according to White(1S) fixed oil and gas 
production platforms and refineries cannot be covered for war risks 
in the commercial market. 
It is usual to take an assignment of insurance policies and to 
require a 'loss payable' clause stipulating that proceeds (over a certain 
amount) be paid to the lenders. The loan agreement will also regulate 
how these insurance proceeds are to be applied. For example in one 
project studied, insurance proceeds could be applied to repairs and 
reconstruction if they were less than a certain amount. If they 
exceeded that amount they could be used for re-completion provided 
repairs were technically and economically feasible and provided it 
did not prej udice the bank's ability to be repaid. .Otherwise 
proceeds had to be applied in reduction of the loan. 
9.9 MORTGAGE 
All banks said that they would require a mortgage or charge over 
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the assets of the project. although they accepted that it was of 
doubtful security value. This is bec.ause the assets are high ly 
specialised. and the only time banks would wish to enforce the 
security would be if the project had defaulted - in which case there 
would be few ready buyers. Moreover. in many less developed countries 
the enforceability of a mortgage was considered doubtful. 
In the USA it is possible to obtain a mortgage of oil in the ground. 
but in many other countries. including the U.K •• title to the oil 
is not obtained until the oil reaches the well-head. Instead of 
taking a mortgage over the oil in the ground therefore. Argyle 
((3) p.33-S) stated that compani~s are required to charge their 
interest in: 
(i) the licence 
(ii) the operating agreement 
(iii) the field facilities. pipeline and onshore facilities, and 
(iv) the petroleum "won and saved" and the proceeds of its sale. 
He further suggested that 
"the value of such securities lies less in the hope of 
selling the defaulter's interest in the field and related 
facilities (which in some cases must be remote) than as 
a defensive mechanism against other creditors". 
The same reasoning was found to apply in other situations where banks 
required a mortgage. 
Finally. in two projects studie8~banks had taken a pledge or charge 
over the shares in the project company. In one of these projects 
the reason for doing this was that it was legally impossible to charge 
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or assign the project assets, the production licence, sales 
proceeds or sales contracts and so the only way to obtain control 
in the event of default was to have a charge over the shares of 
the company owning the project. 
It is also common in the U.K •. North Sea for banks to have a 
'Special Share' in the capital of the company holding the production 
licence. This share gives the banks the right to appoint directors 
and to have voting control of the board if the loan is in default. 
thus enabling them to take control of the licensee's affairs in 
default situations. All of the four deals shown in Appendices IV to VII 
involved the issue of a special share. 
9,10 TRUSTEE ACCOUNT 
In order to avoid the risk of currency blockage and when a project 
is located in the export sector, a trustee account can be established 
in New York or London. Project revenues are then paid directly into 
this account operated by a bank as trustee. The proceeds will then 
be applied in accordance with the instructions prescribed in the 
loan agreement or trust deed. This arrangement was apparently used 
in two Indonesian projects - one a nickel project for Inco and the 
other for Mobil Oil Indonesia12 • 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
1. See Section 12.3 for further details. 
2. For further details of the arrangements for throughput agreements 
see WHALLEY(1) pp2-4. 
3. See for example WHALLEY(1),p.6; and ARGYLE(3) p.14. 
4. See BAMBRICK,S. Resources Policy, June 1980, p.171. 
5. See LIPSCoMBE, O. Financial Times, 1st October, 1980. 
6. For example, if a loan is granted and completion is expected in 
January 1980, the loan agreement may stipulate that repayment 
shall commence in January 1981 or prior completion. If the 
project is not complete by January 1981 the sponsor must make 
the repayments. 
7. See DE GAVRE, (4)p.258. 
8. Details of the project are given in Appendix VI. 
9. For further examples of comfort letters see WOOO,P. Law and Practice 
of International Finance pp.307-9. 
10. See SACERooTI, G. Far Eastern Economic Review 28th December, 1979. p.33. 
11. ARGYLE(3) pp46-64 has a detailed review of these undertakings. 
12. See DE GAVRE (4) p.258; and CoNNELLY. J. Institutional Investor, 
July 1~78. p.107. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE RISK-RETURN TRADEOEE AND pRICING 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to draw some conclusions regarding the riskiness 
of project financing in relation to traditional lending. It also 
examines pricing practice and assesses whether adequate account of 
risk is being taken when pricing. The discussion relates only to 
eurocurrency lending since the pricing of export credit loans is 
relatively straightforward1 . 
10.2 RISKINESS.OF PROJECT FINANCING 
Opinions regarding the riskiness of project financing in relation to 
traditional lending appears to be divided. For. example, Adamson(1) 
stated: 
"Project-type financing by its very nature is usually 
of a higher risk level than the corporate credit risk 
of the owner. The only exception that I can think of 
is where the owner is an extremely small and/or weak 
corporate credit". 
On the other hand, others have argued that project financing is no 
more risky than traditional lending and may in fact be less risky. 
Thus· for example, Tucker (vice president Bank of America, San 
Francisco) is reported by Clarke and Martin(2) as having said: 
"Risk analysis in the project finance area should be 
better tran in the straight loan area because it has 
to be more detailed. Therefore in theory at least, 
there is more scope for identifying and covering all 
the risks than in other. more straightforward forms 
of lending •... ". 
-189-
It is possible to point to factors which tend to make project 
financing more risky and others which make it less risky than 
traditional lending. On the one hand it can be argued that project 
'financing is inherently more risky than a normal loan to say a 
multinational company to'finance the same project. A conventional 
loan would have the support of a cross section of assets serving 
various markets and in different countries. ,Thus no s.ingle commercial 
or political event is likely to affect the borrower's overall 
viability and ability to repay. But a single purpose, non-recourse 
project loan subjects the lender to all the various economic, 
political and force majeure risks as they may impacta single project. 
On the other hand in certain cases the credit standing of a properly 
structured project may be higher than that of its sponsor since it 
may carry the credit support of strong third parties via guarantees. 
sales contracts etc. It can also be suggested that project financing 
is less risky than sovereign risk lending to less developed countries, 
for the reasons mentioned in section 3.3.2. 
Finally. there is the point raised by Tucker above, that the risk analysis 
is far more formalised than in corporate lending. 
It is probably impossible to arrive at any firm conclusion 'regarding 
the riskiness of project financing, particularly as the circumstances 
will vary from project to project. When the banks were asked whether 
they considered project financing to be more risky than con"enti~nal 
lending their views were equally divided. The majority of banks seemed 
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to think it was more risky than corporate lending as they 
usually did not have full recourse to the proj~ct sponsor. Some 
banks did, however, think that project financing was no more 
risky than corporate lending; pointing in particular to the more 
formalised risk analysis ,of the project. Several bankers felt 
that much corporate lending was 'name' lending, undertaken without 
adequate credit evaluation. AS,regards the relative riskiness of project 
financing and sovereign risk lending, banks were again divided but 
the majority of banks felt th'at project financing was generally less 
risky. 
Another approach to this question 'is to assess the experience banks 
have had in project financing. This represents an ex post assessment 
of risk. No bank admitted to having suffered losses on project 
finance loans to date, although one bank did say that they were 
anticipating problems in a petrochemical project where there had been a 
large fall in both demand and price. Some banks also thought that 
there might have been a few problems with some North Sea Projects as 
a result of delay and cost overruns, had it not been for the huge 
increase in oil prices. In fact they suggested that the biggest 
problem was not failure to ,repay but rather that loans have been 
repaid more rapidly than anticipated, with the result that the 
profitability of the deal was less than expected2 • 
Generally banks believed that the safety margin between debt service 
and project cash flow was sufficient to absorb most risks without 
affecting the ability of the project to repay, and the most significant 
risks are generally guaranteed, although banks also emphasised that 
project financing is still relatively new and in the longer term they 
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did expect that a few bad loans would be made. 
The experience in the UK can be compared with that of the projects 
in the survey by Castle(3). Here, out of 17 projects, 9 (53%) had 
severe trouble, 2 ended in bankruptcy and 6 others failed to generate 
enough cash flow during some period to cover repayments of principal. 
However, in only one project did the bank suffer a loss, and this 
was only because the project sponsor went bankrupt as well. It would 
probably be reasonable to conclude that project financing is slightly 
more risky than conventional lending, but that substantially greater 
risks are not being taken. 
In fact it is not the absolute level of risk that is important but 
whether the remuneration received is adequate to compensate for this 
risk. Oavis(4) for example argued (though not specifically in 
support of project financing), that: 
"It is quite valid as a strategic option, however, 
to structure a relatively risky loan portfolio ••. 
and to rely on one's expertise and the higher return 
associated with this type of portfolio to minimise 
and absorb the higher losses which might result." 
We therefore now turn to a consideration of the risk-return tradeoff 
in lending and the practices of banks in pricing project finance loans. 
10.3 RISK-RETURN TRAOEOFF 
It is clear that if banks are to take additonal risks they will 
require additional compensation, and so it is appropriate to attempt 
-192-
to determine whether lenders in fact receive adequate remuneration. 
As Deverell(S) has pointed out. however. this risk return tradeoff 
is likely to have an abrupt 'cut off' point beyond which the risk 
is unacceptable to banks whatever the level of reward. 
Richards and Contesse(6) have suggested a model for pricing project 
financing loans using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The 
CAPM is based on portfolio theory and was initially developed to 
illustrate the risk-return tradeoff for stock exchange securities. 
It suggests that there is a linear relationship between risk and 
return as depicted in Figure 10.1. 
EXPECTED 
RETURN 
Market 
Return 
RISK-FREE 
RETURN 
1.0 
(Market Risk) 
Figure 10.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model· 
MARKET LINE 
RISK 
Risk in CAPM is not. however. total risk but only 'systematic' risk. 
This can be defined as the extent to which the return on a particular 
equity moves in line with the overall market return. Unsystematic risk 
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is the risk specific to a particular firm. It is excluded from 
the model because portfolio theory assumes that it can be eliminated by 
holding a diversified portfolio of shares. 
Richards and Contesse suggested that this model can be applied to the 
pricing of a project loan and indeed go as far as to give a hypothetical 
example from which they conclude that: 
"Using these results we may recommend to a syndicate 
of banks lending money to this .field on a project 
basis. to charge a minimum of 19.8 per cent per annum 
interest. .. 
This would appear to represent a fundamental misapplication of CAPM. 
CAPM was developed for stock market investors and its applicability 
in the lending situation is very dubious. Determining the price ofa 
loan by reference to the covariance of the project's return with the 
overall market return for shares appears to be totally illogical. 
This could only be appropriate if the rest of the bank's portfolio 
was made up of equity investments. Even if we replaced the equity 
market return by a measure of the return on lending. the application 
of portfolio theory to bank lending still seems to be inappropriate. 
Banks are concerned with the total risk in a loan rather than just 
its 'systematic risk'. Loans have no 'upside potential' and so it 
is not viable in a lending situation to operate on a principle of 
portfolio diversification as in equity investment. 
Even if such a model was applicable to project financing there are 
still seve['al problems with the suggestion made by Richards and 
Contesse. These may be summarised as follows: 
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1. The model assumed fixed rate lending while euro-
currency loans are invariably at floating rates. 
2. The model ignores the maturity of the loan. which 
other studies 3 have shown to be important in the 
pricing decision. 
3. The correlation coefficient between project and 
market was estimated on the basis of oil company 
share price performance. This is invalid in project 
lending where the project is treated as a separate 
enti ty. 
It was also clear that it would have been impossible to estimate a 
risk-return trade off empirically. against which the adequacy of the 
remuneration on project loans could be evaluated. None of the 
empirical studies on eurocurrency loan pricing3 have used a measure 
of risk that can be applied in all lending situations including 
governments. companies and projects. Generally these studies have 
concentrated on sovereign risk lending and used certain variables 
such as the debt service capacity as a proxy for risk. 
Moreover the conclusions of these studies indicate that a simple riskl 
return tradeoff will not be found because many variables affect the 
pricing decision. Goodman(7) for example. postulated that spread 
depends on the level of interest rates at a particular time. the 
volatility of interest rates. the maturity of the credits as well as 
risk variables. In addition to these variables banks also emphasised 
that the spread charged on a particular project will also. depend on 
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relative bargaining positions of borrowers and lenders and on the 
state of competition between lenders. One bank also suggested that 
the spread on a loan reflected as much the number of banks capable 
of assessing the particular risk as it does the magnitude of the 
risk itself. Banks were therefore unwilling to make any general-
isations regarding the additional spread that might be required 
for shouldering certain risks. 
10.4 PRICING PRACTICE 
The usual form of remuneration in eurocurrency project loans is a 
lending margin together with certain fees. As in all eurocurrency 
loans the interest rate is set as a margin over the London Inter-Bank 
Offered Rate (LIBoR) of specified reference banks, and the borrower 
is' frequently given the option to choose between 3, 6, 9 or 12 
month LI60R at each 'roll-over' date. In some cases the lending 
margin may remain the same for the life of the loan although more 
usually different spreads are applied over the ·life of the loan. 
In loans where there is a completion guarantee for exampls, the 
lending spread may be increased on completion of the project to 
'reflect the non-recourse nature of the loan thereafter. Initially, 
the differential here was quite substantial. Tricentrol, for example, 
was able to borrow at a spread .. of H% over LIBoR while the loan 
carried a government .guarantee, but when this was released the 
spread increased to 2~%4. Banks suggested that nowadays the increased 
spread might only be·!% although they emphasised that generalisation 
here is impossible. 
Another consideration is the differential between the spread on a 
Table 10.1 
FIELO 
PIPER FIELD 
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ROYALTY PAYMENTS 
SPONSOR 
THOMSON 
SCOTTISH 
ASSOCIATES 
CLAYMORE FIELO THOMSON 
SCOTTISH 
ASSOCIATES 
HEATHER FIELO NORWEGIAN 
OIL ONC 
MARGIN OVER 
LIBOR(%) ROYALTY 
1~% 2!% royalty on Thomson's 
share of the first 642 
million barrels. 
2% 
N/A 
3% royalty on Thomson's 
share of Claymore gross 
revenues for life of 
field plus 2~% royalty 
on Thomson's share of 
Piper oil after the 
first 642 million barrels. 
2~% royalty on ONC's 
share of production. 
Source: Based on Wilson Committee "Financing North Sea Oil" 
Research Report No. 2, pp.20-23. 
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corporate loan and the spread on a project loan to the .same 
company. Again generalisation was found to be impossible. The 
differential was said to depend particularly on the strength of the 
corporate borrower and the amount of risk shouldered by banks. 
Some banks suggested that for a major company the differential might 
be as· low as !%. while for smaller companies which were unable to 
borrow on a corporate basis it could be 2%5. 
As far as fee income is concerned. no information is ever published 
and banks were unwilling to give any generalisations regarding the 
possible level of fees. beyond saying that they would be slightly 
higher than on a straightforward ... loan in view of the additional 
work involved in arranging the loan. 
In three North Sea oil projects the lenders have also taken a royalty 
payment in addition to the normal lending margin. Details of these 
are summarised in Table 10.1. These royalties were apparently given 
to compensate the banks for taking what approached equity risks (although 
banks were at pains to emphasise that they were not taking actual equity 
risks in these deals). 
Deverell(5) has also pointed out that there is a clear limit to the 
amount of risk banks are willing to take even in return for a royalty. 
He mentioned three other cases in which royalties were paid -
Tricentrol/Thistle field. Ranger/Ninian field. and LASMO/Ninian field -
but in which banks were not prepared to take the risks to get these 
royalties. The Tricentrol loan was guaranteed by the Government, 
Chevron guaranteed the Ranger loan. and the LASMO finance was raised 
on the stock market. 
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Generally banks believed that it was acceptable to take a royalty 
in return for shouldering high risks, provided that such situations 
did not constitute a significant part of their portfolio. 
Interestingly however, two' banks stated that it was their bank's 
policy not to iend.in situations which involved the payment of a 
royalty. At the same time most banks believed that it was now rare 
for royalties to be paid, particularly in view of the intense 
competition for lead management positions. 
10.5 PROFITABILITY OF PROJECT FINANCING 
Clearly the question of profitability can be examined on both an 
ex ante and an ex post basis. It·can also be examined on a 'gross' 
or 'net' profit basis (where the net profitability takes into account 
the costs of arranging and/or assessing the loan). Most banks agreed 
that, ex post, previous project financing business had been more 
profitable than traditional lending, as they have been able to obtain 
higher spreads and yet have lost no money. The loans involving the 
payment of royalties had been particularly profitable, given the vast 
increase in oil prices. However, most banks thought that the 
profi tability of proj ect financing had fallen over the years, given 
the increased competition in the market. 
As regards the question of whether banks were taking adequate account 
of the risks when pricing, opinion was··divided. Several banks believed 
that they were taking adequate account of the risks, although others 
thought that, especially recently, some loans had been made at very 
fine margins in relation to the potential risk. A distinction was, 
however, drawn between the profitability of lending and the profitability 
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of lead managing. It was felt that while the spread earned by 
lenders was barely acceptable, lead managers were in a better 
position since they receive management fees in addition to the 
spread, which accounts for the intense competition for lead 
management mandates. 
The remuneration lead managers receive is not however, needed solely 
to cover risks; there are also other costs involved in arranging 
·loans. Banks appeared to be less certain if lead managing project 
loans was more profitable than traditional activities, if account 
is taken of the time and effort expended in arranging such complex 
loans. Moreover it is not only the successful loans which require time 
to arrange; in addition considerable time is wasted preparing un-
successful bids for lead management and advisory positions. 
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NOTES TD.CHAPTER 10 
1. See chapter 11. Export credit interest rates are based on 
DECD Consensus guidelines and are usually set at the minimum 
rate permitted under these guidelines. 
2. Clearly since the lending spread is a major element in the 
profitability of a deal, if the loan is repaid 3 years earlier 
than planned, banks.will earn less than if the loan had run 
until the planned maturity. 
·,3. e.g. GDDDMAN, L.S. FRBNY.Ouarterly Review, Summer, 1980, 
FEDER, G. & JUST, R.E., European Economic Review, May, 1977, 
p.233, FLEMING, A.E., HOWSDN, S.K., BEOB, September, 1980. 
4. See Appendix VII for details of t~is loan. 
5. Although it may appear strange to relate the spread on a limited 
recourse loan to the standing of the project sponsor, this is in 
fact valid since the standing of the sponsor is thought to 
influence the overall riskiness of the project. 
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CHAPTER 11 
SOURCES OF FINANCE 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines some of the issues involved in financing 
the projects. including the objectives in structuring 
the finance, the decision on how much to lend to a project, and the 
alternative sourceS of finance available. 
11.2 FINANCING OBJECTIVES 
." -" This Section examines some of the financing objectives mentioned in 
the literature. Then. Section 11.4 examines the extent to which various 
sources of finance can achieve these objectives. 
~'rrv"",c./"; 
Fowler (1) mentioned the following objectives when structuring a 
" 
project financing plan: 
1. Maximise long-term debt 
Fowler suggested that "payment of relatively higher interest 
rates as a trade-off for achieving long-term financing (10 to 
20 years) can enhance the viability and cash flow rate of return 
(assuming a high discount factor) of a given project". This 
view is supported by Blackwell (2). In other words. the sponsor 
can benefit by maximising the maturity of the loans even if it 
means conceding a higher interest rate. 
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2. Maximise fixed rate financing 
The argument here is that if interest rates are fixed. the 
_t., impact of volatile interest rates on the project viability 
3. 
can be avoided. What Fowler does not say. however. is whether 
it is still appropriate to aim for fixed rate financing if 
long-term fixed interest rates are extremely high. It is 
likely in these situations that the borrower would prefer 
variable rate finance to minimise the interest cost and take 
advantage of any fall in interest rates. (unless the fixed rate 
finance is also at concessional rates) . 
Minimise refinancing risk . .- ,. 
This risk arises .,hen project cash flow is inadequate to service 
the loan over its planned maturity. In order to repay this loan 
it may therefore be necessary to re-finance (i.e. raise a new 
loan). and the risk is that at the time the loan is refinanced 
the market may be unfavourable. 
To these objectives may be added a fourth which became apparent 
from interviews] namely. to maximise the amount of finance granted 
, on concessional terms. 
11.3 DEBT/EQUITY MIX 
As well as deciding the type of debt finance to be raised. it is also 
necessary to determine the total amount that can viably be provided by 
debt finance; and the' amount that .,i11 have to be provided 'in the forn 
of equity. This is of course only relevant when the sponsor is seeking 
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1 to maximise the use of debt finance • and it was pointed out that in 
some cases the sponsor may be willing' to provide more in the form of 
equity than lenders would have required. 
Two possible approaches to. determining the debt/equity mix were found 
during the research: one based on the balance sheet. and the other on 
cash flow. These were respectively: 
1. Debt/equity ratio 
2. Coverage ratio 
11.3.1 Debt/Equity Ratio 
-. 
It appeared from interviews that the debt/equity ratio is not used to 
determine the maximum borrowing capacity of the project. and for two 
reasons. Firstly. as Yassukovich (3) argued: 
"There is no precise answer that can be given or 
standard guidelines to follow because of the many 
variables that must be analyses by the lenders before 
a debt/equity ratio can be established". 
In particular the two factors mentioned in Section 8.3 - the riskiness 
of the project. and the extent to which the sponsor is financially 
committed to the success of the project via guarantees - were found 
·to be particularly important. 
At the same time a minority of banks did suggest that. as a rule of thumb. 
they would like to see approximately 25% of the expected cost financed 
by equity. 
Secondly. several banks suggested that the debt/equity ratio was not. 
in fact. relevant when assessing the maximum borrowing capacity of 
the project and that what matt~red was the ability of project cash 
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flow to service the debt with an adequate safety margin. They 
therefore. saw the coverage ratio as the primary technique is assess~ 
ing borrowing capacity. 
11.3.2. Coverage Ratios 
Castle (4) mentioned three main types of coverage test that may be 
used: 
(i) Annual Coverage - This measures the ability of the project to 
cover the required loan repayments in each year. It is computed 
by dividing net cash flow each year by the amount of the required 
loan repayment in that year •.. Net cash flow is usually defined 
as gross revenue less royalties. operating costs. taxation and 
interest. 
(11) Average Coverage of the Debt Service - This shows the average 
coverage over the life of the loans and is arrived at by 
averaging the annual coverage ratios. 
(iii) Life of the Reserve Coverage - This is clearly.only relevant 
in extractive ventures. The usual cri ter;cq according to 
Castle. is that at the time the loan is projected to be finally 
repai~ at least half of the reserves and half of expected net 
revenue still remain. 
Ross (5). mentioned two other criteria .for determining the maximum loan 
amount using a net present value calculation. 
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The first method is to calculate the,present value ,of net cash inflows 
after taxes and royalties. but before interest. The maximum loan 
value is then say. 50%. of this amount. 
The second alternative suggested by Ross is to calculate the present 
value of future net cash flows that will be generated in the period 
until half of the recoverable reserves have been extracted. The maximum 
loan amount is then equal to the present value of cash flows so 
calculated. (See Appendix III for numerical examples of the five 
alternative coverage ratios mentioned above.) 
Banks interviewed in the U.K. were found to use either the annual 
coverage method mentioned by Castle or the first present value coverage 
mentioned by Ross. or both. It was said that coverage ratios calculated 
in relation to th'e life of reserves were not appropriate. particularly in 
the U.K. North Sea. The reason is that as a result of the North Sea tax 
regim~ net cash flow is highly concentrated in the early years of the 
project. Therefore. by the time say. half the reserves have been 
extracted very little net cash flow \'lQuld be available to service borrowing. 
When performing the present value coverage test banks used a purely 
arbitrary discount factor ranging between 10-15% and excluded the interest 
charge from net cash, flow. The question of discount factors was examined 
in section 7.4.2 where it was concluded that there is no superior 
alternative to the use of an arbitrary rate. As regards excluding the 
interest charge. the rationale is that this is effectively taken into 
account in the discounting process. 
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Banks had no rules of thumb on the coverage factor to be used in 
both the annual and present value coverage tests. The coverage 
required will depend on the riskiness of the. 
project and the amount of credit support behind the ·project. A 
typical figure mentioned for both coverage ratios was 2 : 1 although 
banks ·said that if the project was relatively risk free, the coverage 
might be as low as 1.5.: 1, while in more risky projects it could be 
as high as 3 : 1 or more,b~ itwas suggested that competitive pressures 
are forcing banks to accept reduced amounts of coverage. 
It should be clear that there is no real theoretical rationale for 
comparing the present value of future cashflows, discounted at some 
arbitrary rate, with the amount of the loan, but banks did think that, 
regardless of the theoretical rationale, the present value coverage 
gave them a feel for the safety of the loan. Many banks used 
both the present value and annual coverage tests. It appeared that 
the annual coverage was considered useful in determining the 
required maturity of the loans and in identifying problem years, where 
there was a low cash flow coverage. When using the annual coverage 
banks do adopt some idea of averaging, though the average is not 
actually calculated and banks said that they would not be particularly 
worried if one year's coverage ratio ~Jas belm, the target level. 
As was mentioned in Section 8.3 present value coverage tests were 
found to have been included in a few loan agreements to ensure that 
a certain minimum coverage ratio is maintained through the life of 
the loan. 
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11.4 SOURCES OF FINANCE 
This Section reviews the various sources of funds used to finance 
the capital cost of projects that"were mentioned in the literature 
on project finance '2". This Section can only give a very brief 
outline of these sources and their terms, and it concentrates mainly 
on eurocurrency and expoct credits. This is because, although much 
is written about devising an optimal financial package comprising 
multiple sources of finance, the two main sources were found to be 
eurocurrency loans and export credits. Moreover, in most of the 
project financings referred to in this thesis, the main source of 
external finance was eurocurrency loans. 
The following sources of finance are at least theoretically available 
for project financing: 
1. Export credits 
2. Eurocurrency loans 
3. Euro-bonds 
4. Equity 
5. International Agencies 
6. Advance Payments 
7. Leasing 
11.4.1 Export Credits 
Most developed countries now have some kind of export assistance 
agency. Among the more well" known may be listed: 
" 
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- Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) U.K. 
- Export Import Bank (EXIM Bank) U.S.A. 
- Export Development Corporation (EDC) Canada 
- Compagnie Francaise d' Assurance pour le Commerce .. France 
Exterieur (COFACE) 
- Hermese Kreditirersicherungs A.G •. (Hermese) W. Germany 
A detailed review of the facilities offered by these different 
institutions and the use made of them in project financing is clearly 
3' 
not possible in this thesis Some specific points pertaining to 
project financing are made however. 
Most merchant banks (U.K. and U.S.) interviewed claimed a major role 
in coordinating the supply of export credits from many different 
countries. They saw the maximisation of export credits as a first 
priority in any project financing plan. In many banks the main 
emphasis was on U.K. export credits (ECGO) although most banks claimed 
to coordinate multinational sources. It was pointed out. however. 
that the range of countries covered will vary from bank to bank in 
view of the fact that it is usually necessary to have a foreign 
subsidiary in the relevant country. 
Banks suggested that where export credits are used in project financing 
4 
they are buyer credits rather than supplier credits 
Export credits do have the advantage of being a relatively cheap 
source of finance and the interest rate is fixed from the outset. 
The terms are regulated by an 'Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially 
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5 Supported Export Credit' signed py OECD member countries. ,he current 
.; 
terms under this 'Consensus Agreement' are given in Table 11 •. 1. 
TABLE 11.1 
INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS GUIDELINES 
Importing Country 
'Relatively 
Rich' 
'Intermediate '. . 'Relati vely 
Poor' 
Maximum credit period (years) 10 
Minimum interest rates for: 
- credits between 2-5 yrs. (%) 8.5 8.0 7.5 
- credits over 5 yrs. to 8~ yrs. _ . 
(%1 8.75 8.5 7.75 
- credits over 8! years (%1 7.75 
SOURCE: Based on information in Midland Bank Review Autumn 1980, p.25. 
Banks said that interest rates are usually set at the minimum permitted 
under the Agreement. which means that there is considerable advantage 
for the borrower in maximising this relatively cheap source of finance. 
Leeper (6) reported in 1979 that ECGD had guaranteed certain export 
credits for non-recourse project financings - in particular a 
$390 million loan to Kowloon Electricity Supply Company for a power 
. station in Hong Kong •.. This was seen as a novel trend since previously, 
even ~Jhen financing projects, ECGD had always required a guarantee 
from either the sponsor, the host government or a bank.in that country. 
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In fact this trend does not appear .to have developed and ban ks 
suggested that ECGO was now less prepared .to undertake a detailed 
examination of the viability of .the project. in view of the time it 
takes. and will generally require a guarantee from the sponsor or 
government etc. The attitude of most other export credit agencies 
towards guaranteeing non-recourse loans was thought to be similar to 
ECGO's. 
Banks felt that export credit lending was good business for them. 
In the case. of ECGO export credits. for example. they recieve a 100% 
unconditional guarantee from ECGO in the event of default by the 
borrower for any reason. political or commercial. This means that 
.- . 
lenders have no exposure to project risks; the only risk taken is a 
U.K. government credit .risk. Moreover. ECGO compensates the banks 
for the fact that the loans are at low fixed rates by making up the 
return banks receive to the equivalent of 11% over sterling LIBOR. 
This spread compares favourably.with that available on eurocurrency 
loans. particularly if one takes into account the degree of risk. 
11.4.2 Eurocurrency Loans 
The bulk of ·finance r.aised for the publicised project financings 
encountered during the course of this research involved eurocurrency 
credi ts. 
The process involved in arranging eurocurrency loans has been dealt 
with in Chapter 4 and the pricing arrangements in Chapter 10. It is 
not proposed to examine the covenants used in eurocurrency.project 
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6 loans , but two particular issues were raised during the course of 
interviews. These related to the maturity of.· loans and the 
arrangements for repayment. 
The first question was whether the maturities on eurocurrency loans 
were sufficiently long _ ' to enable them to be repaid from project 
cash flow. Levine (7), for example, suggested in 1976 that: 
" ••••••• if the Euromarket requires repayments of its 
loans within its medium-term framework, which in most 
cases is less than the payback period of a development 
project, the market must look elsewhere than to the 
project itself as a source of repayment". 
Most banks interviewed, felt in fact, that maturities were sufficiently 
.. -" 
long for loans to be repaid from project cash flow. Although banks 
were again reluctant to generalise, they stated that a project finance 
7 loan might have a planned maturity of up to 12 years In oil projects, 
in fact, the problem has been that loans have been repaid faster than 
expected, while even in mining projects banks suggested that maturities 
should be long enough. It was pointed out that borrowers are looking 
for relatively high IRR's8 and, given that the project has achieved 
this hurdle rate, large cash flows must be expected 'relatively early 
in the life of the project. Banks thought it was therefore, only a 
question of ensuring that they obtained a large share of these cash 
flows when they commenced. It was also felt that if a project needed 
more than 12 years to repay, it was probably suspect. 
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Another issue that was raised related to the maturities available 
on project loans as compared to corporate loans, since it has been 
suggested'S that longer maturities are available on project loans 
than on general purpose loans to the same company. 
Banks were divided on this question. Some thought that maturities 
would be longer, while others thought they would be about the same. 
Still others said that in many cases a project would not require the 
maximum maturity that was available anyway. 
The second main issue on eurocurrency loans that was examined concerned 
the arrangements for loan repayment. Again, these were 
found to vary from prcject to project, but the following are some of 
the main ways in which the repayment schedule has been set. 
Firstly, the repayment schedule may be fixed at the outset and be 
either in the form of equal quarterly or semi-annual instalments, or 
with the schedule moulded to the cash flow, profile of the project. 
It is apparently rare to have such a fixed schedule, ·and banks did 
not think it was sufficiently flexible for project financing in view 
of the, risk, of interruptions in production or fluctuations in cash 
10 
flow They said that their aim was to avoid an 'event of default' 
11 
under the loan agreement and continual renegotiation of the loan. 
It is, however, usual to have a 'target' repayment schedule specified 
in the loan agreement which would be achievable if everything 
went according to plan, and which will ensure that the loan is repaid 
by the planned maturity. Usually however. some flexibility is built 
in. This may simply be an ability to defer repayment for a maximum 
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period of time. after which repayment must be made at a faster rate 
12 to ensure that the loan is fully repaid by the planned maturity 
Alternatively. the repayment schedule can be linked to the actual cash 
flow. This is usually achieved by dedicating a specified percentage 
of cash flow to repayment of the loan. This dedicated percentage will 
be set- so as to ensure that. if the 'best estimate' cash flow occurs. 
the loan will be repaid according to the planned schedule. If cash 
~low is above this expected level. then the loan will be repaid faster 
than planned. Generally. any excess of dedicated cash flow over 
planned repayment is applied in repayment of the final instalment of 
the loan and so on. thus shortening the life of the loan. If the 
dedicated cash flow is insufficient to meet planned repayments. then 
-
the dedicated percentage will be increased to 100% of available cash 
flow. If this is still insufficient then the loan will be repaid less 
quickly than planned. 
The definition of cash flow used is clearly important. and banks were 
found to use two general definitions - one termed 'gross' cash flow. 
and defined as revenues less royalties; and the other termed 'net' 
cash flow (gross cash flow less operating costs and tax). Basing the 
dedicated percentage on gross cash flow was said to be advantageous 
since it enables the banks to avoid fiscal and operating costs risks. 
Provided there is sufficient gross revenue to meet the target repayments 
the lenders will be repaid. irrespective of whether the project faces 
a net cash deficit as a result of increases in tax or operating costs. 
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11.4.3 Eurobond· 
The Eurobond market appears to be rarely used in.project financing. 
As Yassukovich (( 3) P .151. suggested "the Eurobond is usually confined 
to standard corporate or government obligations because of the lack 
of interest by investors in .start-up or developing projects (pipe-
lines ·are the exception)". Indeed. the only known use of the Euro-
bond market for what we have defined as project financing was a OM 100 
million bond issue for Norpipe secured by a throughput agreement. 
and used to finance the Ekofisk pipelines. 
The reason is apparently that bond investors are usually not prepared 
to undertake a detailed evaluation .of projects or shoulder project 
risks. They prefer first class credit risks. Norpipe was able to 
use Eurobonds because a group of major oil companies were guaranteeing 
the obligations of their subsidiaries under the throughput agreement 13 
Another problem is that drawdown of the bonds cannot be matched to 
expenditure on the project; bond proceeds become avai.lable immediately 
on issue. Yassukovich therefore suggestld that Eurobonds may be 
appropriate to refinance project debt at a later date. although no 
example was found where this had occurred. 
11.4.4 Equity 
The question of the appropriate debt/equity ratio .has already been 
examined in Section 11.2.1. where it was suggested that equity will 
be required to assure the sponsor's commitment to the success or 
failure of the project. unless this is provided indirectly by a 
guarantee. 
\ -
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It should be stressed that this 'equity' is not necessarily funds 
raised on the stqck marketJrather it is taken to mean funds injected 
by the project sponsor, It may well be that the project sponsor has, 
in· fact, borrowed this money as well, though on·a full corporate 
credi t basis. 
Rendell (8) also suggested that lenders should require that all equity 
be paid in before project loans are available, and this was found to 
be common practice in the projects studied. 
11.4.5 International Agencies 
There are several financial institutions which have the objective of 
providing financial assistance for projects, . usually in less deve loped 
countries. Among these may be listed: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and its affiliate th·e 
International Finance Corporation; various Regional Development Banks 
(e.g. Inter-American Development Bank), and the European Investment 
Bank. These institutions are frequently mentioned as a source of 
14 finance for projects but it appeared that they are used relatively 
infrequently in project financing. 
Borrowing from:.these agancies does have certain advantages, particularly 
in respect of interest rate and maturity. Loans are usually made at 
fixed rates and these rates may also be lower than normal commercial 
rates. Similarly maturi ties tend to be longer than are obtainable 
from commercial banks. Support from the World Bank etc. may also be 
useful if a large amount of infrastructure is required for the project. 
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Beim (9) for example, referred .to a bauxite project in Guinea where 
the World Bank made loans to the GUine.an government to construct a 
railroad and a port. This infrastructure.was designed solely to 
serve the mining project and the project itself was separately 
financed by commercial banks. Finally, banks felt that the involve-
ment of the Worl·d Bank gave a project an important 'seal of approval' 
in view of the detailed evaluations undertaken by the Bank, and also 
reduced the political risk. 
Certain disadvantages of World Bank involvement were also mentioned 
in interviews, ho.Jever. Firstly. the Bank was said to be very 
bureaucratic and to take a long time to perform its own feasibility 
.-- .-
studies, which could cause delays. Secondly, the World Bank requires 
that construction be put out to international .tender which again takes 
a considerable time. Thirdly, they usually require a host government 
guarantee, and finally, the amounts lent are usually relatively small 
(their main function being to act as a catalyst for other funds). 
11.4.6 Advance Payments 
An advance payment is basically.a loan made by a potential purchaser 
of the project's outpu~ in return .for guaranteed access to such output 
when the project is complete. They appear to have been a major source 
of finance in the U.S. oil, gas and coal industries 15 
Most banks in the U.K. had never seen advance .payments used as a 
source of finance in project financing and suggested that it is 
only in exceptional cases, .where purchasers are desperate for supplies 
that purchasers .. would be willing to enter into such arrangements. 
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11.4.7 Leasing 
Leasing is also apparently used quite frequently in the U.S.A. as 
a source of finance for projects • Nevi tt's book on Project Financing (10) 
for example, discussed various leasing arrangements in some. depth. 
Leasing does not. however. appear to be widely used in project 
financIng arranged from the U.K. The problem does not appear to be 
the inability to lease large assets.- a catalytic cracking unit costing 
£100 million was leased to Murco Petroleum Ltd in 197916 The 
Leasing Digest (11) also reported that in West Germany a number of 
oxygen plants have been financed by way of leases supported by long-
term sales contracts; and the Murco catalytic cracking unit was also 
partly secured by the assignment Qf.'a' put or pay' processing agreement. 
both of which are typical project financing obligations. 
When asked why leasing appears to have been so little used in project 
financing. banks suggested the following reasons. Firstly. 
in the North Sea, the Oil Taxation Act 1975 treats leasing dis-
advantageously in comparison with other forms of borrowing 17 
Moreover. 'American 'banks have been discouraged from 
leasing by an IRS ruling that· North Sea platforms are fixtures. Their U.S. 
parents are therefore unable to -benefi t from.'the· usual tax,'allowances given 
to lessors. The second reason given by banks waS that with projects 
located outside the U.K. it would be necessary to use 'export' or 
'cross-border' leasing. of which banks have little experience at 
present. Thirdly. since ownership of the assets vests in the lessors 
leasing is only appropriate when there is only one sponsor. or where 
a consortium wish to raise joint finance. 
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11.5 STRUCTURING THE FINANCE 
Anderson . (12) suggested that: 
"One of the recent keynotes of project financing has been 
the creative approaches which have been taken to package 
credi ts to meet particular needs". 
Similar mention of this 'packaging' of credits has been made by some 
U.K. authors. Bulfield (13), for example, suggested that: 
"By using .computer programs, numerous alternatives can be 
run, using 'model' structures. Comparisons can be made 
between various types of financing and between sources 
(e.g. ECGO versus Ex-Im). The aim, again, is to find the 
structure which maximises returns to the sponsor ••••• ". 
In fact, it appeared from interviews, and from the project financings 
mentioned by banks, that it is relatively rare to be faced with a choice _. 
between multiple sources of finance. In many cases the only source of 
project finance was eurocurrency loans. Moreover, when export credits 
were an option, several banks suggested that the choice between the 
various agencies had already been determined by the procurement decision. 
It also became apparent during the course of interviews that clear 
differences existed between banks regarding the emphasis given to the 
'packaging' of finance. Generally, merchant banks saw 'packaging' as 
an important aspect of project financing activities, whereas commercial 
. banks appeared to concentrate primarily on eurocurrency loans. This is 
clearly related to the differing roles adopted: with merchant banks 
acting primarily as advisors, and commercial banks acting. as lead 
managers of eurocurrency loans. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 
1. It would seem a priori reasonable that borrowers should seek 
to maximise the project gearing in order to maximise the return 
on equity - see BULFIELO, P.W. (13) pp.10-11 for an elaboration 
of this point. 
2. See for example: FOWLER (1) and BLACKWELL (2). 
3. But for a useful summary see "Midland Bank Review", Autumn 1980, 
pp.20-29. The Banker Research Unit also undertakes a regular 
survey of export credit terms. 
_ ... 
4. Buyer credits involve a loan made by banks to the purchaser (i.e. 
importer) of the equipment. The bank's loan is guaranteed by the 
export credit agency. Supplier credits involve a loan made to 
the supplier (i.e. exporter). 
5. At the time of writing moves are in progress to bring export 
credit rates more in line with market rates. 
6. See wood, P. "Law and Practice of International Finance" 
Chapter 6 and Appendix, and OAVIES, R.G. Energy Law Seminar, 
. Cambridge, 1979, for details. 
7. The interviews were conducted during the second half of 1980 at 
a time of relatively easy terms. At times of a 'lenders market' 
the maturities available are likely to be shorter. Note also that 
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NOTES (continued) 
the planned maturity may either be longer or shorter than the 
actual maturity depending on whether repayment is deferred or 
prepaid. The maturity is likely to be a function of both the 
project and the country in which it is located. 
l 
B. 25% was a frequently quoted figure and the President of Gulf Oil 
is also reported (Sunday Times, 22 September 1974) as saying that 
a 25% after tax return is a minimum hurdle rate. 
9. See Anon "It Is OK If You Show a Project" Euromoney April 1977, p.116. 
_. 
10. The only exception to this was found to be certain pipeline 
financings supported by 'put or pay' throughput agreements 
which required tariff payments even if production was interrupted. 
11. Clearly inability to meet planned repayments will be one such 
. event which will put the loan into default. 
12. This was the case in BP's Forties loan. See Appendix IV. 
13. See oUTHIT, P. Energy Law Seminar, Cambridge, 1979 for details 
of this project. 
14. See for example BLACKWELL, W.A. Paper given at SPE-AIME Bth 
Hydrocarbon Economics and Evaluation Symposium, Dallas February 1979. 
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15. ROSE ANa COOPER World Oil, 1 February 1977, p.49, reported that 
in 1972, $689 million was provided by way of advance payments, 
while in 1975 the figure was $3.2 billion. 
16. For further details, ,see Leasing Digest January 1979, p.3-4, and 
Financial Times, 27 February 1979, p.21-24. 
17. For further details see Leasing Digest Special report "Leasing and 
the North Sea", March 1980, pp.21-2. 
:1 
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CHAPTER 12 
LOAN STRUCTURE AND THE OFF-BALANCE 
SHEET MOTIVE 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines some of the approaches to structuring a euro-
currency project loan and the effect of alternative arrangements on 
disclosure in the sponsor's balance sheet. It also assesses the 
evidence regarding the off balance sheet motive in project finance. 
--
12.2 LOAN STRUCTURE 
Both Oeverell.(1) and Bulfield (2) mentioned three main types of loan " 
structure: 
1. Straightforward loan 
2. Production repayment loan 
3. Forward purchase 
12.2.1 Straightforward loan 
Here the loan is made to a subsidiary of the project sponsor which 
has been specially incorporated to own the project's assets and 
raise finance for construction. Repayments can be arranged in any 
11.4.2 
of the ways mentioned .in SectiQ~.1 and the amount of recourse lenders 
have to the sponsor. will vary depending on the structure of the 
security. Clearly. since the borrowing company is a subsidiary of 
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the sponsor it will be consolidated in its balance sheet. although 
there appears to be no established method of disclosing these 
liabilities. For example. the two limited recourse loans to Thomsons 
and the two for Occidental Petroleum are all included in the respec-
tive group accounts under the heading 'long-term debt'. together with 
a note explaining the li~ited recourse nature of these loans. On 
the other hand. three limited recourse loans to Tricentrol and another 
to Petrofina are deducted from the fixed asset cost of the project. 
and only the net figure for fixed assets is shovln on the face of the 
balance sheet. This calculation is. however. shown in a note to the 
accounts. . The result is that a cursory examination of the face of 
the balance sheet may give a misleading Pictur~ and it is necessary 
.. -- . 
to study the notes and make appropriate adjustments. If. as several 
banks suggested. limited recourse loans are not a true liability of 
the sponsor it is necessary to ensure that the limited recourse loans 
and associated assets are excluded from calculations of gearing etc. 
On the other hand. if it is believed that. regardless of legal obliga-
tions. the sponsor would stand behind the project in the event of 
difficulties. then both the liability and related assets should be 
included in such calculations. 
12.2.2 Production Payment Loan 
Since this thesis is concerned with financing start-up projects. only 
the 'deVelopment production payment' is considered~ These originated 
in the 1920's as a means of financing the development of Texan oil 
fields. Production payments have. however. been applied to many types 
of extractive venture. including gas. iron ore and coal 3 
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FIGURE 12.1 PRODUCTION. PAYMENT LOAN 
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Williams and Meyers (3) defined a .production payment as: 
"A share of the oil produced from a described tract 
of land free of the costs of productio~ at the surface, 
terminating when a specified sum from the sale .ofsuch 
oil has been realized". 
The mechanics of a developmental production payment illustrated in 
Figure 12.1 are as follows: The project sponsor (opera.ting company) 
sells a production payment to a third party. This is usually a 
nominally capitalised company owned by the lenders. The lenders 
finance 100% of the cost of purchasing the production payment by a 
loan to the vehicle company, and so the sponsor indirectly receives 
-" the proceeds of the loan, which -it uses to develop the project. 
Repayment of the loan is made from dedicated cash flow of the project 
if and when it is .producing, and lenders typically have no recourse 
to the sponsor. As security, it is usual to give a mortgage of the 
field to the purchaser of the production payment and this, together 
with the production payment indenture is assigned to the banks. 
The result is that production payments appear on the sponsor's 
balance sheet as a 'deferred credit' or similar wording. The loan 
does not appear in long-term debt as it was made to a company owned 
by the lenders. The lenders will also ensure that the vehicle company 
does not have to be consolidated on their balance sheets by ensuring 
a wide spread of ownership. 
In the U.S. the granting of a production payment creates an interest 
4 in the land and in the oil in the ground In the U.K. and certain 
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FIGURE 12.2 FORWARD PURCHASE 
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other jurisdictions however. the use of production payments is more 
complicated. North Sea licence holders cannot acquire any title to 
the oil until it has actualfy been extracted4 and so cannot convey 
such an interest to the purchaser. Although it is legally possible 
to use a production payment in the North Sea. the preferred structure 
appears to be the forward purchase. and despite the fact that certain 
financings (notably the BP Forties loan) have been misleadingly termed 
'production payments'. an examination of their structure revealed . 
that they are in fact forward purchase agreements. 
12.2.3 5 Forward Purchase 
This structure has been used in .three publicised North Sea financings 
6 to date As can be seen from Figure 12.2. the structure of a 
forward purchase is very similar to that of a production payment. 
though there are legal differences. 
Again a vehicle company is incorporated. owned by the banks 7 • which 
borrows from them. The funds are used to make advance purchases of 
oil etc. from the project operator for delivery if and when production 
commences. When product:ion does begin the vehicle company receives 
the oil as it is produced but immediately re-sells it. (without taking 
physical delivery). usually to a company in the same group as the 
project operator. in order to produce cash with which to service the 
bank loan. Of course. this is only the bare structure of such a loan 
and there are endless permutations regarding the sharing of risks. 
The actual structure of the BP Forties field loan is shown in Appendix 
IV .• while in the ICI Ninian loan lenders had full recourse to ICI 
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in the event of the field failing .to produce· sufficient oil for any 
reason. 
As with the production paymen~ the loan itself is not consolidated 
into the project sponsor's group accounts as it was made to a company 
owned by the banks. What is consolidated is the advance payment for 
future oil and this is reported in the balance sheet as a "deferred 
liabili ty" or words to that effect. in a separate category from 
"long-term debt". 
12.3 'OFF BALANCE SHEET' FINANCE 
It was suggested in Section 3.3~1_that borrowers have sought to use 
project finance to achieve off balance sheet advantages in the form 
of an.increased borrowing capacity in excess of that normaily con-
sidered prudent by lenders and investors. 
It would seem that this advantage could be achieved for either of two 
reasons: 
1.. Because lenders. investors and analysts fail to recognise either 
the existence or full financial implications of such obligations. 
2.; Because analysts etc. believe that project finance obligations 
are different from normal corporate obligations. 
Although Wynant (5) recognised both possibilities. he appeared to 
concentrate on the first alternative. He conducted a questionnaire 
survey among credit officers and security analysts in the U.S. in 
which he investigated their treatment of production payments. non-
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capitalised leases and borrowings of unconsolidated investments. 
He concluded ((15) p.35) on the basis.of 56 completed questionnaires. 
that: 
"For the majority of the survey institutions, indirect 
liabilities as a whole are not systematically or formally 
included in their analysis of a company's financial 
position. A failure by credit and equity analysts to 
recognise fully the financial implications of such 
obligations because of either ineffective techniques, the 
novelty of such financing ·arrangements or inadequate 
disclosure· practices may enable a firm, through the use 
of project and indirect borrowings, to raise total debt 
capital in excess of the amounts available directly at 
the parent level." 
The implication here is of course. that as analysts and others become 
more aware of project finance techniques, the advantage of off-balance 
sheet finance will disappear. 
It can be argued, however, that project finance obligations are not 
equivalent to straight debt obligations for the sponsor and so are 
advantageous even if correctly interpreted by analysts. 
As Peppers and Wellman (6) pointed out: 
"A non-recourse production payment is not a true debt 
obligation for the borrowing firm. Default on a 
production payment will not result in bankruptcy for 
the borrower, assuming that assets pledged to the 
production payment represent less than 100% of the 
firm's total assets". 
-233-
The implication is that a non-or limited recourse loan (structured 
as a production payment or otherwisel should not be regarded as 
equivalent to long-term debt in calculating a company's gearing. To 
the extent that the project is self financing, and recourse to the 
sponsor is limited or non-existent, it would seem logical to exclude 
the project debt from calculations of the sponsor's interest coverage 
and gearing test~ as the lenders do not have a general claim against 
the corporate assets of the project sponsor. 
The evidence does suggest that at least some project financings are 
structured to achieve purely cosmetic off balance sheet advantages. 
Although it is clearly dangerous to be too dogmatic, it appeared 
that the three North Sea financings which used a forward purchase 
structure - BP, ICI and BNOC - were all primarily for off balance 
, 
sheet reasons. In the case of the BP loan only the oil in place risk 
in 
was shouldered by lenders, while/the other two financings, the loans 
were fully guaranteed by the parent company. 
It also seems likely that cosmetic off balance sheet motives prevail 
when an unconsolidated project company is supported by a 'strong' 
take or pay, throughput or processing agreement. The obligation of 
the parent company to repay is effectively as great as if it had given 
an unconditional guarantee, and yet the disclosure requirements for 
such 'commercial' contracts appeared to be less stringent than for a 
guarantee. An examination of the balance sheets of two companies 
known to have entered into throughput agreements revealed that they 
8 
were either apparently not shown at all or were reported in the 
notes to the balance sheet as a contingent liability, but without 
the potential liability being quantified (as is required for guaranteesl9 
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Having established that there is a potential for borrowing capacity 
to be increased. either because of cosmetic factors. or the limited 
recourse nature of the obligations. the next question that has to be 
explored is how analysts etc. treat project finance obligations when 
evaluating a company. If they are treated as normal corporate 
obligations. then. no borrowing capacity benefits would accrue. No 
analysts were approached during the research. but the banks interviewed 
were asked to give their opinions regarding the attitude-of ,analysts 
towards project finance obligations. Most banks believed that analysts 
were no longer fooled by 'cosmetic' off balance sheet arrangements. 
such as for"lard purchase agreements. where lenders had full recourse 
to the sponso~ and that these would be included in long-term debt 
when evaluating the company's gearing. It was thought. however. that 
off balance sheet advantages could still be obtained by using through-
put agreements etc. rather than guarantees. largely because of the 
. 
reduced disclosure requirements. 
As regards limited or non-recourse finance supported by. say. a com-
• 
pletion guarantee. banks believed that until completio~ analysts would 
treat it as part of normal long-term debt. while after completion 
(i.e. once -it became ~on-recourse to the sponsor) it would be excluded 
from calculations. along with the fixed assets it financed. It was 
thought. however. that the actual treatment might depend on the 
individual circumstances. andin particular the amount of recourse 
lenders had to the project sponsor. 
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This view can. however. be contrasted with that of the U.S. Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. In December 1977 they issued Statement 
No. 19 (FASB 19) which required. inter alia. that production payments 
should be reported as ordinary debt. ·regardless of the degree of 
recourse which lenders have10 • If this can be taken to an indication 
of the attitude of accountants towards production payments (and 
presumably therefore. limited recourse finance in general). it would 
suggest that the borrowing capacity advantages of even non-cosmetic 
arrangements may be limited. 
The FASB has also recently issued an exposure draft of a proposed new 
standard which would increase the .. disclosure requirements for take or 
pay contracts. throughput agreements etc. The proposed standard (7) 
provided that " •.•. for such contingencies an enterprise should disclose 
the agregate commitment and the payments required in each of the next 
five years". When implemented. it is likely that many of the off balance 
sheet benefits of these obligations· which at present result from 
inadequate disclosure. will be lost. Banks felt. however. that it would 
be several years before an equivalent position was reached in most 
European countries. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 
1. The effect on the appearance of the balance sheet of these 
alternative methods of presentation can be .shown by the following 
simplified example involving a project loan of 300 to finance 
an oil field costing 400. 
AN OIL COMPANY 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 
ALTERNATIVE 1 
Current Assets 
Fixed Assets· 
Total Assets 
+ 
Long Term Debt 
Equity 
Notes 
500 
1500 
2000 
1000 
1000 
2000 
• including 400 relating 
to oil field 
+ including 300 of limited 
recourse loan 
Apparent Debt: Equity ratio 
."', .... = 1 : 1 
ALTERNATIVE 2 
Current Assets 500 
fixed Assets· 1200 
Total Assets 1700 
Long Term Debt 700 
Equity 1000 
1700 
·calculated as: 
• Ordinary fixed assets 1100 
Oil field cost 400 
less Loan 300 
100 
1200 
Apparent Debt: Equity ratio 
= 0.7 : 1 
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NOTES (continued) 
2. The other types of production payment are the 'reserved production 
payment and the carved out production payment. both of which are 
used with producing properties. 
3. See CASTLE. G.R. "An Overview of Project Financing for the 
Petroleum Industry" paper given at SPE-AIME Eighth Hydrocarbon 
Economics and Evaluation Symposium. Dallas February 1979. p.133. 
4. See LEWIS. G.M. (4) pp.2-3. 
5. See MARRIAGE. P. "International Business Lawyer" Vol. 5. 1977. 
pp.220-22. for a more detailed description. 
6. These were: - - BP Forties loan (see Appendix IV)' 
- ICI Ninian loans (see Wilson Committee 'The Financing 
of North Sea Oil' Research Report 
No. 2. p. 11 ) • 
,- BNOC loan (see Committee of Public Accounts, Eighth 
Report. Session 1977-8. House of Commons 
Paper No. 621). 
7. Or the vehicle company may be owned by a charitable trust which 
is owned by the lenders. as was the case in the BP loan (see 
Appendix IV). 
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NOTES [continued) 
6. No reference was found in the accounts of ENI [Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi - the Italian state oil company) to throughput 
agreements given by its subsidiaries in respect of the EKofisK 
and Trans-Tunisian pipeline loans. 
9. As an example of this, the following extract from the notes to 
• the 1979 accounts of Texaco Inc. illustrates the difference 
between the reporting of guarantees and other obligations: 
Note 10 Contingent Liabilities 
"The Company and its subsidiary companies were 
contingently liable in the amount of $21,000,000-
as guarantors on loans outstanding, principally of 
certain associated companies. Also, under long-term 
agreements with certain pipeline companies in which 
capi tal stocK interests are held, the Company and 
certain of its subsidiary companies guarantee specified 
revenue from product shipments through the pipelines 
and, in the event such companies are unable to meet debt 
obligations, funds may be advanced against future 
transportation charges". 
The note gees on to mention three otriel' projects - a deep water oil 
port; a Swedish refinery; and a U.K. catalytic cracKing unit - for 
which similar obligations exist. 
10. See PEPPERS and WELLMAN "World Oil" 1978, p.99. 
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PART III 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
CHAPTER 13 
FUTURE FOR--PROJECT FINANCING 
. -
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
This ,chapter examines the future for project financing in terms of the 
likely future growth in its use and possible developments in techniques. 
It also highlights some suggestions for future research in the area of 
lnternational banking and project financing. 
13.2 FUTURE DEMAND FOR FINANCE 
,- ' 
The future level of demand for project flnance is clearly dependent on 
the financing decisions of the petroleum industry, in particular. and the 
elements in this process are summarised in Figure 13.1: 
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Figure 13.1 SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS 
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The first element in Figure 13.1 is the financing requirement. of which 
the three most significant aspects are capital investments, dividends, 
and debt repayments. Forecasting the future level of capital investment 
is a particularly difficult task, depending as it does on such factors 
as the future growth in the world economy, energy.conservation measures, 
and trends in oil prices, (all of which are interrelated and affect the 
demand for oil and gas). Then there is the real cost of meeting this 
demand (which depends on such factors as the location of supplies and 
the extent of the use of costly sources such as LNG, and the extraction 
of oil from tar sands or shale). This will give a measure of capital 
requirements in real terms, and it is.then necessary to incorporate the 
effects of inflation in order to.arrive at the capital investment require-
ments in money terms. 
, 
Chase Manhattan produce regular forecasts of the capital investments 
and financing needs of the world petroleum industry, but unfortunately 
only superficial information is available on the most recent forecast. 
This suggested that total capital expenditure over the period 1980 to 
1990 will amount to $878 billion in the U.S. and about $600 billion in 
1 the rest of the world. In addition Chase assumed that dividends amount 
to 30% of net income and debt repayments to one sixth of the debt 
·outstanding in each year. This produced a total financial requirement 
of about $100 billion in 1980, rising to about $500 billion by 1990. 
Using unspecified assumptions regarding the amount of internal cash 
generation (historically about 70% of total sources of finance), the 
amount of new equity (which is likely to be small), and short term debt 
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finance. the Chase· forecast is that the .amount of new long term debt 
2 
required by the petroleum industry each year will be as follows • 
($ billion)· 1980 1985 1990 
U.S. petroleum industry 13 26 47 
Non U.S. industry 13 23 46 
Now much of this long term debt will be provided in the form of project 
finance? The Chase forecast does not attempt an assessment. and it 
proved impossible to determine the proportion of long term debt 
currently provided by project finance (see Section 3.4). The view of 
most bankers interviewed was. however. that an increasing proportion of 
..... " 
commercial bank loans would take the form of project finance in the 
future. particularly as the size of projects would continue to grm1 in 
relation to the resources of sponsor companies. 
Generally banks saw little difficulty in satisfying this demand. although 
two banks did suggest that very costly projects (particularly LNG). 
might cause capacity problems for lenders. given that they set exposure 
limits for particular countries. industries and borrowers. 
. 3 
Forecasts of future investment needs in the mining industries also 
indicate a continuing need for bank finance in the future. as well as 
a continuing use of project finance. The view of the banks interviewed 
was that their involvement in the mining industries would continue to 
be less important than that of the petroleum industry. although one banker 
suggested that the use of project financing techniques was likely to 
increase in the mining industries as petroleum companies (customary users 
of project finance). continued their diversification into mineral activities. 
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13.3 . FUTURE TRENDS IN TECHNIQUES 
Radetzki and Zorn (1) suggested in 1979 that ths·trend in mining 
project finance was away from limited recourse financings and towards 
more stringent completion guarantees etc. as well as towards greater 
equity contributions. It is not clear whether this was a general 
4 
comment or related to the practice in the U.S. • Certainly. interviews 
with banks in the U.K. and a study of several project financings 
suggested that in the U.K. in recent years the trend has been for banks 
to have less recourse to project sponsors. and also for the acceptable 
levels 'of cash flow coverage to be reduced. The pressures of competition 
was the main reason given by banks to explain this trend. When asked 
what the likely future trend would··be. a majority of banks suggested 
that banks were likely to shoulder even more of the project risks in. 
the future and have even less. recourse to project sponsors. It was also 
thought likely that the required levels of cash flow coverage would be 
further reduced. The three main reasons given to explain this trend 
were: 
1. Increasing experience in project financing and evaluation of risks. 
2. Pressure from borrowers as projects became larger in relation to 
their resources. 
3. Competitive pressures between banks. 
At the same time. however. the general feeling was that if there was 
a major default on a project loan the natural response of banks would 
be extreme conser'/atism and that. for a time at least. they would become 
extremely reluctant to shoulder project risks. 
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13.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of this research several un researched areas of 
international banking practice were discovered. In particular, the 
following. were though to be significant areas for further research: 
1 ) 
. 2) 
Country risk analysis some work has been undertaken to 
determine the best indicators· of economic (and to a less·er 
extent) political risk, although the debate is as yet unresolved. 
There would also seem to be a need for a survey of the current 
practices of U.K. based banks in analysing country risk as well 
as the related areas of setting country exposure limits and 
allocating loans to different ·countries (particularly when the 
loan involves, say, a debtor located in one country and a 
guarantor in another) • 
Organisational structure of lending function it became 
apparent during the course of the research that the project 
financing activities of different banks were organised in different 
ways. While a comparative study' of this may be too restrictive, 
a study of the lending function in different banks, covering the 
organisational structure and loan approval process and the 
possible impact of this on the lending decision, might usefully 
be undertaken. 
As regards further research on some of the specific aspects·of project 
financing, it is clear that many areas would merit a more rigorous 
approach. In particular the question of the riskiness of project 
financing and its profitability were areas in which conclusions were 
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particularly difficult. Problems are envisaged. at least in the 
near future. however. in obtaining a sufficiently large and homogeneous 
sample with which to test these issues. 
It might also be useful to explore the subject from the viewpoint of 
the borrower. examining in particular. their reasons for using project 
financing. as well as perhaps the reason given by other companies in the 
same industry for not using project finance. 
Another area in which conflicting views were found concerned the 
question of off balance sheet finance. A study of the ,practices of 
analysts and lenders' when evaluating the balance sheets of companies 
~' .. 
which have used project finance would also help to shed some light on 
the off balance sheet and borrowing capacity aspects of project financing. 
Finally. it is ~hought that the preparation of a few selected case. 
studies could help an understanding of the complexities of the subject. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 
1. Given in EMERSON. J .0. "Financing the World Petroleum Industry" 
a report to BIAC Energy & Raw Materials Committee. September 1980. 
This is based on an estimated inflation rate of 8.7% per year 
from 1980-85 and 8.1% per year from 1985-90. 
2. These figures were given by ADAMSDN, J.A. "North Sea Financing -
A Commercial Banker's View", paper given at Energy Law Seminar, 
Cambridge 1979, p.6. but it is known that they relate to the 
same forecast. 
3. See, for example, MIKESELL, R.F. Mining Congress Journal, July 
1978, and RADETZKI, M. & ZDRN,. S. "Financing Mining Projects in 
Developing Countries". 
4. WYNANT, L. "A Study of Financial Strategies for Large-Scale 
Mining Ventures" (DBA) Harvard University 1976 p.V-10, also 
expressed ·a similar view regarding project financing in the U.S • 
• 
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"Financing Mining Projects in Developing 
Countries" Mining Journal Books 1979. p.85. 
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APPENDIX I LIST OF BANKS INTERVIEWED 
CLEARING BANKS 
Bank of Scotland (International Division) 
Barclays Bank International Ltd. 
Lloyds Bank International Ltd. 
Midland Bank (International Division) 
National Westminster Bank (International Banking Division) 
U.K. MERCHANT BANKS 
Baring Brothers g Co. Ltd. 
Hill Samuel Project Finance Ltd. 
Kleinwort Benson Project Services Ltd. 
Lazard Brothers g Co. Ltd. 
Morgan Grenfell g Co. Ltd. 
J.H. Schroder Wagg g Co. Ltd. 
Standard Chartered Merchant Bank Ltd. 
S.G. Warburg g Co. Ltd. 
AMERICAN BANKS 
Amex Bank Ltd. 
Bank of America International Ltd. 
Bankers Trust Company 
Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. 
Chemical Bank 
Citibank N.A. 
Continental Bank 
Manufacturers Hanover Ltd. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 
Republic National Bank of Dallas 
OTHER BANKS 
Bank of Montreal 
European Banking Company 
International Energy Bank 
Royal Bank of Canada 
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APPENDIX II 
TYPE OF PROJECT WHERE PROJECT FINANCE HAS BEEN USED 
(1 ) Oil field development 
(2) Gas field development 
(3) Uranium mining and processing facility 
(4) Gas liquefaction plant (LNG plant) 
(5) Aluminium smelter 
[B} Gas transmission system [pipeline) 
(7) Oil transmission system 
(8) Nickel mining ,and processing facility 
(9) Electricity generating station 
(10) Petrochemical plant 
(11) Oil refinery 
(12) Oil transhipment facility [offshore'oil port) 
(13) Copper mining 
(14) Geothermal project 
(15) Coal mining 
[1B) Steelworks 
APPENDIX III 
YEAR 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
THEREAFTER 
TOTAL 
ALTERNATIVE COVERAGE RATIOS 
HYPOTHETICAL PRODUCTIONS AND CASH FLOW SCHEDULE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
~ ',' .. OIL ,.,., GAS 
(Thousands (Millions Cash Cumulative Present Cumulative Target Annual 
of of Flow 
Barrels) Cubic Feet) ~OOO' s') 
Cash Value of Present Repayment Coverage 
7757, 
6291 
5007 
3980 
3188 
2640 
2285 
2033 
1866 
1656 
22041 
58684 
7563 
6134 
4882 
3880 
3109 
2574 
2228 
1982 
1761 
1615 
21490 
57218 
Flow Cash Flow Value Schedule 
(otooo' .. ) at 10% (~ooo''') (000' s) 
70447 70447 
57132 127579 
45472 173051 
36:145 . ,:).09196 
28953 238149 
23975 
20752 
18463 
16402 
15039 
200170 
532950 
262124 
282876 
301339 
317741 
332780 
532950 
, 
64043 
47217 
34164 
24688 
\ 17978 
13533 
10649 
8613 . 
6956 
5798 
32729 
$266368 
64043 
111260 
145424 
170112 
188090 
201623 
212272 
220885 
227841 
223639 
266368 
30,000 
20,000 
20,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
$100,000 
Source: Based on Castle G.R. Case II in "An Overview of Project Financing for the 
petroleum Industry". Given at SPE-AIME 8th Hydrocarbon Economics and 
Evaluation Symposium Dallas, February 1979. 
NOTG'· c 4SH p~ows C>c<-<-<-<. It'- Y~"I krV~. 
2.34 
2.85 
2.27 
3.61 
2.89 
2.40 
,!" 
lJ1 
'l' 
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APPENDIX III (continued) 
Coverage ratios 
~ 
1. Annual coverage - see column 8 calculated as --7-
2 •. Average coverage = 2.73. 
3. Life of reserve coverage - loan fully repaid in 1984 at which time 
more than half of the reserves and cash flows are still remaining. 
Therefore passes this test. 
4. Present value coverage - maximum loan amount given by 50% of total 
present value of n~t cash flow = $266.368 ~ 2 = $133.184.000. 
Actual loan is for $100m •• therefore it is within this coverage test. 
5. Present value life of reserve coverage: - cumulative present value 
to the point where half of cash flow and half of reserves are used 
up (ie. one fifth of the way through 1985 = $203.750.800 (which 
represents the maximum loan amount under this criteria). Since 
the actual loan is $100m. it is well cover~d. 
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APPENDIX IV 
British Petroleum Co. Ltd. Forties Field 
Technical details 
·Location 
Water depth 
Date discovered 
Original cost estimate 
Actual cost 
Financial arrangements 
Amount of loan 
Date of loan 
Lead managers 
Type of loan 
Loan terms 
- borrower 
- .maturity 
- interest rate 
- fees 
- repayment terms 
UK North Sea block 21/10 
348 - 402 feet 
October 1970 
$900m. 
$2680m. 
$468m. + £180m. 
1972 
Lazard Brothers; Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.; 
National Westminster Bank 
Forward oil purchase (see section 12.2.3) 
Norex Trading Ltd. (a company owned by 
the managing banks) 
9 years 
1~% over LIBOR rising to 1;% if not repaid 
by 1979. 
Not known 
Until end 1978 repayment only from cash 
flow from the field. If production is 
interrupted prior to end 1978 (subject to 
the presence of recoverable oil) repayment 
will be suspended. Repayment must be 
completed by end 1982 in all events unless 
there is insufficient oil in place. After 
1978, B.P. must make cash payments (up to 
the value of recoverable oil) to keep the 
repayment schedule if project cash flow is 
insufficient. 
Risk sharing 
Risk 
Completion 
Oil in place 
Recoverabili ty 
Operating 
Marketability 
Exchange rate 
Borne by 
BP/lenders 
Lenders 
BP 
BP 
BP 
BP 
Project Structure 
Development Ltd. 
livers oil 
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Comment 
Banks have limited risk of delay in 
repayment until end 1978. 
Estimates of 2 consultants were very close 
to BP's estimate and there was a good 
safety margin. 
BP guaranteed a minimum recovery factor of 
44% of oil in place 
Sales agreement between Norex and BP Trading 
BP Trading purchases the oil for the 
appropriate currencies to ensure that Norex 
faces no exchange risk. 
Ltd. 
Advances 
Under Forwar 
Oil Purchase 
Agreement 
Norex Trading Ltd. -------{ Kimberley Oil Co. Ltd.1 
Proceeds of L-______ ~_~~------------~ 
oil sale "".. ..... 
1. Norex Trading Ltd 
2. Kimberley Oil Co. 
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nominally capitalised funding vehicle owned 
by Kimberley Oil Co. 
borrows from banks and makes an advance 
payment to BP Oil Development Ltd. in return 
for an agreement to deliver oil produced from 
the Forties field. 
trustee of a charitable trust wholly owned 
by the lead managing banks. 
3. BP Oil Development Ltd. builds and operates the production 
4. BP Trading Ltd. 
facilities using the advance payment from 
Norex. 
ultimately owned by B.P. Co. Ltd. but Norex 
Trading holds 1 special share enabling it (and 
therefore the banks) to take control of the 
company in the event of default. 
purchases Forties oil from Norex in return for 
cash to service the loan. 
ultimateiy owned by BP Co. Ltd. 
Implications of the structure. 
1. Norex is not a subsidiary of BP and is not therefore 
consolidated in the group accounts. Norex's borrowing 
does not therefore appear on BP's balance sheet as long 
term debt. 
2. The advance payment to BP Oil Development is treated as 
deferred revenue and when consolidated in the BP group 
accounts is shown as "North Sea oil advance payments" 
under a .separate heading from long term debt. 
Security for the lending 
1. BP Co. Ltd. guarantee of everything.except the oil in 
place risk. 
2. Special share in BP Oil Development held by Norex enabling 
the banks to take over operation of the field. 
3. Debentures containing fixed and floating c~arge given by 
BP Oil Development to Norex, and by Norex to the Banks. 
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Apparent reasons for using project finance 
1. Ability to debt finance 100% of the expected cost •. 
2. Flexibility in draw down and repayment of loan to avoid 
adverse effect on corporate cash flow. 
3. Minimal impact on the ability of BP to raise funds to 
finance other activities (notably Trans Alaskan pipeline). 
Sources of Information 
1. Wilson Committee "Financing of North Sea Oil" Research 
Report No. "2. 
2. Argyle RES "Governmental Powers & Project Financing in 
the North Sea" Appendix II. 
3. Returns to Companies House of Norex Trading; Kimberley Oil 
Co •• BP Oil Development and BP Co. Ltd. 
4. Ladd. E.H. British Petroleum Co. Ltd. (D) and (E) - Case 
Studies Harvard Business School 1973. 
APPENDIX V 
Thomson Scottish Associates - Piper Field 
Technical details 
Location 
Date discovered 
Water depth 
Participating companies 
Financial arrangements 
UK North Sea Block 15/17 
January 1975 
475 feet 
Dccidental 
Getty 
36.5% (operator) 
23.5% 
Allied Chemical 20.0% 
Thomson 20.0% 
. Each participant made its own arrangements for finance. Thomson 
and Dccidental both used project finance. 
Amount;of loan 
Date of loan 
Lead managers 
Loan terms 
- borrower 
- maturity 
- interest 
- drawdown 
- repayment 
rate 
$100m. 
1974 
International Energy Bank and Republic 
National Bank of Dallas 
Thomson North Sea Ltd (TNS) 
9 years 
1~% over LIBOR plus royalty of 2~% of 
Thomson's share of the first 642m. barrels 
produced 
only permitted after Thomson had invested 
$20m. of equity 
from a varying dedicated percentage of 
gross cash flow. Percentage is determined 
annually .and is based on the relationship 
between the present value of future cash flOl'/ 
and the outstanding balance. Any excess of 
dedicated cash flow over the .scheduled repayment 
may be applied as a prepayment of the loan, 
but if not it must be retained. In the event 
of default, the banks can require the borrOl<er 
to pay back this excess cash flow (subsequently 
amended in 1978 so that only 25% of excess 
cash flow was subject to this ·c,lawback). 
Risk sharing 
Risk 
Cost overrun 
Completion 
Market 
Price 
Operating 
Reserve 
Political 
Comments 
Borne by 
Not known 
Banks 
Banks 
Banks 
Banks 
Not known 
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, Conunent 
relied on covenants given by Occidental 
in its own loan. 
market assured by firm sales contracts 
at market price. 
Occidental (the operator) was a well 
respected company. 
1. The loan was essentially non-recourse to TSA. but the value 
of any recourse would have been small given the small size 
of TSA at the time of the loan. 
2. The field was a particularly profitable one with comparatively 
low development costs. leaving a large coverage to absorb any 
problems. 
3. While Thomson had no experience of oil. the field was being 
developed by an experienced operator (Occidental) which was 
also borrowing on similar terms. 
Project structure 
Loan Banksr-------~~------~------~ 
Guarantee 
of TNS 
obligations 
Thornson 
Scottish 
Associates 
Thomson North Sea Ltd. 
Finance Share 
of Development Cost 
Share of Piper Field 
Sales contracts 
I 011 Buyers 
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Implications of the Structure 
1. TNS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Thomson Scottish 
Associates. 
2. The loan is shown as part of long term debt in the accounts 
of INS and the consolidated accounts of TSA (since a merger 
in 1978 it appears in the group accounts of International 
Thomson Organisation under long term debt). A note explains 
the limited recourse nature of the loan. 
Security for the lenders 
1. Fixed and floating charge over the interest of TNS in the 
Piper field licence ·and facilities and the excess cash flow 
subject to clawback. 
2. Special share in TNS giving banks the right to take control 
of TNS in the event of default. 
3. Guarantee of TNS obligations under the Piper loan by TSA. 
Apparent reasons for using project finance 
1. Ability to raise finance - the alternatives were either to 
farm out or to raise expensive new equity. 
2. Desire to shelter the rest of corporate assets from the effect 
of problems with the field. 
Sources of Information 
Wilson Committee "Financing of North Sea Oil" Research Report 
No. 2. Documents relating to the Proposals for the Merger of 
the Thomson Organisation Ltd. and the North Sea petroleum 
interests of Thomson Scottish Associates Ltd •• 1978. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Dccidental Petroleum Corporation Piper Field 
Technical details 
see Thomson case, Appendix V. 
Financial arrangements 
Amound of loan 
Date of loan 
Lead managers 
Loan terms 
.. borrower 
- maturity 
- interest rate 
- repayment 
Risk sharing 
Risk Shouldered 
Completion Occidental 
Cost overrun Occidental 
Marketabi 11 ty banks 
Reserve banks 
Operating not known 
Political Occidental 
by 
~ ] 
$150 
1974 
Republic National Bank of Dallas; 
International Energy Bank 
.. -" Piper Finance Ltd (a company owned by 
the managing banks). 
9 years 
1~% over LIBDR 
calculated with reference to production 
from the Piper field. 
Comment 
Completion guarantee from parent company 
guarantee from parent company in case of loss 
of licence or nationalisation. 
• 
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Project structure 
Loan l Banks L. Piper Finance 
. , Kepaymen" Ltd • 
Guarantee of Repayment 
Occidental Petroleum I 
(UK) Ltd. 
Working interest 
in licence 
Loan 
, Occidental of 
l'Repay- Britain Inc. 
. hases . 
Funds use 
to develo 
Piper Fie 
(a) Until Completion 
(b) On loss of licence 
m,"' "\ ~'"
oil at marke commitm '"",~o, 0'0'"' 
price 
1 but 
ctual 
ent 
or nationalisation 
>.I 
Occidental Occidental 
Petroleum International 
Corpn. 
1. Piper Finance Ltd - owned by the lead managing banks. 
Borrows from syndicate and on-lends to Occidental of 
Britain. 
2. Occidental of Britain Inc. - a U.S. incorporated subsidiary 
of Occidental Petroleum Corpn. 
3. Occidental Petroleum (UK) - joint holder of the production 
licence for Piper. Gave a working interest in the field 
to Occidental of Britain Inc. by which oBI bears all costs 
and receives all income. Piper Finance (and therefore the 
banks) holds a special share in Occidental Petroleum (UK). 
This arrangement was necessary because UK la'", required the 
holder of a production licence to be incorporated in the 
UK, while for US tax reasons the expenditure must be 
incurred by a US incorporated company. 
Security 
1. Guarantee of occidental Petroleum Corpn. 
(a) until completion. 
(b) in the event of nationalisation or loss of licence. 
2. Debenture incorporating a fixed and floating charge given by 
OBI to Piper Finance and by Piper Finance to the banks. 
3. Special share held by Piper Finance in occidental Petroleum (UK). 
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Sources of Information 
Companies House returns for: Occidental of Britain Incl 
Occidental Petroleum (UKll and Piper Finance Ltd . 
. -
APPENDIX VII 
Tricentrol Ltd. 
Technical details 
Location 
Date discovered 
Water depth 
Financial arrangements 
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Thistle Field 
UK North Sea blocks 211/18 and 211/19 
September 1972 and June 1974 
530 ft, 
Finance was arranged by participants independently. Only Tricentrol 
used project finance. Initially there were plans to arrange joint. 
finance but these collapsed because of political uncertainties. 
Background 
In 1974 Tricentrol's share capital was only £11.6m. It was able to 
meet initial development costs from corporate loans and cash flow, but 
it required substantially more to meet further costs. Borrowing on a 
corporate basis was impossible as it would have·made the gearing top 
heavy and so it was left with a choice between selling out, farming out 
or raising a non-recourse loan. The first two choices were undesirable 
and the third was difficult because of uncertainty over government policy. 
Tricentrol therefore approached the government in january 1975·for 
assistance in raising finance, on the basis that political uncertainties 
had meant that the change of a non-recourse loan had been lost. The 
result was a government guarantee. 
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First financing 
Borrower Tricentrol Thistle Development Ltd. (nO) 
Date 1976 
Amount £60m. 
Lead managers Barclays Merchant Bank: NM Rothschild & Sons 
Loan terms 
- maturity 4 years 
- interest rate while guaranteed 1k% over LIBOR 
when guarantee released 2~% over LIBOR 
- repayment by end 1980 
Option to convert to a production payment 
once certain production criteria were met. 
Security 
1. Debenture giving first fixed and floating charge over TTD's 
interest in the field. 
2. Guarantee of Department of Energy exp1r1ng at the latest end 
1978. In return the government received a special 5% royalty 
(in addition to the usual 12~% royalty). This royalty could 
increase should the cash flow fall short of target. 
3. Special share held by banks in TTD. 
Second financing 
Borrower Tricentrol Thistle Development Ltd. 
Amount £10m. 
Date April 1978 
Limited recourse loan, unguaranteed by the government: terms unknown. 
Third financing 
Borrower 
Amount 
Date 
Type of loan 
Loan terms 
- maturity 
- interest spread 
- repayment 
Security 
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Tricentral Thistle Development 
t60m. 
November 1976 
Limited recourse project refinancing. 
partly used to refinance some of the 
government guaranteed loan 
5 years 
2% over LIBDR until 31 March 1960 
thereafter 1;% 
final repayment due by end 1963. Loan 
is repayable only from the proceeds of 
production. 
1. Debenture - covered by the same debenture as the first 
financing but ranks before the guaranteed loan. 
2. Special share in TTD. 
Project Structure 
I Banks Loan ~ .- p a meQ1; -f'n 
I'OdUction 
Guarantee 
(First Financing 
only) 
H.M.G. 
Secretary of 
State for Energy 
, 
~ 
ITricentrol Ltd. I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Tricentrol Thistlel 
Development 
.~unds used 
Thistle Field I 
to develop Field 
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TTD is wholly owned by Tricentrol Ltd •• though the lenders hold one 
special share giving them control in the event of default. TTD is 
therefore consolidated in the Tricentrol group accounts. The loans 
are shown as a deduction from Tricentrol'sshare of the Thistle field 
assets to which they relate. Only the net figure for fixed assets is 
shown on the face of the balance sheet. Attention is drawn to this 
deduction by a note to the accounts. 
Sources of Information 
Wilson Committee Research Report No. 2. 
Companies House returns for Tricentrol Thistle Development 
and Tricentrol Ltd. 
--

